Philosophy
Maryam Tahmasebi; Abbas Zahabi; Ahmad Beheshti
Abstract
Shihab al-Din yahya Suhrawardi, illuminationist philosopher, explaining his epistemological views, proposed a new point of view that known as illuminationist relation and in this way he considers the acquisition of many perceptions, including vision, of through of intuitive knowledge.The present research ...
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Shihab al-Din yahya Suhrawardi, illuminationist philosopher, explaining his epistemological views, proposed a new point of view that known as illuminationist relation and in this way he considers the acquisition of many perceptions, including vision, of through of intuitive knowledge.The present research focuses on the nature of knowledge by presence and its role in the problem of “vision.” It considers the following key question: Does Suhrawardī mean the same thing by “knowledge by presence” in all degrees of perception from the most primitive external levels—that is, vision—to the deeper levels? Then, given his epistemic model, can we treat him as a phenomenologist? The present article considers the nature of knowledge by presence in the process of vision according to Suhrawardī and presents a different approach to it. By reference to Suhrawardī’s discussion of issues of vision and a conceptual clarification of “presence,” we show that Suhrawardī could not have used the term “knowledge by presence” in the case of vision in its common sense as opposed to “knowledge by acquisition” (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī). Instead, this is a different notion, and thus the term is equivocally used in his work. Moreover, we argue that his epistemological model for vision is phenomenological. The method of research in the present article is qualitative and analytic
Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
Is Suhrawardi's criticisms of the peripatetic concept of definition, and the establishment of the Ishraqi theory of definition by him, a sharp divergence of Ibn Sina’slogic of the definition? Some scholars think that the answer is yes, however thepresent paper’s answer to this question is ...
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Is Suhrawardi's criticisms of the peripatetic concept of definition, and the establishment of the Ishraqi theory of definition by him, a sharp divergence of Ibn Sina’slogic of the definition? Some scholars think that the answer is yes, however thepresent paper’s answer to this question is ‘no’. In Hekmat al-Ishehraq,Suhrawardihas three basic criticisms to the theory of completeessential definition, some of which can be generalized to the incomplete essential definition and also accidental definitions: (1) conflicts with the conventional use of language; (2) the incomprehensibility of the realdifferences; (3) the perpetual probability of neglect of one or more intrinsic features. The bold veins of these three critiques can be found in the treatise of Ibn Sina’sal-Hodoodva al-Ta'lighat, along with two other criticisms: (4) theperpetual probability of theacquisition ofrequisite rather than essence; and (5) the perpetual probability of the acquisition of remote genus instead of close genus. The only possible definition fromSuhrawardi point of view is the definition of quiddity through the combination of general accidents that are belonged to thatquiddity, provided that the definition proceeds in the epistemological trades between definiens and definiendum and on the basis ofdirect(unmediated) knowledge.This theory is also the extender of the line Ibn Sina has drawn in Al-Ta'lighatva Al-Isharat. Therefore, Suhrawardi'slogic of definition complementsthe Avicenna's logicofdefinition.
