Mahdi Assadi
Abstract
IntroductionṢadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. On this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. They remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. ...
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IntroductionṢadrīan philosophy holds that all kinds of memory, as well as all kinds of perception (sensory, imaginary, or rational/intellectual), are non-material. On this account, perceptual forms are identically retained. They remain in the core of our souls and never go out of existence. Remembrance or recollection is to give attention to and recognize the very same initial forms. In this way, when it comes to memory, Ṣadrīan philosophy fundamentally diverges from its predecessors as well as modern sciences. Because, these modern sciences do not see the need to assume the immateriality of memory. They often suggest that information is stored in the material brain through a kind of encoding, attributing the constancy of memory to the constancy of genetic and neuronal encoding.In this article, I adjudicate these opposing views. To do so, I overview arguments presented for the immateriality of memory both in Ṣadrā’s own works and those of his commentators. I then show that, pace Ṣadrīan philosophy, materialism about memory is more plausible than the immateriality view. I propose a simple materialistic explanation as an alternative—i.e. an explanation in terms of a distinction between the epistemic mind and the non-epistemic brain memory—to criticize Ṣadrīan arguments and unveil their fallacies.MethodIn this research, I analyze and then appraise the relevant views by drawing on a philosophical method and logical tools. On occasion, we cite the achievements of modern sciences as well.DiscussionFor Ṣadrā, sensory and imaginary perceptions are immaterial. These immaterial forms are identically retained in memory, and then the same identical immaterial forms are recollected. In his discussion of the “traversing movement” (al-ḥarakat al-qaṭʿiyyah), he makes it explicit that the mind, unlike the changing physical external world, has the following characteristic: whatever occurs moment by moment in it remains the same and in an instantaneous, rather than gradual, way. Ṣadrīans hold that when, say, a lunar eclipse happens, a form is present to me, and when the eclipse ends, another epistemic form is created in me, while the first form still remains in my mind. In this way, the initial form does not go away, but rather a new form is added. Another argument presented by Ṣadrīans is that, when dying, people “instantaneously” remember everything they perceived throughout their lives. Moreover, memory is characteristically recognitional; that is, it involves the recognition that the remembered thing is identical to what was initially perceived. However, “identity” is incompatible with the materiality of memory. Changes in the brain also demonstrate that memory is not material: brains and their nerves change with all of their material contents, while psychological memories remain in the mind after years.I think all of these arguments are objectionable. Suffice to say, Peripatetic philosophers believe that sensory and imaginary mental forms are material, and then assume that no mental form goes away, but remains in its own realm. Such constancy does not necessarily have to do with immateriality, since such constancy of the material is conceived in modern philosophy and physics in terms of the growing block view of time.In critique of the recognition argument for the immateriality of memory, for example, we might say that it proves too much: The basis of this argument is the very paradox of Meno, which challenges not only the memory but also any kind of knowledge.Similarly, the identity argument proves too much and therefore it is objectionable in that if identity could show the immateriality of memory, it could establish the immateriality of the material world as well. For instance, the mountain I see today is identical to the one I saw yesterday. So, these are identical, without the mountain being immaterial. Since identity does not imply immateriality in these cases, it does not imply the immateriality of memory either.In response to the argument from brain change, we might say that, before their destruction, brain cells transmit their physical information to the young cells, which in turn transmit the information to other cells before they die. As an analogy, suppose that an audio tape lasts for twenty years, but before it expires, we record its content on another brand-new tape, which retains the same audio.In addition, since Ṣadrīans believe that the retained perceptual forms are directly present to us, they must say that we have knowledge-by-presence of them, albeit unconsciously. The idea of unconscious knowledge sounds implausible to me.To establish the immateriality of memory and imaginative forms, Ṣadrā also tries to undermine the material account of memory. He argues that the many forms we have perceived in our lives cannot be imprinted in our finite, and even small, material brains. However, this seems unlikely only for Ṣadrā while it is not impossible by itself. It simply can be explained away by modern science: it has been established today that a large amount of information can be stored in very small memory cards.A major objection I raised against the Ṣadrīan view is that errors in memory are incompatible with its immateriality and with being remembrance a matter of knowledge by presence. For just as sensory perceptions cannot be kinds of knowledge by presence because they involve errors, remembrance cannot be a kind of such knowledge because of errors it involves.Moreover, I argue that not only Ṣadrā’s commentators, but also Ṣadrā himself, failed to stay committed to the consequences of the immateriality of memory, as he sometimes says, and rightly so, that memories are destructible. This is an obvious endorsement of changes in such perceptual forms, which imply their materiality and inconstancy.ConclusionPre-Ṣadrīan philosophies as well as the prevalent scientific view present a far more plausible account of memory and how sensory and imaginative forms are retained than the Ṣadrīan constancy and immateriality account. Alternative materialistic explanations and the objection from errors in memory, as well as a host of other reasons, call Ṣadrīan arguments into question, including the sudden survival of movement, instantaneous detailed recollection of all forgotten memories in abnormal states or under unusual pressures, conceiving particular meanings as they were initially perceived by some old and sick people without any distortions, recognition and identity, and constancy of memory despite changes in brain cells.
Islamic mysticism
Azita Belali e oskui; Morteza shajari; mina heydaritorkmani; seyd jalal mousavi sharabiani
Abstract
IntroductionHuman agency, both in creation and in recognition of architectural space and their interaction with the space, has been affected by the hidden harmony that is generated in the space, which turns the architectural space away from its static state, stillness, and lifelessness, and the core ...
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IntroductionHuman agency, both in creation and in recognition of architectural space and their interaction with the space, has been affected by the hidden harmony that is generated in the space, which turns the architectural space away from its static state, stillness, and lifelessness, and the core of the harmony is indeed the “unity”; that is, multiple parts find unity and totality within a whole that creates a sense inside, which fits the aesthetic desire and indeed the internal human self, because the human self seeks unity and suffers from multiplicity, diffusion, and conflicts (Ardalan et al., 2011). In fact, it might be acknowledged that architecture as a created work secretly involves the creation of multiplicity and turning it into unity in interaction with humans. Given the idea of the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) in Islamic mysticism, a world is portrayed that is, first, divine and spiritual, where the song of holiness resonates, and second, it involves a unity by which all multiple parts are unified, or more precisely speaking, all that exists is a manifestation or representation of the one unified reality. In this way, art in general and architecture in particular might come to have a different color. Unity of existence is evident in architectural work in the Islamic world, but the character of this unity is not adequately discussed. A genuine perception of unity in architectural space is not confined to external senses. To the contrary, in its higher degrees, i.e., internal senses, it affects the observer. The goal of the present research to identify the nature of this unity and how it occurs. The question of our research is as follows: are Ibn ʿArabī’s views of unity applicable to architectural space, and what material grounds are prepared in architectural space to attain the unity? To answer the question, we begin with an overview of Ibn ʿArabī’s mystical view, where the question of existence and knowledge of unity is discussed as the foundation of Ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism.According to our surveys, the issue of whether Ibn ʿArabī’s account of unity is applicable to architectural space has not been properly addressed in the past research. Instead, issues of the unity of existence and multiplicity within unity have been discussed separately in philosophy and architecture. Moreover, the architectural literature tends to focus on corporeal, visual, and symbolic aspects of architectural parts in the realization of unity. In the present research, we drawAssociate Professor, Department of Architecture, Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism, Tabriz Islamic Art University, Tabriz, Iran (Corresponding Author). oskoyi@tabirziau.ac.irProfessor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Persian Literature and Foreign Languages, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran. mortezashajari@gmail.comD. Candidate of Islamic Architecture, Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism, Tabriz Islamic Art University, Tabriz, Iran. m.haydari@tabriziau.ac.irAssistant Professor, Department of Islamic Education, Faculty of Multimedia, Tabriz Islamic Art University, Tabriz, Iran. sjsharabiani@tabriziau.ac.irDate received: 2022/03/19, Date of acceptance: 2022/07/19 This article has been extracted from the course "Wisdom in Islamic Architecture" in the Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism of Tabriz Islamic Art University.on Ibn ʿArabī’s views about the questions of existence and knowledge of unity as the foundation of his mysticism to tackle material and perceptual grounds in the Islamic architectural space to examine the move from multiplicity to unity.Method of ResearchMethodologically speaking, the present research is descriptive-analytic, adopting the qualitative research approach. Qualitative research involves identification of the relevant references, studies and overviews of the written sources, comprehension of their meanings, and extraction of the relevant material, establishment of relations between issues, and providing descriptions and analyses of them.Discussion and ResultsCreation of multiplicity in architectural space and its transformation into unity has been effective in attaining an understanding of the existential unity, such that this understanding in architectural space was a determinant of the degree of the work’s life, and was somehow a cause of its existence. In fact, to attain such a unity, the human presence and existence in the space is undoubtedly what engenders a motion toward its recognition. Accordingly, the move from multiplicity to unity in architectural space implies physical movement (translocation – ocular) and semantic movement (mental movement). During the movement in architectural space, the observer’s physical movement turns into visual movement, which in turn results in reception of a series of regression and connections in the observer’s mind, leading to his or her mental movement. However, once the observer begins to recognize and see signs, it enables him or her to move in the world of imagination to attain unity. In fact, genuine unity is obtained through human imagination.ConclusionThere is a remarkable correspondence between perceptions of existential unity in both philosophy and architecture. On Ibn ʿArabī’s account, imagination is perception of images in the soul after having seen something. Indeed, imagination is the intermediary between dualities. So in his view, human imagination is capable of attaining unity in the world that is abstracted or detached from the sensible world (existence of multiplicity). Furthermore, in the unity of existence, finding the existence is the same as coming to exist, where the finding is through intuitions and revelations. In the Imam Mosque of Isfahan (or the Shah Mosque), manifestation of the pairs [imagination being in pair] in space provides a bedrock for the observer’s intuition and revelation of unity through a definition of hierarchies and qualitative geometry based on the principle of the centrality and symmetry and existence of light.
Philosophy
Afra Khakzad; Hadi Rabiei; Mohammad Akvan
Abstract
AbstractIntroduction: Avicenna has discussed the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties in several of his works. Avicenna's views on the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties are often expressed under the more general concept of pleasure and are scattered in works with various subjects such as ...
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AbstractIntroduction: Avicenna has discussed the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties in several of his works. Avicenna's views on the pleasure of artistic and natural beauties are often expressed under the more general concept of pleasure and are scattered in works with various subjects such as theological, logical, natural and mathematical works. He also discusses pleasure in relation to the perception and the perceptual faculties of the soul. In addition, an important and significant part of Avicenna's discussions about pleasure is devoted to pleasure of the arts, especially the representative arts.Since the work of art is considered sensible, the question arises as to which perceptual faculties of man the pleasure of the work of art depends? Does the mere fact that a work of art is a sensible thing, means that the pleasure of a work of art is considered a sensible pleasure? Do other perceptual faculties, including the internal sensory faculties and the rational faculties, also contribute to the perception of the work of art, and does the pleasure of the work of art also depend on them? In the case of each of these faculties, including the external and internal sensory faculties and the rational faculty, the question can be asked how important and effective they are in perceiving the beauty of the work of art? In the present article, an attempt has been made to answer these questions from Avicenna's point of view. Methods and Materials:The research method of this article is fundamental. This research was conducted using a library research method, and the method of describing and analyzing information in this research is qualitative. The claim of this research is that according to Avicenna's views, the pleasure that is obtained from works of art, as a kind of sensible things, is not merely sensory pleasure and dependent on the five external sensory faculties.Results and Discussions:To examine this claim, the characteristics of aesthetic pleasure and its subjects as well as the epistemological status of this pleasure are studied and the pleasure of the arts of poetry, painting and music is explained from Avicenna's point of view. Finally, it is shown that the aesthetic pleasure of works of art is first of all a rational pleasure and depends on the faculty of reason and then, respectively, is an imaginary pleasure and depends on the faculty of imagination, and finally, is a sensible pleasure and depends on the perceptual faculties. Among the faculties of external perception, the faculties of sight and hearing have the greatest ability to obtain aesthetic pleasure from the arts, respectively.Conclusion:The findings of this study show that from Avicenna's point of view, each of the external and internal sensory faculties, and to a higher degree, the rational faculty, have their own aesthetic pleasure. External sensory faculties, namely sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, each have limitations. In this way they can only enjoy what they can comprehend. But the range of pleasure of the internal faculties is much greater than the pleasures of the external faculties. Because all the sensory forms perceived by the external perceptual faculties are grouped together and interconnected, there is more pleasure for the internal faculties. This is why the imaginative faculty enjoys the perception of images preserved in the imagination. For example, the imagination, by preserving and storing sensible auditory forms of musical notes, makes it possible that the audience's pleasure is not limited to single notes and sound type, but can understand the sequence of musical notes and enjoy them. Ultimately, it is the faculty of reason that in the strict sense of the word can enjoy the pleasure of perceiving beauty. Because from Avicenna's point of view, beauty lies in features such as proportion, composition and symmetry, and although the audience first perceives data from a sensible object through sensory perception, but the perception of features such as proportion is specific to reason. Accordingly, aesthetic pleasure is at its highest dependent on rational perception.According to Avicenna, irrational pleasure is a pleasure that is aroused, but without thought and reflection, and is appropriate to nature and the senses, but hearing and sight give pleasures to the soul that are not merely by nature, but are rational, because they refer to nonsensible meanings, for example, when one sees a beautiful work of art, one is drawn to it and tends to liken it.The results of this study show that according to Avicenna, since the external and internal senses present the works of art to the human intellect and the intellect recognizes their beauty, the perception of beauty encompasses all levels of human cognitive faculties. Also, since aesthetic pleasure follows the perception of beauty, the perception of beauty produces different levels of pleasure, at least as much as it involves perceptual levels.
Philosophy
Ali Sayyah; Shams-ol-Molouk Mostafavi; Reza Davari Ardakani
Abstract
IntroductionHaving rooted in Islamic doctrines and Greek philosophy -specially Plato and Aristotle-, Al-farabi gave central role to Happiness in his philosophy, locating it at the heart of his political thought. His unflagging effort to conceptualize the notion of happiness ended up bringing to the scene ...
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IntroductionHaving rooted in Islamic doctrines and Greek philosophy -specially Plato and Aristotle-, Al-farabi gave central role to Happiness in his philosophy, locating it at the heart of his political thought. His unflagging effort to conceptualize the notion of happiness ended up bringing to the scene a new theoretical view on happiness, which has been circulated throughout the Islamic philosophy by his disciples. In this paper, I would tend to reconsider this key concept in Al-Farabi’s philosophy, by looking at it in relation to Imagination. The key question, therefore, would be “what is the role of imagination in the process of achieving happiness”; in other word, “How Imagination can participate a role in the attainment of happiness?”. To approach this question, first, I will look at how Al-Farabi deals with the notion of happiness in his works and how he puts this notion at the heart of his political view. Thereby, it will be discussed that happiness is being attained through existing in the society (virtuous city), which means, happiness can be attained collectively, not individually. Finally, by exploring Imagination in Al-Farabi’s happiness theory, I will discuss the significant role and statue of artists, who deal with the public’s imagination, in the virtuous city. Literature ReviewThe views of Al-Farabi on the subject in question have been discussed to some extent in books such as Al-Farabi, Imagination, and Artistic Creativity and Al-Farabi and Conceptualization of Religious Art. In addition, in Al-Farabi, a Strange Philosopher, Nasrollah Hekmat tries to open new horizons in this field, criticizing dominant readings of Al-Farabi’s views. In third section of this book, titled “Philosophy of Imagination in Al-Farabi’s thought”, author introduces the notion of “imaginary rationality” that plays an important role in Al-Farabi’s prophecy theory and paves the human way towards happiness. Going beyond a merely explanatory view, The Political Thought of Al-Farabi by Reza Davari Ardakani, provides a comprehensive reading of Al-Farabi’s thought, drawing connections between the notion of happiness and his political views. Moreover, in Politics and Excellence: The Political Philosophy of Al-Farabi, Miriam Galston considers relations between Politics and Excellence in a broader philosophic context. And finally, it is totally worth to talk about Al-Farabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy, written by Muhsin Mahdi, that deals with key concepts of Al-Farabi’s philosophy through reading his works. Methods and MaterialGathered the information from Al-Farabi’s own books, as well as the second literature and commentaries on his works, this paper is completely library research. Firstly, I made an outline to keep our research focused. After gathering information, in the second step, I would be able to narrow down the research area. By analyzing, deducing, and reconsidering data, in the last phase, the study would come to conclusion. Results and DiscussionAlthough Al-Farabi enumerates theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues, and practical arts as conditions of possessing happiness, according to his works, theoretical contemplation is a necessary condition of reaching happiness. The theoretical contemplation, however, is the property of the elect, and the vulgar are deprived of this activity. Since he is aiming at happiness for all citizens of the society, Al-Farabi appeals to a faculty that is common between all human beings: Imagination. What is important in this context is that, in Al-Farabi’s view, Imagination- which contributes to his prophecy theory- has the capacity of imitating not only the sensible, but also the intelligible. (this latter function of Imagination -imitating of the intelligible- has not been considered in his antecedents, specially Plato and Aristotle, and seems it is his own innovation). The supreme ruler of virtuous city (philosopher-prophet) and the elect -specially the artist among them- can project the representations of the intelligible on the public’s minds which are able to imitate them. It gives the opportunity to the public that find their way to happiness. In other word, Imagination -its ability to imitate the intelligible- paves the way of happiness for all citizens of virtuous city. ConclusionIn a way of conclusion, Happiness plays an important role in Al-Farabi’s political thinking, in a way that he articulates his political theory around this notion. As we mentioned above, while the theoretical contemplation is necessary for reaching happiness, this ability merely belongs to the elect. By taking advantage of their Imagination, which is capable of imitating abstract concepts, the public can reach the highest good, the happiness. Since the artists, among the elect, deals directly with the public’s imagination and can project theoretical virtues on their minds, Al-Farabi puts a high value on them in the second highest level of virtuous city (His view stands in stark contrast to Plato who believed artists -specially poets- must be banished from his ideal society).
seyd mehdi mirhadi
Abstract
The aim of the present article is to investigate the relationship between imagination and emotions and to explain the role and way of the involvement of imagination in the emotional domain. The essence of the imagination, the nature of the affections and the relation between the imagination and emotions, ...
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The aim of the present article is to investigate the relationship between imagination and emotions and to explain the role and way of the involvement of imagination in the emotional domain. The essence of the imagination, the nature of the affections and the relation between the imagination and emotions, are the three main questions in the current research. Analysis and inference method was used to explain the subject. Preserving the faces after the sensory perception of phenomena, seizure in the repository faces, and the transformation of perceptual faces, are the main functions of imagination in the field of cognitive activity and self-stimulation. Instincts, natures and emotions are considered as the infrastructures of human tendencies. Emotions, while being acquired, are human tools for survival and excellence. According Mulla Sadra, emotions create motivation to move in human, and focus on self-esteem from scattered efforts and willing, in a single direction. According to him, emotions can be considered a kind of heart action by being activated in our existence, and since the activities of the soul are united with the oneself and are the part of it, then they can be the constructor of the ultimate entity of human and his/her overwordly face. The imagination is the origin of the emergence of emotions, the cause of the survival and decline of the emotions, and is the reason for meaning and revival of the emotions.
Mohammad Hosein Vafaiyan; Ahad Faramarz Ghramaleki
Abstract
‘Thinking about ends, ‘measuring the possible ends’ and ‘the final selection of end or purpose’, are the first stage (the stage of cognition) of the stages of issuance of action for Muslim philosophers in their analysis of the philosophy of action. Analyses regarding the ...
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‘Thinking about ends, ‘measuring the possible ends’ and ‘the final selection of end or purpose’, are the first stage (the stage of cognition) of the stages of issuance of action for Muslim philosophers in their analysis of the philosophy of action. Analyses regarding the recognition of end and purpose at this stage, are epistemological, therefore are influenced by human perceptual powers, and particularly the mode of imagination and its effect on the scientific basis of act issuance. The main issue of this research is to recognize the place, function, and the influencing mechanism of imagination in the cognition and selection of ends (goals). The results show the effective and extensive influence of imagination power on ‘human self-knowledge’ and ‘the selection of goals’. Motive and will to do a particular behavior or act is also based on the needs and perfectionism of the subject, which is formed in the light of the images which imagination power constructs of the subject and its surrounding objects, so that behavioral goals and motivations are belonged to human’s imaginative images, not external facts.
Mohammad Kazem Elmi Sola; Seyyede Akram Barakati
Volume 6, Issue 1 , May 2015, , Pages 67-94
Abstract
The present article studies Paul Ricoeur and Mulla Sadra's views on imagination, particularly its influential role in knowledge. Though their philosophies differ in principle, they share certain ideas in common. Ricoeur, contemporary philosopher and hermeneut, utilizes semiotics, linguistics, structuralism, ...
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The present article studies Paul Ricoeur and Mulla Sadra's views on imagination, particularly its influential role in knowledge. Though their philosophies differ in principle, they share certain ideas in common. Ricoeur, contemporary philosopher and hermeneut, utilizes semiotics, linguistics, structuralism, and so on, to enrich hermeneutics. Language, thus, gets a central role in his philosophy. The basic difference of Ricoeur’s idea on imagination which distinguishes him from Mulla Sadra is that ‘language’ is used as a basis to explain imagination; he explains the role of imagination in knowledge through language. But Mulla Sadra does not directly deals with language, but considers act of imagination in constituting knowledge as an act of certain faculty of the soul. But in spite of this basic difference, both philosophers consider imagination as a mediator between external world and internal world of the mind and both explain this possibility by the notion of integration of two different issues.
Samanbar Mirzayi; Hadi Vakili
Volume 5, Issue 1 , October 2014, , Pages 133-160
Abstract
Among the issues which have been raised in the Islamic philosophy and mysticism, Idea and Imagination play an essential role to explain many Islamic beliefs such as the resurrection, the life after death and soul incorporeity. Ibn-al Arabi, Mulla Sadra, Ibn Sina and Sheikh-al Ishraq have dealt with these ...
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Among the issues which have been raised in the Islamic philosophy and mysticism, Idea and Imagination play an essential role to explain many Islamic beliefs such as the resurrection, the life after death and soul incorporeity. Ibn-al Arabi, Mulla Sadra, Ibn Sina and Sheikh-al Ishraq have dealt with these issues and addressed them. For Ibn-al Arabi, Imagination (Al-Qial) is the place of conflicts, a paradoxical fact which is neither available, nor destroyed, neither known, nor unknown. He believes that imagination is vastest as well as narrowest known objects with which we can understand the sensorial and imaginal forms. For him, Ama (blind state) would not appear if imagination did not exist. He believes that imagination is the slave of the rational soul and due to the ownership, it has a kind of sovereignty, the sovereignty of the imagination is that it shapes soul in any form. From the perspective of Mulla Sadra, innate power of imagination is sometimes acquisitive and sometimes indigenous. Among the ways to reach lightening objects are to prevent from eating, drinking, sleeping and getting rid of indolence. Mulla Sadra believes that the soul has an imaginational faculty by which it can create and compose forms which have no existence in worlds of intelligences and external objects, even in the world of ideas
Maryam Saneapour
Volume 1, Issue 1 , September 2010, , Pages 55-76
Abstract
The principles of the mysticism of Ibn Arabi, the founder of the Image theory, had a great influence upon the Transcendent Theosophy of Mullā Sadra. This influence is so great that the theory of the immateriality of image and the mediation of the imaginal world can be described as the basic causes for ...
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The principles of the mysticism of Ibn Arabi, the founder of the Image theory, had a great influence upon the Transcendent Theosophy of Mullā Sadra. This influence is so great that the theory of the immateriality of image and the mediation of the imaginal world can be described as the basic causes for the formation of the Transcendent Theosophy of Mullā Sadra. In other words, it is possible to treat the immateriality of the imaginal world and imaginal forms and their materiality in Peripatetic and Illuminationistic philosophies in the Transcendent Theosophy as the distinguishing feature which might separate “Transcendent Theosophy” from “Peripatetic philosophy” and “Illuminationstic philosophy”. In the present article, the theory of Image is treated as the most pivotal element in the mystical theory of Ibn Arabi and the Transcendent Theosophy of Mullā Sadra, and the nature and quality of the imaginal world and the faculty of imagination have been analyzed and examined.
