Mahmoud Hedayatafza
Abstract
Being familiar with various philosophical sources and schools, Mulla Sadra sometimes provides diverse answers to some of the philosophical or theological problems, including in regard of the elaboration of God’s inherent characteristics for which three different solutions can be inferred from Mulla ...
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Being familiar with various philosophical sources and schools, Mulla Sadra sometimes provides diverse answers to some of the philosophical or theological problems, including in regard of the elaboration of God’s inherent characteristics for which three different solutions can be inferred from Mulla Sadra’s works. He constantly keeps making a great deal of emphasis on the exemplary objectification of essence with divine characteristics, but three different approaches are observed, namely discourse, philosophical and Gnostic, in his works when it comes to the clarification of a meaning for “objectification”. The primary objective of the present study is to explicate Mulla Sadra’s special approach, and to elucidate the aspects rendering it different from the other two perspectives. Naturally, in order to understand a philosophical response thereto, it is necessary to compare it with the other two approaches, especially with the more general and discourse-based approach, so that the differences could be figured out. These three approaches signify three levels of cognizance: A) Sadra’s general and discourse-based approach is expressive of the existential unification of the reasonable perfections with the unit essence of God, which can be seen flowing in the works of the majority of the verdict interpreters. Besides accepting the classification of the characteristics to inherent and non-inherent in his works, Mulla Sadra largely underlines the abstraction of numerous concepts of extended truth, as mental innovation of Muḥaqiq Ṭūsī and Ḥillī. B) The philosophical or specific approach of this Shirazi philosopher is based on the comparison of the divine essence and characteristics of the possible existence and nature. Based on the Sadraean theory of existence originality, each externally present object is firstly and essentially an example of “existence” (with noun and not infinitive meaning), and secondly and transversally an example of a certain nature. Accordingly, the divine essence is firstly and essentially an example of the “existence”, and secondly and transversally an example of the lofty characteristics and beautiful traits; so, what is immediately abstracted from the divine essence is the nominal concept of “existence”. Moreover, the same way that the existence, as held in Sadraean system, features a conditional mode in every substantive conveyance to the weights thereof, the reasonable perfections of the same type as the “existence”, considered as the inherent characteristics thereof, are all examples of built-in non-acquisitive states with existence dependency. These have been abstracted from the unit essence of God in regard of a single aspect. Thus, besides the objectification of the essence by characteristics, there is a single topic involved in the verity of the characteristics, and such a positive trait as “equality of the inherent characteristics concepts” is the attribute of the divine rank. C) Sadra’s Gnostic and specialized approach leads to the denial of the characteristics of the divine essence. Obviously, resembling the essence and characteristics to existence and nature is effective in the elaboration of such a standpoint, but the divine perfections are to be regarded as rank-based conditional states.
Khadijeh Hashemi Attar; saeed anvari
Abstract
Mulla-Sadra writes in al-shavahed al-robubieh, after negating the gradation in quiddity that he contrasted with this idea in al-Asfar. In spite of the fact that he has refused to accept the gradation in quiddity in some of his works, he has given theories such as the Platonic idea and the eternal essences ...
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Mulla-Sadra writes in al-shavahed al-robubieh, after negating the gradation in quiddity that he contrasted with this idea in al-Asfar. In spite of the fact that he has refused to accept the gradation in quiddity in some of his works, he has given theories such as the Platonic idea and the eternal essences that some of the necessary acceptance of them has been considered in gradation in quiddity. This article explains and justifies this incoherency by identifying Mulla Sadra's different views on the gradation in quiddity. of the discussion and discussing the issues that they are required to accept in gradation in quiddity. To this end, various justifications have been raised and criticized about this apparent disagreement with Mulla Sadra. These views include: gradation in quiddity in defense of the iluminationists, changing his view in gradation in quiddity, the gradation in quiddity means gradation in essence, gradation in graduated concepts, gradation in quiddity persons, gradation in quiddity in subordinate with existence.
Ali Motahari
Abstract
Contingency in line with general concepts such as “existence and non-existence” , “unity and plurality” , and “ causality and being caused” is one of the fundamental and remarkable philosophical issues. The proper explanation of the different meanings of contingency ...
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Contingency in line with general concepts such as “existence and non-existence” , “unity and plurality” , and “ causality and being caused” is one of the fundamental and remarkable philosophical issues. The proper explanation of the different meanings of contingency and of the relationship of these meanings to each other make it possible to correctly understand and prove many other principal philosophical problems. Essential contingency and dispositional contingency are among the important meanings of contingency , so that the way we explain them will change basically the destiny of problems such as “coming into being and eternity” , “ potentiality and actuality” , and “causality and being caused” . Sheikh Ishraq for the first time has raised the issue of dispositional contingency , while contradicting Ibn Sina's argument for the rule that “ every event is preceded by potentiality and by matter that possesses that potentiality” . MullaSadra has dealt with the differences between essential contingency and dispositional contingency , and MullaHadiSabzevari has categorized these differences into six groups.At least in sixteen pieces of his works, MullaSadra has expressed his views on the relationship between essential contingency and dispositional contingency, therefore compatibility between these ideas seems very difficult . Indeed, It can be said that these views are contradictory. In this article , using professor Motahhari 's philosophical researches , we have tried to explain the new relationship , obtained in the light of genuineness of existence , between these two meanings of contingency , while judging MullaSadra's different positions concerning essential contingency and dispositional contingency.
mehdi azimi
Abstract
One of the important voids in Iranian, even World, logical Studies is absence of a comprehensive History of Islamic Logic. The works has been done in the East and West hitherto are steps for peregrinating a long road which should be continued many years. Writing a history of Islamic Logic naturally should ...
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One of the important voids in Iranian, even World, logical Studies is absence of a comprehensive History of Islamic Logic. The works has been done in the East and West hitherto are steps for peregrinating a long road which should be continued many years. Writing a history of Islamic Logic naturally should be begun by the study of the development of Porphyry’s Isagoge, a book that always was the first part of all logical writings in the history of Islamic Logic. Doing this, in turn, should be begun by the study of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s Isagoge, a paraphrase that firstly introduced Porphyry’s Isagoge to the Islamic World.
AmirHosain MansouriNouri; Einollah khademi; leaila purakbar; Mahdi sanei
Abstract
Introduction: One of the most important questions for people today is what fact can properly justify their life. The question might be as old as the human history, but it was in the last 50 years that analytic philosophers dealt with it as a particular and independent question. Continental philosophers ...
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Introduction: One of the most important questions for people today is what fact can properly justify their life. The question might be as old as the human history, but it was in the last 50 years that analytic philosophers dealt with it as a particular and independent question. Continental philosophers might be deemed pioneers of the issue because they grappled with challenges of modernity for religiosity much sooner than analytic philosophers, although the latter are known for their more coherent treatment of the issue. Since they believe in God and in human servitude toward God, Muslim philosophers never saw the “meaning of life” as a considerable problem. However, since problems in the Western theological-philosophical tradition tend to find their way into the intellectual domain of Muslims, Muslim scholars need to provide relevant answers to the question and consider the factors contributing to it. In order to derive a theory from the Islamic tradition which can actively answer the questions about the meaning of life, we need to consider the work of Western intellectuals as inventors of the question, since without awareness of Western ideas we will be passively on the defensive, whereas after a careful consideration of their views, we can establish an independent theory drawing upon the inherent resources of the Islamic tradition. Research question: The present research seeks to answer the following question: “How does the belief in the possibility of knowing the divine essence affect the ‘meaning of life’ in Fakhr al-Rāzī’s view?” Research method: Here is the method of research in this article: First the required data are extracted from the relevant sources via a library research, then the data are coded and organized in accordance with the titles, and since the subject-matter of the article was not Fakhr’s problem, the data were analyzed and criticized through a particular reading. The main body of the article: For Fakhr, the meaning of life is indeed a desire for God in accordance with innate knowledge of Him. From Fakhr’s work, it is implied that he extended his conception of the “meaning of life” to the areas of utilitarianism and functionalism as well. Notwithstanding this, his entire analyses in other areas are also grounded in innate knowledge and desire. On this account, Fakhr’s reply to the main research question here—“ How does the belief in the possibility of knowing the divine essence affect the meaning of life”—will be as follows: Fakhr al-Rāzī, as a theologian, analyzes the innate desire for God in terms of sharia (Islamic jurisprudence), holding that knowledge of God provides the meaning of life. In the next step, Fakhr al-Rāzī as a philosopher puts the innate desire along with acquisition of discursive knowledge, extending the path to higher levels of wisdom which might be considered as philosophical-mystical. He characterizes rational knowledge in the first step and intuitive knowledge at higher steps as what organize the meaning of life. Finally, Fakhr al-Rāzī as a full-fledged mystic suggests that, by endorsing annihilation as a cognitive system, we can achieve knowledge of the divine essence, which will bring about a fundamental transformation in the “meaning of life,” since with any limitation at any level, the desire will be limited, but if we attribute unending knowledge to man, it will amount to saying that the desire to God is unending; that is, it will be deeper and finer with every higher step. In this case, the “meaning of life” will be more transcendental. Research conclusions: Here are the conclusions of this research: Fakhr applies the meaning of life to the areas of theory, utility, and function on the basis of innate knowledge and desire for perfection. Since Fakhr’s thought is based on knowledge, he believes that there are different degrees of knowledge: knowledge is, for him, a process that goes through different stages of rationalization, refinement (tahdhīb), and annihilation (fanā’). In his view, knowledge of the essence is not possible for man before the stage of annihilation. This is why, the desire for God will have its limits, relative to which the meaning of life will also be limited. Eventually, however, Fakhr al-Rāzī introduces annihilation as a cognitive system, in light of which he endorses the possibility of achieving knowledge of God’s essence. In this way, innate desire will cease to be limited, and with thin unlimited, unending desire the “meaning of life” will be at its highest.
Philosophy
efat alsadat hashemi; Alireza Kohansal; seyed morteza hoseini shahrudi,
Abstract
There are Quranic verses that cannot be interpreted without rational or intellectual exegeses and merely by drawing on their prima facie meanings, such as those that do not square with explicit Quranic doctrines, including those in which “hands” or “face” are attributed to God. ...
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There are Quranic verses that cannot be interpreted without rational or intellectual exegeses and merely by drawing on their prima facie meanings, such as those that do not square with explicit Quranic doctrines, including those in which “hands” or “face” are attributed to God. Another group of verses of a similar vein are those concerning “treasuries of Allah” (khazāʾin Allāh). The predicament is that people tend to collect valuable things in treasuries only because they have a limited power and cannot have what they want whenever they do, but this is not true of God, because of His unlimited, unconstrained power and knowledge.
According to Quranic exegetes, there are two types of “divine treasuries”:
Worldly treasuries
Otherworldly treasuries (those of the absolute hidden world)
There are different views of the nature of “divine treasuries” proposed by exegetes of the Quran and Muslim philosophers. We begin with views propounded by Quranic exegetes in philosophical-theological exegeses of the Quran. Major views of this sort have been offered in the exegesis of verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr in the Quran. These views might be classified into four:
Rains
Material elements and occasions of creation
Divine predestinations
Divine knowledge
In a number of his exegetical and philosophical works, Mullā Ṣadrā has presented his account of “divine treasuries.” In line with his philosophical principles, he construes divine treasuries as intellectual entities; that is, as a particular stage of divine knowledge (after that of divine grace or ʿināyat), which mediates the emanation of divine blessings or grace to creatures—a stage in which the forms of everything inheres in an intellectual way. A systematic, rational rendering of Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of divine treasuries requires a proper elaboration of his philosophical principles associated with divine knowledge, including the primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd), gradation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), objectivity of knowledge and existence, etc.
The following are the questions we consider in this paper:
How do theological exegeses of the Quran account for the notion of “divine treasuries”? What problems do they face?
What are Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles underlying his account of divine treasuries? How does his account treat the problems faced by other accounts?
What other account of divine treasuries might be yielded, which is still compatible with the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy?
To answer these questions, we begin with a literal definition of “treasuries of Allah” and then overview the accounts provided by exegetes and their problems. Next, we offer a detailed account of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles as preliminary to a proper account of “divine treasuries.”
Articles have been published about “divine treasuries,” including “Divine treasuries” by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ḥishmatpūr (2005), “A critical analysis of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of treasuries in light of structural semantics” by Mahdī Bāqirī and Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalikī (2018) and “A critical application of the theory of conceptual mixture in al-Mīzān’s reading of divine treasuries” again by Mahdī Bāqirī and Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalikī (2017).
We conclude that, of the four accounts outlined in this paper, the first three suffer from numerous problems, and thus they fail to yield an adequate account of the Quranic notion of divine treasuries. In our view, the fourth view—that is, Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical account—has failed to offer a full-fledged account of instances of divine treasuries. Accordingly, we propounded a fourth view, which is an extension of Mullā Ṣadrā’s account. We argue how a proper, reasonable account of the notion of divine treasuries can be made possible by an elaboration of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles concerning divine knowledge and its degrees, and by drawing on characteristics of divine treasuries as outlined in the Quran, particularly verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr. We show that this revised Sadraean account is immune to the objections raised against other theories. On this account, divine treasuries suggest God’s knowledge of the measures of everything before its descent; that is, its creation. Moreover, on Mullā Ṣadrā’s principles, treasuries are of two sorts: worldly and otherworldly, where the latter is of two kinds in turn: objective and subjective (or cognitive). Objective treasuries are entities existing in imaginal (mithāl) and intellectual (ʿaql) worlds, and subjective treasuries are entities existing in the world of divine names and attributes. This is an “existential account of divine treasuries,” which might apply to all degrees of existence and creation.
Leila Kiankhah
Abstract
IntroductionA scrutiny of Fārābī’s works reveals that one of his major concerns and a key philosophical problem in his view was God as the origin of other existing entities as well as His attributes and His relation with the world of being. As a founder of Islamic philosophy, in his efforts ...
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IntroductionA scrutiny of Fārābī’s works reveals that one of his major concerns and a key philosophical problem in his view was God as the origin of other existing entities as well as His attributes and His relation with the world of being. As a founder of Islamic philosophy, in his efforts to establish the intellectual system of Islamic philosophy, Fārābī not only takes the study of God as a metaphysical problem, but also considers it as a key central problem in metaphysics. Indeed, in most of his works, he defines metaphysics in terms of God (the First Existent: al-mawjūd al-awwal) as the study of the First Existent and the study of other existents in that they are caused by the First Existent. Accordingly, in Fārābī’s view, the First Existent is an entity on which other existents depend in their existence, and in fact, other existents deserve to be studied in metaphysics just in virtue of their relation to it. For this reason, it is the most significant and central issue in the study of Fārābī to research into the First Existent and its attributes as well as its relation with other existents. A scrutiny of Fārābī’s view of the First Existent will give us an understanding of the main metaphysical problem in his philosophy, which is crucial to an understanding of other problems of metaphysics as well as the entire system of his intellectual doctrines. Additionally, a major offshoot of this is a more accurate understanding of the relation between Fārābī’s theology (study of God) and Avicenna’s theology, which results in an enhanced study of Avicenna’s philosophy. Accordingly, the main problem tackled in this article is an analysis of Fārābī’s view of God and His attributes.In this way, the article is chiefly concerned with a study of God as the First Existent and His attributes from Fārābī’s perspective. However, since Fārābī’s theological studies largely appear in his Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila (Opinions of the citizens of the virtuous city) and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya (Urban politics), this article focuses on these two works, although it also reviews the rest of Fārābī’s works when they involve a reference to the problem at hand. It is necessary to note that this article overviews and analyzes Fārābī’s views in terms of his own intellectual context and only draws on the jargons prevalent in the works that are attributed to him beyond any reasonable doubt.Discussion and ResultsIn many parts of his works, Fārābī discusses theological issues, but a large part of his theological studies appears in two of his works: Ārāʾ ahl al-madīnat al-fāḍila (Opinions of the citizens of the virtuous city) and al-Siyāsat al-madaniyya (Urban politics). The jargons Fārābī uses to refer to God include the “First” (awwal), the “First Existent,” and the “First Cause” (al-sabab al-awwal). Unlike Avicenna, he does not believe that God is the essentially necessary existent. Fārābī ascribes several names and attributes to the First Existent, in particular its being immemorial and the most perfect. These attributes encompass other divine attributes. Indeed, other attributes ultimately refer to these two. Fārābī explains that although multiple names and attributes apply to the First Existent, this does not add up to the multiplicity of the First Existent, because it includes all those attributes in its essential unity. In Fārābī’s view, when common names are predicated of the First Existent and other existents, they are not predicated by way of univocity (or a common meaning: al-ishtirāk al-maʿnawī). Moreover, because of a resemblance and relation between the First Existent and other existents, the predication is not by way of equivocity (or a vebal commonality: al-ishtirāk al-lafẓī) either. It is indeed a different variety of predication by which common names are predicated of the First Existent and other existents not as univocal, but by virtue of a sort of relation and resemblance and in terms of priority and posterity. This resemblance or relation between the attributes of the First Existent and those of other existents provides us with some kind of knowledge about the First Existent, by which we apply positive attributes to it.Fārābī explains the relation between the First Existent and other existents in terms of the theory of emanation (fayḍ). While he was influenced by neo-Platonic philosophers, particularly Plotinus, and despite his ample influence on Avicenna, there are significant ways in which Fārābī can be distinguished from them to the extent that the theories of emanation put forward by each had better be treated as three separate views. Fārābī’s theory is distinguished from Plotinus’s mainly by his introduction of heavenly spheres into the flow of emanation, the multiplicity and number of intellects, and the possibility of human knowledge of the First Existent and the First Existent’s knowledge of other existents. Furthermore, his theory is discriminated from Avicenna’s by his rejection of accommodating essential necessity and essential possibility in his theory of emanation. Since Fārābī did not even consider the principle of essential necessity and possibility, he does not account for emanation in terms of essential and non-essential necessity or possibility. Although Avicenna was influenced by Fārābī’s theory of emanation, his view is far away from Fārābī’s because he explains emanation in terms of necessity and possibility. It should be noted, however, that Avicenna’s theory is so dominant that, at first sight, it seems impossible to be able to explain emanation without the key elements of necessity and possibility. The main contribution of the present research is the study of Fārābī’s authentic views of God based on the works that are attributed to him beyond any reasonable doubt, and without any mixture with dubious works attributed to him. Accordingly, it turns out that, despite his great influence on Avicenna, Fārābī’s view diverges from Avicenna’s on many key issues such that it seems that they present two distinct intellectual frameworks.ConclusionFārābī believes that God is the origin of all existents, hence His appellation as the First, the First Existent, and the First Cause. In Fārābī’s view, the First Existent is not only an entity on which other existents depend in their existence, but also an entity in relation to which they deserve to be studied in metaphysics. A scrutiny of the First Existent and its attributes as well as its relation to other existents is a major research question in the study of Fārābī’s philosophy. Since there are doubts about the attribution of some works to Fārābī, and those works provide a distinct intellectual framework relative to his definitive works, this article aims to derive and overview Fārābī’s authentic views. According to definitive works by Fārābī, God is not a necessary existent, and the theory of emanation he puts forward as an explanation of the relation between the First Existent and other existents is not based on essential necessity and possibility. For this reason, his view of God is fundamentally different from that of his successor Avicenna.
somayeh malleki; Mahdi Emami Jome; nafiseh ahl sarmadi
Abstract
Introduction: Superficial theology and superficial understanding of religion, as a current of thought and belief throughout the history of Islam, has been presented in the form of various ideas and has been influential in social, cultural and moral fields. Mulla Sadra (979-1050 AH) in most of ...
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Introduction: Superficial theology and superficial understanding of religion, as a current of thought and belief throughout the history of Islam, has been presented in the form of various ideas and has been influential in social, cultural and moral fields. Mulla Sadra (979-1050 AH) in most of his works enters into the study and critique of this trend and its consequences in the society of his time. The main issue for him is the critique of superficial theology, which has limited the understanding of religion to the apparent level of texts and religious practice to individual jurisprudence. In most of his works, Mulla Sadra has criticized this kind of understanding of religion and believes that if we put all our efforts in grammar, we cannot provide a correct understanding of religion and religious texts. Therefore, one of the main axes of Sadra's thought is the critique of this type of understanding and the study of its social, political, moral and cultural consequences. In this study, we will conclude that if the ostensible understanding of religion prevails in society, the false moral values will prevail in society, and therefore the people of society will move towards cultural and moral decline every day. Basically, the goal of religion and morality is to value human beings and life. In fact, it should be said that from Mulla Sadra's point of view, there can be a significant relationship between this kind of understanding and interpretation of religion on the one hand and ethics, culture, people and even social and political sovereignty in a society on the other hand. Based on our best knowledge, no article or book has been written independently on the subject of this article in Persian, Arabic and English. However, we can indirectly use the following works to some extent; Emami Jome (2012) in an article entitled Hermeneutic Horizons of Transcendent Wisdom and Social, Cultural Mulla Sadra has studied the hermeneutic foundations of transcendent wisdom and its historical, social and cultural mission. Also, Arshad Riahi and Tabatabai (2016) in an article as strategies for reviving morality in society from the perspective of Sadr al-Muta'allehin to examine the strategies for reviving morality in societies that have been ruled by moral depravity or in the path of separation from values. Divine morality has been established, paid for. Method and Material: In this study, we have assumed that from Mulla Sadar's point of view, there is a significant relationship between a superficial understanding and interpretation of religion and moral, cultural and social issues. To prove this hypothesis, we had a comprehensive overview on documentary, library and content analysis and descriptive methods. Results and Discussion: The type of knowledge of societies about religion is influential in the ethics and culture of the society. Mulla Sadra has had a special view on this issue. He considers religious communities to be prone to religious violence due to the superficiality of scholars also he beleives that unreal scholars at any time, under the support of their rulers, have interpreted the verses of the Qur'an superficially in accordance with their thoughts and ideas, and in fact have imposed their opinions and prejudices on the Qur'an in order to achieve their goals. They have hired religion. The result of using unrealistic scholars for the government is that the government gains legitimacy through them,Therefore, it should be said that Mulla Sadra expresses the situation of his time not only as a complaint but also as a lesson. and it seems that his main concern to be about the future. Basically, the goal of morality should be to value human beings and their lives, and to stand against God's creatures is against human values, and Mulla Sadra pays special attention to this issue. According to Mulla Sadra, as science and knowledge spread in the society, the cultural, moral and existential perfection of the citizens increases and vice versa. If we want to express Mulla Sadra's conception of his time correctly, we must say that in his opinion, his time was a time of decline and a kind of deviation from the main path of human life. Although he could not take a step towards social, cultural and moral education due to the social conditions of his time, but today, with the help of his views, it is possible to provide the necessary and appropriate social, cultural and moral contexts. In this area, it is necessary to pay attention to the material, spiritual and planning needs for the cultural and moral flourishing of Islamic societies at the same time. As a result, it should be said that Mulla Sadra's philosophy is not just a collection of dry philosophical topics; rather, it is a coherent, well-founded, purposeful, dynamic, and practical system of thought, and if its content is considered, it can have a positive impact on human individual and social life. Conclusion: The type of societies' knowledge of religion influences the ethics and culture of that society. Lack of a rational approach to religion can severely adversely affect the family, society, culture, and moral system. Mulla Sadra considers religious communities to be prone to religious violence due to the superficiality of scholars. Unrealistic scholars in every age and time, under the protection of their rulers, have interpreted the verses of the Qur'an superficially according to their thoughts and ideas, and in fact, instead of interpreting the Qur'an, they have imposed their opinions and prejudices on the Qur'an. They have used religion to achieve their goals, as a result of which Mulla Sadra considers the mixing of imperfect scholars with sages and sultans as the cause of any sedition that has taken place in religion. Because religious scholars have a deep-rooted spiritual base among the people, the government can increase its popularity among the people by approaching unrealistic scholars. Mulla Sadra describes the situation of his time not only as a complaint but also as a lesson, and it seems that Mulla Sadra's main concern is with the future.
Philosophy
Rohullah Kazemi; ghasem purhasan
Abstract
Abstract Introduction:Ever since Aristotle studied intellect in the third book of on the soul (Aristotle, 1990: 429a-432a), the concept of intellect has become the fundamental issue of philosophical discussions among later philosophers, but in the meantime, Farabi is one a prominent exception counts ...
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Abstract Introduction:Ever since Aristotle studied intellect in the third book of on the soul (Aristotle, 1990: 429a-432a), the concept of intellect has become the fundamental issue of philosophical discussions among later philosophers, but in the meantime, Farabi is one a prominent exception counts with the establishment of the intellectology. The purpose of this article is to prove the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. The question is whether the intellect is self-founded in Farabi's thought, or does it rely entirely on the bestowal of active intellect? If the intellect is self-founded, what kind of role will the active intellect play? In this regard, Is Farabi's diction clear or confused, and how his language can be interpreted in favor of the autonomy of intellect. Farabi's declaration is less vague and more explicit in his various works. As far as the author is concerned, most of the investigations on Farabi's theory of intellect has been reportable and descriptive, and less has been sought to interpret and present a theory. These researches have first reported the meanings of intellect. Secondly, they have discussed intellect according to psychology. Thirdly, they have centralize more on active intellect, and ultimately, they have discussed the relationship between intellect and religion (Reza Akbarian, 2009; Kamalizadeh, 2014, Baharnejad, Changi Ashtiani, 2011, Fazlur-Rehman, 2011, Khosravi, 2020), but the question about autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking has not been their problem. Method and MatterialThe question of this research is whether intellect self-founded in Farabi’s thought. Along with the main question, the following sub-questions also raised. What is the difference between Farabi and Aristotle regarding intellect? In his field of semantics, which meaning is relate to practical reason and which to theoretical reason? To what extent is man and his intellect highlighted by giving originality to reason? What is the difference between the first noumenon that make the intellect actual and the noumenon at the higher levels of the intellect; That is, the intellect becomes actual with concepts only or with the proposition? Our approach answering these questions involves reporting, describing, analyzing, and finally interpreting. First, we explicitly or contently report Farabi's ideas and provide them to the reader. Then, we have turned to interpretation of his ideas to get the main point of understanding; finally, we have obtained the proof of the autonomy of intellect in his thinking. Here all of Farabi's thoughts on intellect studied in his various works. Therefore, according to the question of research and its method, the article has a theoretical framework and not an applied one. According to Farabi’s affirmation (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174), psychology based on intellectology. Accordingly, in terms of research and method, we have gone to the intellectology instead of psychology in analyzing and interpreting his thoughts.Discussion and Results Based on the main question, the main conclusion of this article is the self-foundation and autonomy of intellect in Farabi's thinking. First, Farabi authenticates the intellectology over the phsycology (Al-Farabi, 1995: 173-174) and speaks on the intellect as the main form of the soul (Farabi, 2008: 144-145). This idea is a source that provides an important perspective for the establishment of autonomy. Secondly, in explaining the meanings of reason in a certain opportunity (fi maani alaql), Farabi shows that all areas of life, from the public sphere to the more specific one, are embodied only by reason. However, the most important meaning that Farabi chooses to explain is the fifth meaning of intellect, which has four stages: potential intellect, actual intellect, used intellect, active intellect (ibid: 2012: 259). The question is how the intellect comes out of potential and go through these stages until to be compeer with the active intellect. It is true that al-Farabi also speaks of the role of the active intellect in the emergence from potentiality, but the role of the active intellect is inherently an ontological role in conferring the forms of beings. In addition, the explanation that expresses the relationship between the active intellect and the human intellect is a metaphor, and this metaphor shows difficulty of this relationship in terms of logic and clarity. Farabi believes that the potential intellect has the ability to abstract the essences and forms of beings and then to place the same forms as their essences (ibid: 223). Intellect, both through self-evident propositions (Al-Farabi, 1986: 103) or through the first noumenon (Al-Farabi, 1964: 37), becomes actual with its inherent effort and becomes one with the noumenon (Al-Farabi, 2012: 227-229). For him, even the active intellect itself is the subject of the human intellect (ibid: 1986: 103;, 1964: 35-36; Davidson, 1992: 50-51). In addition to these arguments, according to Farabi’s thinking, reason is the essence in which the truths of beings are occult (Farabi, 2008, 145). Eventually, the intellect becomes compeer to the active intellect (Farabi, 1964: 35) and man becomes the substance in which the active intellect seems to have dissolved under the ensign of the growth of intellect (Al-Farabi, 1986: 124-125). Al-Farabi's attempt to consolidate logic as an independent science (Al-Farabi, 1996, 27) means that logic for him is the stability of intellectual autonomy that does not need outside of itself and inspiration (Al-Jabri, 2011: 244-245).ConclusionAll of Farabi's efforts centralizes on the autonomy and self-foundation of intellect. Farabi does not claim just to connect with active intellect; He tries to prove the alignment of the human intellect with the active intellect. In his viewpoint, the intellect achieves all its evolutions in the question of being and the knowledge of the truths of beings, and this means that the intellect becomes autonomous to the extent of knowing the existence. From the viewpoint of the autonomy of reason, another perspective is to open for Farabi's reading. The denial or weakening of the autonomy of the intellect in Farabi’s philosophy makes the understanding of intellect experience of existence difficult in the epistemological and logical systems in many respects. Therefore, the author suggests that we study not only Farabi's thought but also philosophical thought from the perspective of the autonomy of Intellect.
Gholamhossein Khedri; Mastaneh Kakaii
Volume 3, Issue 1 , September 2012, , Pages 75-96
Abstract
The Agent intellect of Aristotle has different position in later philosophers’ thoughts. Each, according to their need and the vacuum in their philosophy would determine the position of the agent intellect. Plato considered ‘Universals' as self-subsistance, immaterial and permanent which ...
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The Agent intellect of Aristotle has different position in later philosophers’ thoughts. Each, according to their need and the vacuum in their philosophy would determine the position of the agent intellect. Plato considered ‘Universals' as self-subsistance, immaterial and permanent which were not in the sensible world. He had not felt that there would be a need for agent intellect; however Aristotle, contrary to his master put ‘Universals' in sensible things, and to be able to explain the concept of universals, required intellect. Since Aristotle discussed vaguely about the intellect and compared it with the sense, after him, exponents and commentators, extracted agent intellect from his philosophy, or like Alexander of Aphrodisias who considered it as a transcendent and supernatural being or put it beyond the human soul like, Muslim philosophers, Al-Farabi and Avicenna to resolve the issue of the relationship between plurality and unity as well as Knowledge. In contrast, some philosophers in the medieval age, like Thomas Aquinas despite the influence of these Muslim thinkers, regarding agent intellect took a different position and offered another explanation about Aristotle and put Intellect as part of the ‘soul'. Avicenna's agent intellect has the same position in Plotinus’ intellect. In the ontological realm, the link between separable intellects (tenth) and sensible things is offspring of emanation of the plurality of the material world. And in the epistemological realm, diffusion of the universal forms and ‘intelligible' on ‘rational soul’ and transformation from potentiality to actuality is one of its functions. Agent intellect for Thomas, according to him, is more Aristotelian and merely has epistemological position. Agent intellect for him is abstractive agent; it abstracts the intellectual forms from sensible things and actualizes them. In the ontological realm, agent intellect located in human soul and has no ontological and causal functions.
Zahra Mazaheri; mohammadkazem alavi
Abstract
One of the contemporary controversies about Islamic philosophy is the controversy over its originality that makes it possible. This identification issue has a great impact on the history of Islamic philosophy and the future of Islamic philosophy. In this regard, the opinions ...
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One of the contemporary controversies about Islamic philosophy is the controversy over its originality that makes it possible. This identification issue has a great impact on the history of Islamic philosophy and the future of Islamic philosophy. In this regard, the opinions of three contemporary thinkers, Mustafa Malekian, Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani and Reza Davari Ardakani, have been investigated. By reducing Islamic philosophy to theology, Malekian denies the originality and possibility of any religious philosophy, including Islamic philosophy. On the other hand, Dinani and Davari not only emphasize the originality of Islamic philosophy and its possibility, but also speaking of the necessary interaction between philosophy and Islam. This research has been done in four axes and in the form of these axes, their views have been studied. In analyzing these views, their agreement to oppose religious philosophy and their differences in considering Islamic philosophy as a religious philosophy is mentioned and it has been stated that it is possible to defend the possibility of Islamic philosophy by considering the demonstrative method and the argumentative process of Islamic philosophy. The impossibility of Islamic philosophy is considered incompatible with the historical reality of Islamic philosophy and its possibility has not been denied, but the continuation and the realization of the possibility of its advancement is only possible if current and future philosophical issues are taken into account.
Arya Younesi; hossein kalbasi; ghasem pourhassan
Abstract
Leo Strauss held that the essence of society is opinion and the essence of philosophy is knowledge and thought of these two as rivals; thus, he maintained that philosopher has to use esotericism and writing between lines to avoid persecution. Doing so, Strauss advanced a kind of hermeneutics ...
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Leo Strauss held that the essence of society is opinion and the essence of philosophy is knowledge and thought of these two as rivals; thus, he maintained that philosopher has to use esotericism and writing between lines to avoid persecution. Doing so, Strauss advanced a kind of hermeneutics which is invented for interpreting philosophical texts. One could find supportive idea to this hermeneutics in works of Plato, Farabi, Avicenna, Suhrawardi, Ghazali and others; but, there are, at the same time, a number of problems which Strauss’ hermeneutics face them: first of all, there are philosophers who hold opinions by strictly adhere to other philosophers thoughts rather than seeking knowledge; secondly, a long-lasting tradition of philosophical commentaries and interpretation undermine Strauss’, because it is not reasonable that a philosopher do not have enough courage and bravery to express their idea but commentators have; thirdly, a significant number of philosophers have not used esotericism in the ancient times, those philosophers weaken the universality of Strauss’ hermeneutics. In this paper, it is showed that hermeneutics of Leo Strauss is authentic for some ancient philosopher, but it could not be used as a general theory of interpretation for any given philosopher and philosophical school.
mohsen feyzbakhsh
Abstract
Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic World aims at developing the history of Islamic philosophy beyond Aristotelianism. The chapters of the book can be divided into two main parts. While one part addresses the juridical aspects of the works of those who are known as "philosophers" in the Islamic ...
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Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic World aims at developing the history of Islamic philosophy beyond Aristotelianism. The chapters of the book can be divided into two main parts. While one part addresses the juridical aspects of the works of those who are known as "philosophers" in the Islamic world, the other part is about Muslim jurists who have developed philosophical ideas in their works. For the most part, the topics are about questions in ethics and legal philosophy. The book can serve as starting point in the road to broadening the history of Islamic philosophy and understanding it in tandem with other aspects of Islamic intellectual history.
ahmad reza honari
Abstract
Abstract Symbolism in the field of metaphysics is a method that has always been considered and widely used in various religious and mystical and philosophical schools, as well as traditional arts such as Iranian Islamic art. Applying this method requires providing its own existential and epistemological ...
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Abstract Symbolism in the field of metaphysics is a method that has always been considered and widely used in various religious and mystical and philosophical schools, as well as traditional arts such as Iranian Islamic art. Applying this method requires providing its own existential and epistemological foundations. Given that metaphysical symbolism is related to the realm of existence, and in Islamic wisdom, the originality of existence and the originality of essence are the two foundations that have been proposed in the field of ontology and each has its own supporters, so this study seeks to answer this question. Are these two bases compatible with symbolism? Which is preferable to the other and what are the reasons for this preference? Given that the basis of the originality of existence provides a deeper look at existence, and also the metaphysical symbolism is based on the gradiation and the hierarchy of existence, so it is consistent with the originality of existence and this is preferable to the originality of essence Provide symbolism theory.
Ahad Nejad Ebrahimi; Minou GharehBaglou; amirhossein farshchian
Abstract
Introduction In Islamic architecture, the architect must be face all the issues in architectural design. Create quantitative & qualitative issues by observing the principles & rules of the process. The architect must create the architectural structure with geometry through art & based on ...
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Introduction In Islamic architecture, the architect must be face all the issues in architectural design. Create quantitative & qualitative issues by observing the principles & rules of the process. The architect must create the architectural structure with geometry through art & based on theoretical reason. Architecture has numerical & theoretical dimensions, because it is for the human being as a thinking being, it has qualitative dimensions. The architect must pay attention to the quantitative & qualitative dimensions in creating the architectural building. Traditional Iranian architecture has quality dimensions that include the wisdom of philosophers & Islamic thinkers of Iran. These topics are combined with the basics of other topics to work. Islamic architecture is called Islamic because it combines with the principles of Islamic wisdom & philosophy in uses it. In order to underst& Islamic architecture, wisdom must be examined in the process of creating an architectural building. The truth of the function of wisdom in the process of creating an architectural structure is an important issue. Wisdom in the science of architectural geometry can mean Coded truths that include the Coded structure of architecture. The Coded truths in Islamic philosophy are the same as the divine truths. God provides knowledge of divine truths to thoughtful & knowledgeable human beings who seek the truths of the universe. Thoughtful human beings become aware of the divine truths of God to the extent of the power of their intellect & perception. Islamic architecture in the l& of Iran has always used the principles & subjects of geometry in external & internal science. The use of geometry is superficial in maps & decorations & inwardly it is an architectural building in general form & body. The geometry used in the Islamic architecture of Iran has been done by Islamic thinkers, mathematicians & Scientists. Geometry in architecture increases the strength of the architecture & its beauty. Geometry has used wisdom in creating the beauty & function of an architectural building. An architectural structure is successful when human beings can meet their biological & spiritual needs through it. A skilled & professional architect can use all external & internal issues in creating an architectural building with wisdom. Geometry must also consider beauty in creating an architectural building through wisdom. Knowledge of geometry & wisdom is very important in creating an architectural building. Architecture as a traditional profession needs wisdom in geometry. In this article, the subject of geometry has been studied & analyzed from a scientific & artistic point of view. Also in this article, the subject of wisdom in geometry in creating an architectural building has been studied. Wisdom in this article is in the form of theoretical wisdom & practical wisdom. The point is, how does mathematics in geometry combine with artistic & aesthetic subjects? & How to create architecture using wisdom? In the present age there is no connection between the subjects of mathematics which are used rationally & the subject of wisdom. This is also seen in the science & art of architecture today. In the past architecture of Iran, there was a deep connection between mathematics & wisdom. In the past architecture of Iran, the connection between wisdom & mathematics in creating geometry has made the architecture of beautifuly & also its proper functionaly. In the science of wisdom, geometry has a meaning in the form of a code & this code has external & internal meanings & truths. The facts in the codes are not normally recognizable by human beings. The code of geometry is in the structure of the universe & has divine truth. Geometry in this world has a trend towards beauty. Wisdom in science belongs to Islamic philosophy. The meaning of wisdom in Islamic philosophy is knowledge & awareness that has been created through reasoning. Argument arises through deep thought in the human mind. Methouds & Material In this research, the views of Islamic mathematicians in the form of mathematics & wisdom have been studied. Islamic mathematicians include the following.Mohamad Bouzajani; Abu Nasr Farabi; Ibn Sina, Akhavan Al-Safa & Jamshid Kashani. The subject of the research method is to obtain geometry & wisdom from the perspective of mathematics. How to transfer geometry from visual and numerical dimensions to the practical world has been analyzed in this method. The success of riddles in the past must be examined in terms of wisdom and geometry. The research method of writing in mathematics and numerical subjects is deductive. The Grounded theory method has also been used in dealing with historical situations. Result & Discussion In Islamic architecture, geometry has been associated with wisdom. Wisdom in geometry has created a beautiful and functional architectural space and decorations. Geometry in the wisdom of Islamic architecture has a sacred place & has hidden secrets. Wisdom & geometry in architectural building, in addition to creating decorative roles in a general & specific way, has led to the recognition of the divine truth in the hidden layers of architectural construction. Accordingly, geometry in Islamic architecture has caused the symbolic identification of the truth of existence and the display of the hidden world. The geometry inside the architectural building is like a code that must be known. In Iranian Islamic architecture, geometry has been used to be aware of divine knowledge as well as to reveal the hidden truths of the divine world in the external world. Geometry has used wisdom for this issue. Conclusion Geometry is hidden in Islamic architecture as a mystery & truth. Geometry in its process shows real tangible subjects along with hidden subjects. Geometry creates awareness of the external & internal codes contained in the architectural building. The geometry of the codes in creating the architectural building in which wisdom plays a role can be identified & informed. In addition to a few topics in Islamic architecture, geometry deals with many qualitative issues. Theoretical wisdom & practical wisdom in understanding the science of geometry can in fact distinguish the outer world and the inner world. Geometry causes the objects that exist in the world of imagination and mentality to become a visible world & human beings can see it with their physical eyes. Geometry creates a logical connection between the external world & the internal world. This logical connection creates a balance between the worlds. Using the balance of geometry, he can distinguish the facts of existence. Geometry in Islamic architecture makes quantities & qualities conscious to man externally & inwardly.
Philosophy
mohammad ali vatandoost; mahdi Chanaani
Abstract
AbstractA major problem introduced to the contemporary Islamic philosophy by ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī is whether propter quid demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-limmiyya) can be deployed in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has given rise to two responses by contemporary scholars ...
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AbstractA major problem introduced to the contemporary Islamic philosophy by ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī is whether propter quid demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-limmiyya) can be deployed in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has given rise to two responses by contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy: some have endorsed and defended his view, and others have criticized the account. In this article, we draw on a descriptive-analytic method and adopt a critical approach to assess the two responses. We conclude that, notwithstanding its novelties, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account rests on problematic grounds. Moreover, it is founded upon a redefinition of demonstrations propter quid and quiatic demonstrations (al-barāhīn al-inniyya), which go against the common conception of these demonstrations in Islamic logic.Keywords: ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī, critique, propter quid demonstration (al-burhān al-limmī), quiatic demonstration (al-burhān al-innī), general implications IntroductionPropter quid demonstration (al-burhān al-limmī) and quiatic demonstration (al-burhān al-innī) are major issues in Islamic logic, which are deployed in other fields of study, including Islamic philosophy. In the contemporary Islamic philosophy, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī was the first to propound the idea that propter quid demonstrations are not legitimate in dealing with philosophical problems. On his account, the demonstrations or proofs used in coping with philosophical questions are general implications (al-mulāzamāt al-ʿamma), as it is indeed impossible to use propter quid demonstrations in philosophy. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account has been criticized by some of his students and contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy. Some have endorsed and defended his view, whereas others have criticized its foundations or raised objections against it by its own merits.The basic question of the present research is as follows: How to assess the arguments for and against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view of the deployment of propter quid demonstrations in philosophy?Method of ResearchIn this research, we provide an accurate rereading of the definitions of propter quid and quiatic demonstrations in Islamic logic, and then assess the views of both camps. We begin with an account of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view as well as the positions of his proponents and opponents. Finally, having evaluated both views, we elaborate upon our espoused account. This research is done with a descriptive-analytic method and a critical approach.DiscussionIn some of his works, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī suggests that propter quid demonstrations do not apply to philosophy. Indeed, all demonstrations or proofs in philosophy are quiatic demonstrations based on general implications. In his view, propter quid demonstrations cannot be deployed in dealing with philosophical problems. This is because the absolute existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq) as the subject-matter of philosophy is general, and since there is nothing beyond the absolute existence, it cannot have a cause, which implies that it cannot be subject to propter quid demonstrations, in which causes are adduced.With a survey of the debates over ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account among contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy, we find two major approaches: some have criticized ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view, and some have defended and justified the view.Javadi Amoli raises two objections against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s position. He holds that the predicate of existence is predicated of both absolute and qualified (muqayyad) existences, and when it is predicated of the latter, it can be subject to propter quid demonstrations, since qualified existence needs a cause. In addition, if propter quid demonstrations did not apply to philosophical problems, then all demonstrations in philosophy would be undermined and there would be no conclusive argument in philosophy, because quiatic demonstrations are grounded indeed in propter quid demonstrations. Given ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s response to Javadi Amoli’s objections, it turns out that his view presupposes his own account of the “criterion of philosophical problems.” However, the second objection raised by Javadi Amoli seems to go through.Mesbah Yazdi has also criticized ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view based on its incompatibility with the conditions of propter quid demonstrations in logic. He argues that causation in such demonstrations is not confined to external causation, but includes analytic causation as well. Accordingly, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view is objectionable. In this research, we endorse Mesbah Yazdi’s critique of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view.Gholam-Reza Fayyazi believes that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view should be examined in terms of his own assumptions. One such assumption is that all predicates that are more specific than the absolute existence equal existence when taken together with their complement notions. Moreover, in propter quid demonstrations, the middle term is indeed an external cause for the predication of the major premise on the minor premise. In Fayyazi’s view, the first assumption—equality of the “essential accident” (al-‘araḍ al-dhātī) with the subject-matter of a science—finds counterexamples in many philosophical problems, and the second contradicts the views of logicians, since they believe that the causation of the middle term in propter quid demonstrations includes both external and mental causation. In this research, we criticize Fayyazi’s first objection against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view, but we agree with the second objection, which is a reformulation of Mesbah Yazdi’s view.Yazdanpanah endorses ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s assumptions, but he argues that they have their source in the idea of a cause beyond the existent qua existent. However, since this idea is problematic, ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view is challenged. A reflection on Yazdanpanah’s remarks makes it obvious that they are reformulations the objections raised by Mesbah Yazdi and Javadi Amoli.Finally, people such as Samadi Amoli believe that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view should be deemed intuitive (shuhūdī), while all the objections raised against his view assume that philosophy is confined to reflective or intellectual knowledge. In this research, we criticize Samadi Amoli because it does not square with ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account to take it as pertaining to intuitive, rather than acquired, knowledge.ConclusionHaving assessed and examined the arguments for and against ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s account, we conclude that, despite its novel contributions, his view rests on problematic assumptions. Moreover, it is founded upon a redefinition of propter quid and quiatic demonstrations that goes against the standard view in logic. Thus, we should either modify the standard logic definition of propter quid demonstrations or believe that ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s view is a novel view based on new principles, which can be criticized.
Zahra Yahyapour; Naimeh Pourmohammadi; Malek Hosseini
Abstract
AbstractIntroduction The perennial problem of evil, which includes a set of problems, was generally formulated in three ways: (1) the logical problem of evil (logical inconsistency of God’s existence and attributes with the existence of evil), (2) the evidential problem of evil (evil ...
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AbstractIntroduction The perennial problem of evil, which includes a set of problems, was generally formulated in three ways: (1) the logical problem of evil (logical inconsistency of God’s existence and attributes with the existence of evil), (2) the evidential problem of evil (evil as evidence against the rationality of theism), and (3) the existential problem of evil (the inconsistency between religious beliefs and one’s lived experiences). The main apologetics provided in contemporary Islamic philosophy in reply to the logical problem of evil include (i) evil as illusory, (ii) evil as nonexistent, (iii) evil as relative, (iv) the necessary of there being an existing entity whose good outweighs its evil (or the necessity of little evil to perceive the good), (v) matter as the origin of evils, (vi) the necessity of evil for the realization of the good, (vii) the necessity of evil for perceiving the good, (viii) evil as what results from an atomistic view of the world, (ix) evil as existing only from the human perspective, and (x) evil as existing as a result of human free will. From the perspective of modern philosophy of religion, discourse criticisms were raised against the traditional apologetics and theodicies, which include Islamic philosophy as well. The criticisms include the following: (a) with respect to the proponent of the apologetics and theodicy: theoretical, subjective, and non-historical, (b) with respect to the nature of evils: abstract, essentialist, observer-related, and second-order, (c) with respect to the language of the apologetics and theodicy: non-tragic, (d) with respect to the practice of apologetics and theodicy: looking for professionalization and systematization. The present research considers the replies to the problem of evil offered by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, and analyzes and asses the above criticisms. Method of the Research The present research adopts a descriptive-analytic and critical method to consider the replies to the problem of evil offered in contemporary Islamic philosophy (ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari) as well as criticisms raised against them. It then deals with an analysis and elucidation of discourse criticisms of their replies from the perspective of modern philosophy of religion. Finally, it evaluates their criticisms and the extent to which they apply to the replies provided by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari. Moreover, it offers suggestions and solutions to revise or supplement their apologetics. Discussion and Results Islamic apologetics, particularly those of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, tend to adopt a subjective-theoretical approach. However, if we say that apologetics have practical commitments or approaches as well, then a particular approach will follow from such an interaction between theory and practice (theoretical and practical reason), which in addition to dealing with theoretical problems, will address the versions that are more specifically focused on practical concerns and solutions to the practical problems of evil. Moreover, the apologetics provided by Tabatabaʾi and Motahhari are subjective and are often focused on eliminating the feeling of evil in the subject’s mind. In this way, social and objective categorizations of the object will be warded off. Furthermore, their apologetics are non-historical, which might undermine their efficiency and might not deploy any social or political act. Evil is something non-conceptual, non-absolute, varied, and situation-dependent. For this reason, we need to think of providing practical, objective, and historical apologetics. ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi’s and Ayatollah Motahhari’s apologetics tend to be abstract and conceptual, rather than objective. They justify the evils not individually, but abstractly. That is, they do not engage much with objective evils and the realities of evil in time and place and its victims or agents. In this perspective, evil is no longer a problem that needs a solution. Moreover, their apologetics make a universal, static, and common essence for evil. However, evil is indeed situation-dependent, temporal, spatial, and highly varied. It thus seems that apologetics overcome the concept or ghost of evil, rather than the real evil. Further, apologetics are often observer-relative; that is, the ways in which theologians encountered the narratives of suffering and pains come down to the theological question(s) they give importance to. Such pictures, positions, and perspective demarcate the boundary and form a logical space within which people seek their replies. In addition, proponents of the apologetics use a second-order language, in the sense that they theorize about evils, and evil is described by philosophers and theologians, while the narratives and language of victims are first-order languages that can serve as models and might be inspiring, and in fact, effective novel replies may come out of their narratives. For this reason, we need to create a discourse that can collapse the prevalent discourse and be concrete, objective, non-essentialist, and non-absolute. The apologetics offered by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari avoid the tragic emotional language and are solely focused on eliminating logical inconsistencies. Apologetics can reply to the subjective and emotional problem of evil and at the same time sympathize, give consolations, and give meaning to the suffering so that they might not only be concerned with solving the theological and philosophical problem of evil, but also be concerned with solving the human problem of evil. The apologetics or theodicy of ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari tend to be a profession, chiefly focused on providing an intellectual system consistent with other elements of theology or philosophy. With mere focus on professionalization and systematization of apologetics and making theories about evil consistent with other philosophical and theological sections, apologetics might turn into a purely theoretical exercise and deviate from its goal of providing an answer to the person in pain and solving the problem of evil for the object. Furthermore, it hinders creative unproblematic answers, or those with a practical, objective, historical, concrete, structural, victim-centered, first-order, and tragic approach. Apologetics can have more liberal discourses with respect to philosophical and theological systems. Conclusion An overview of the replies offered by ʿAllama Tabatabaʾi and Ayatollah Motahhari, and a consideration of the above criticisms, require a reform, supplementation, invention, and presentation of new varieties of apologetics in Islamic philosophy, which particularly takes account of the practical dimension of evil as well. In that case, apologetics will be more responsive, more efficient, and more virtuous, and will face fewer criticisms and objections. On the other hand, apologetics should be consistent and compatible with the data from the religious tradition on which the apologetics is based and with the data about the world. Accordingly, in formulating and constructing theories, it is illuminating to consider the data from the transmitted tradition, reason, and experience at the same time.
mehdi golparvar rouzbahani
Abstract
Abstract.Willard Van Orman Quine, one of the dominant figures in the 20th-century Anglo-American philosophy, is said to have joked that “there are two sorts of people interested in philosophy, those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of philosophy”. Quine seems to ...
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Abstract.Willard Van Orman Quine, one of the dominant figures in the 20th-century Anglo-American philosophy, is said to have joked that “there are two sorts of people interested in philosophy, those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of philosophy”. Quine seems to suggest, in a humorous manner, that the history of philosophy lies completely out of the realm of real philosophy. If taken seriously, philosophy would have nothing to do with the history of philosophy. I argue in this article that Professor Quine and others of his mindset are wrong in that they mix up things that should be discriminated.As is well known, attitudes toward philosophy may be categorized in a variety of ways, among them is the familiar division of schools of “Analytic” and “Continental” in the Western philosophy, and the schools of “Peripatetic”, “Illuminationist” and “Transcendental” in the Islamic tradition of philosophy. In the same line of drawing contrast between different modes of philosophical thought and according to their relation with the history of the enterprise of philosophy, this article differentiates between two kinds of philosophizing, namely “trendy” and “historical”.Those loyal to the trendy way of philosophizing see their professional practice as independent from philosophy’s past, and rely solely on the ability of their “presentist” reason to address the currently existing challenges. This may be called a memoryless way of philosophizing, as there would be no need from this outlook to be concerned with philosophy’s past or to keep a memory of what has already happened in the enterprise. Philosophy as expected to be practiced now may be said to be detached from philosophy’s past, just as is the case in sciences. Those people who may be interested in the historical issues may of course refer to the history of philosophy, but this would not be philosophy proper. One could regard the contemporary Analytic philosophy which is the mainstream in Anglo-American circles as an exemplar of this attitude, whose pioneers give a demeaning look at the history of philosophy. As Wittgenstein has put in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, “most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.” If this is the case, why should philosophers bother themselves with the history of philosophy at all?Adherents of the historical way of philosophizing, on contrary, turn to philosophy’s past seeking philosophical truth, and shape their philosophy in exchange with it. According to this outlook, history of philosophy is like a precious mine of problems and ideas that were explored partially by some brilliant minds in the past. We may take benefit of their efforts by taking their philosophical concerns serious and move forward the enterprise by engaging with their problems and ideas. Many updates from different aspects would be needed for sure, but the essence of philosophical problems remains the same through the history of ideas. We would therefore need to do philosophy historically, that is to master the past as the key to understand the present. This type of philosophizing seems to have been realized by Islamic philosophers, who typically position themselves within a lineage of preceding thinkers. Just take the example of Mulla Sadra’s Asfar, a masterpiece in transcendental school of Islamic philosophy, and see the vast amount of discussions devoted to the thought of past thinkers.The way of philosophizing adopted by the advocates of each camp would have crucial impacts on their philosophy’s pedagogy and writing style, as well as on their historiography of philosophy. Especially, both are very susceptible to historical anachronism, namely to shape a distorted narrative of the past as viewed from the supposed vantage point of the present. Moreover, each attitude has also its peculiar characteristics. On one hand we see that the writings of trendy philosophers are typically overwhelmed with philosophical jargon; i.e., expressions that have gained very specialist and narrow meanings. On the other hand, the relations of ideas explored by historical philosophers and their development over centuries are usually very complicated to be captured, so the need for long years, even decades, for a scholar to be able to enter the circle of interlocutors.The present article characterizes trendy and historical ways of philosophizing separately, details their implications, and finally put them in comparison against each other. This problem falls within the scope of what is usually called metaphilosophy, and would make salient some features in the enterprise of philosophy that otherwise would have remained obscure. Another metaphilosophical issue is the probable unnoticed effects of the history of philosophy on the work of philosophers, whether trendies or historicals. This issue remains to be investigated further in a subsequent research.
Azam Ghasemi
Volume 3, Issue 1 , September 2012, , Pages 97-117
Abstract
From the standpoint of Seyyed Hossein Nasr the most challenges of human is due to demystification of knowledge. That’s why Scientia sacra is very important in his thought. His method is completely different from epistemologists’s method. He believes Primordial Tradition is able to overcome ...
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From the standpoint of Seyyed Hossein Nasr the most challenges of human is due to demystification of knowledge. That’s why Scientia sacra is very important in his thought. His method is completely different from epistemologists’s method. He believes Primordial Tradition is able to overcome challenges. In this paper Scientia sacra from the standpoint of Seyyed Hossein Nasr is described and finally it is criticized
masoud farastkhah
Abstract
Humanities in pre-revolutionary Iran had two distinct paths. In the first place, we may see these sciences with a critical and intellectual orientation that are focused on change and liberation. Sometimes they find political clashes and social conflicts. But in the second path, the humanities are seeking ...
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Humanities in pre-revolutionary Iran had two distinct paths. In the first place, we may see these sciences with a critical and intellectual orientation that are focused on change and liberation. Sometimes they find political clashes and social conflicts. But in the second path, the humanities are seeking more specialized research alongside current social conflicts and ultimately wanting to expand Iranian culture, Persian language, and knowledge of civilization, understanding its strengths and weaknesses, pursuing its interactions with other cultures. And they come from weaknesses and strengths. There followed the deeper layers of cultures beneath the skies of the world. The first path is often found at universities or at most institutions such as the Institute for Social Studies and Studies, which are influenced by student spaces and public discourses, intellectual spaces and political disputes, and in such circumstances sociologists such as Amir Hossein Aryanpour, We see the noblemen and the masters of history like Homa Talker and others
seyd mehdi mirhadi
Abstract
The aim of the present article is to investigate the relationship between imagination and emotions and to explain the role and way of the involvement of imagination in the emotional domain. The essence of the imagination, the nature of the affections and the relation between the imagination and emotions, ...
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The aim of the present article is to investigate the relationship between imagination and emotions and to explain the role and way of the involvement of imagination in the emotional domain. The essence of the imagination, the nature of the affections and the relation between the imagination and emotions, are the three main questions in the current research. Analysis and inference method was used to explain the subject. Preserving the faces after the sensory perception of phenomena, seizure in the repository faces, and the transformation of perceptual faces, are the main functions of imagination in the field of cognitive activity and self-stimulation. Instincts, natures and emotions are considered as the infrastructures of human tendencies. Emotions, while being acquired, are human tools for survival and excellence. According Mulla Sadra, emotions create motivation to move in human, and focus on self-esteem from scattered efforts and willing, in a single direction. According to him, emotions can be considered a kind of heart action by being activated in our existence, and since the activities of the soul are united with the oneself and are the part of it, then they can be the constructor of the ultimate entity of human and his/her overwordly face. The imagination is the origin of the emergence of emotions, the cause of the survival and decline of the emotions, and is the reason for meaning and revival of the emotions.
Mostafa Momeni
Abstract
Afḍal al-Dīn Muḥammad in Nāmāvar Khūnajī (d. 1248/646 AH) was a 13th-century logician who wrote eminent logical works such as Kashf al-Asrār ‘an Ghawāmiḍ al-Afkār [Uncovering the Secrets from Abstruse Thoughts], al-Mūjaz fi-l-Manṭiq [The Succinct in Logic], and al-Jumal fi-l-Manṭiq ...
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Afḍal al-Dīn Muḥammad in Nāmāvar Khūnajī (d. 1248/646 AH) was a 13th-century logician who wrote eminent logical works such as Kashf al-Asrār ‘an Ghawāmiḍ al-Afkār [Uncovering the Secrets from Abstruse Thoughts], al-Mūjaz fi-l-Manṭiq [The Succinct in Logic], and al-Jumal fi-l-Manṭiq [The Outlines in Logic]. This paper is concerned with textual criticism and verification of the latter essay. Although Kashf al-Asrār is Khūnajī’s most important work, it does not obviate our need to other works by him. It is, therefore, necessary to provide a refined text of these works, including his al-Jumal. This succinct essay counts as an abstract of Kashf al-Asrār, and was taught as a textbook for a long time. As evidence for the significance of the essay, it should suffice that several commentaries and expositions were written for it. The essay involves Khūnajī’s own views in Kashf al-Asrār as well. In my textual criticism of the work, I have relied on four manuscripts and one printed edition deploying the intermediary method (between copy-text editing and eclecticism) in order to provide scholars of logic with a refined text of the work. The significance of al-Jumal is attested by the fact that it was taught as part of the curriculum in northwestern Africa, and many expositions were written for it in this region. Although Khūnajī’s innovative ideas appears in his elaborate book, Kashf al-Asrār, a comparison between the two works reveals that the former is indeed an extended abstract of the latter. In fact, al-Jumal contains everything that appears in Kashf al-Asrār except for certain elaborations and objections raised by Khūnajī to others. Al-Jumal involves Khūnajī’s own views as well. Therefore, al-Jumal is a very succinct essay on important logical issues, serving as an introduction to logic and the rules of accurate thinking. It only includes the issues of definition and syllogism as part of arguments. In this essay, the author embarks on the core logical rules without going into preliminaries and without engaging in controversial problems. The method of textual criticism and an introduction of the manuscripts and copies: in the textual criticism of this book, I have deployed the “intermediary” method, relying on the following manuscripts: Two original manuscripts of al-Jumal both of which are close to the author’s time, and two other manuscripts of expositions of al-Jumal. “M”: the manuscript in Malek National Library, associated with Astan Quds Razavi, in microfilm no. 640, written between 1258 (657 AH) and 1268 (667 AH), and as it seems, it was proof-read by Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. “Q”: a manuscript of Jumal al-Qawā‘id [Outlines of the Rules] in Central Library of Astan Quds Razavi, no. 981. It was written in 1341 (742 AH) in Mecca. The manuscript is stamped as “precious.” “Sh”: a manuscript of Sharḥ al-Jumal [Exposition of the Outlines]. This manuscript also belongs to Malek National Library and was written in 1320 (720 AH). “A”: This is a very elaborate exposition of al-Jumal by Sayyid Sharīf Tilimsānī under Sharḥ Jumal al-Khūnajī fi-l-Manṭiq [Exposition of Khūnajī’s Outlines in Logic]. This manuscript belongs to Fazili Library in Khansar, available in Markaz Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami (Center for the Revival of Islamic Heritage) in Qom. I did not regard this as an important alternative copy.
ali asghar yazdanbakhsh; jahangir masoudi; Abbas Javareshkyan
Abstract
Introduction There have always been two viewpoints on the human rights in the history of Western philosophy: some philosophers adhere to Natural Law, while the others follow Positive Law. Among modern philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, and among the contemporary ones, Lon L. Fuller and John ...
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Introduction There have always been two viewpoints on the human rights in the history of Western philosophy: some philosophers adhere to Natural Law, while the others follow Positive Law. Among modern philosophers, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, and among the contemporary ones, Lon L. Fuller and John Finnis, are known to be followers of natural law. Positive law refers to the rights established by the legislator and recognized through interpersonal conventions and contracts; people and states may establish or lift them. As a matter of fact, this kind of law is focused on a set of rules and regulations which gains force through guarantee and acceptance of social institutions and governs a certain community during a specified time frame. Natural law, with its characteristics, i.e. universality, necessity, and stability, began to popularize in the West in the third century AD, but it is rather newly-established among Islamic scholar. It constitutes the origin of many governing rules in communities, so this topic deserves considerable debate and discussion by Islamic scholars. Rights, observance, setting up justice, and preventing injustice are of utmost importance in Islamic teachings; they also influence many religious acts, and Islamic doctrines strongly enjoin it and emphasize its moral, legal, and ideological necessity. Undoubtedly, the concept of human rights is one of the modern challenges facing Islam in comparison with the West, and it is going to take a more serious form in the future. The current paper did not search for strong and weak points of the theory of rational decency and obscenity and natural human rights and did not pass any judgment thereof; this paper aimed to analyze the ideas of Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra) as the founder of transcendental philosophy/theosophy, esp. the theory of decency and obscenity, and sought to answer the following question from his viewpoint: In Mulla Sadra’s opinion, are decency and obscenity rational and inherent? If so, is it possible to attribute the belief in natural human rights to him? The Study of these items from the viewpoint of Mulla Sadra and the analysis and evaluation of them will provide answers to above questions. The current paper focused on proving the following line of argument based on its multiple premises: - Premise 1: Duties/obligations bring rights with them. - Premise 2: Duties are congeneric with their rights. For instance, if a duty is conventional, its interrelated right will be conventional too, and if it is religious, i.e. originating in a divine command, the interrelated right will be religious too, having its roots in a divine command and providence. - From Mulla Sadra’s perspective, duties, decencies, and obscenities are inherent. Conclusion: Mulla Sadra believes that rights accompanying duties are inherent, incorporated in the center of reality. Apophatic interpretation of the duty as it is necessary to respect the freedom/ liberties of humans (It is decent to respect the freedom of humans.) consists in: “Humans should not be deprived of freedom.” (It is obscene to deprive humans of the freedom.) This duty is interrelated with a human right: humans enjoy the right to freedom. 2. Methods and Material we did this within the framework of Mulla Sadra’s perspective on ethical values. The data were gathered through library research and the conclusions were reached using a logical, deductive method. 3. Results and Discussion Although the discussion of rights is apparently different from the discussion of ethical values, these two topics can be linked according to some views; the foundations raised in one area can be extended to another, and we may conclude that although Mulla Sadra did not expressly state his acceptance of natural human rights, his ideas were in conformity with Inherent Natural Rights based on evidence and rational reasoning taken from his moral views. 4. Conclusion This paper used sufficient evidence to show that the theory of Mulla Sadra chosen in this regard was rational and inherent decency and obscenity. Regarding the question of Mulla Sadra belief in rational or inherent decency and obscenity, this paper answered that he believed in inherent, and not divine, decency and obscenity, in terms of ontology (real/outside world and universe of permanent positiveness) and believed in rational decency and obscenity in terms of epistemology (understanding and proving), not religious decency and obscenity. Ash’aris supported divine and religious decency and obscenity, but Mulla Sadra said this view would dispel wisdom, reason, and religion. In relation to understanding decency and obscenity and the intellectual ability of humans, Mull Sadra maintained that only a perfect human was able to grasp the inherent properties of acts not all people. In addition, different views on the contradiction and interrelation of rights and duties were covered, and it was proved that most scholars approved the existence of a relationship between natural human rights and belief in inherent and rational decency and obscenity. Only those who accept inherent decency and obscenity may support natural, innate rights, because the duties are congeneric with their interrelated rights. Thus Mulla Sadra who was a moral realist and believed in inherent decency and obscenity and considered all duties, decencies, and obscenities inherent would adhere to inherence or naturalness of rights. In summary, Mulla Sadra believed that humans, qua humans, enjoy universal, necessary, fixed rights which result from their nature and character, unaffected by time and space. These rights which are in total coordination with creation and universe are called Natural, Inherent, or Innate rights. Although Mulla Sadra did not mention explicitly the inherent decency and obscenity of duties and the inherence and naturalness of humans rights, it is possible to deduce these two points from his theoretical foundations and some views plus supporting premises.
keramat varzdar; fatemeh ketebchi
Abstract
IntroductionMulla Sadra differentiates between "action" and "intentional action". He considers the intentional action as an action, which is caused by second-order consciousness of the purpose of the action (Mulla Sadra 1981, 2/223). His interpretation of this second-order consciousness is "awareness ...
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IntroductionMulla Sadra differentiates between "action" and "intentional action". He considers the intentional action as an action, which is caused by second-order consciousness of the purpose of the action (Mulla Sadra 1981, 2/223). His interpretation of this second-order consciousness is "awareness of purpose" (Mulla Sadra undated, 69). According to him, the voluntary Agent is different from the intentional Agent. An intentional Agent is an Agent who not only intends to perform the action, but also has second-order consciousness of the purpose of the action (Mulla Sadra, 1354, 134); That is, he knows what he is doing and what purpose he is trying to achieve. This second-order consciousness leads to the transformation of action into intentional action and the feeling of free will.It seems that this ability is specific to the human soul and the faculties that is specific to this soul. The basic issue of this research is the analysis of the role of "practical reason" as a consciousness-creating factor in this process - that is, the process of converting a "voitional act" into an "intentional action" - in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. For this purpose, by searching in the works of Mulla Sadra, the authors try to evaluate the functions of "practical reason" in the process of issuing action and reveal its position as an "consciousness-creating factor" among the principles of action.Methods and MaterialThe research method of this paper is descriptive-analytical method. In this way, by referring to the different works of Mulla Sadra, the authors try to provide a complete description of his opinions. Then, by analyzing his opinions based on logical requirements, it is tried to discover the functions of practical reason in the process of intentional action in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Results and DiscussionThe element of "second-order consciousness", which is the condition for turning a voluntary action into an "intentional action", is one of the characteristics of the human soul, and animals lack such an element (Mulla sadra 1981, 6/312). In other words, animal souls have perception through their faculties; but they don't have second-order consciousness to their faculties and their perceptions; but the human soul has the ability to aware of the "self" and "its faculties” as a part of its perception (Mulla sadra 1981, 6/251). This feature is achieved by "reason faculty" for this soul (Mulla sadra 1363, 133-132). It seems that practical reason with three functions transforms voitional act into intentional action and brings second-order consciousness to a person.The first function of practical reason is the positive function. According to Mulla Sadra, the only faculty that creates particular mental forms is not the “imaginal faculty”; Rather, the practical reason has also the ability to create them (Mulla sadra 1363, 516-516). According to him, the affirmation of benefits is done in the imaginary level by the imaginal faculty and in the rational level by the practical reason (Mulla sadra 1382, 2/1037). The rational level here does not mean general mental forms, because Mulla Sadra points out that decision of doing an action always require partial mental forms (Mulla sadra 1363, 516) and he states also that practical reason is the ability to perceive practical mental forms (Mulla sadra 1360, 200).The second function of "practical reason" refers to the judgment about the practical mental forms that the imaginal faculty has acknowledged their usefulness. In his sensory and imaginary encounters with the real world, a person creates images of action. When the imaginal faculty creates a practical image in the imagination and decides to issue it based on nature of body; practical reason evaluates its acceptance, and it judges the goodness and badness of that partial practical judgment based on general normative patterns (Mulla sadra 1354, 261).The third function of "practical reason" in the process of issuing an intentional action is managing the imaginary passions of a person towards performing an action. This role-playing actually occurs at a time when the imaginal faculty orders the performance of action A and in this way, arouses the lust or anger of a person to do it. This function is different from the previous function; because the practical reason in the previous function used to make judgments about the decision of the imaginal faculty; But in this function, practical reason manage lust or anger which is the result of the decision of the imaginal faculty. Mulla Sadra referred to this function as "caring" (Mulla sadra 1981, 3/419). ConclusionIn transcendental wisdom, the Reason is a self-aware power; this means that it can rationalize itself and achieve second-order self-consciousness. The Reason rationalizes not only itself, but also other perceptive and practical powers. Rationalizing here is not the understanding of the general mental form, but the acquisition of second-order consciousness.According to Mulla Sadra, "intentional action" is different from "voluntary action" because "intentional action" is an action that is the result of the will along with the "second-order consciousness of the agent" for the purpose of the action. According to the this explanation, the element of "second-order consciousness" is an element that is obtained by adding "practical reason" to the principles of action; Therefore, "intentional action" is a voluntary action in which "practical reason" plays a role in its process.Practical reason with three different functions brings second-order consciousness to the human soul: imagining particular and practical mental forms, acknowledging its usefulness and managing perceptual and motivational other faculties.
saeed anvari; Zeynelabidin Hüseyni
Abstract
Extended abstract Introduction In this poem of one thousand couplets (alfīya) which was composed in the eighteenth century, the treatise The Temples of Light has been poetized. There is a separate commentary on the treatise which shall be introduced in a moment. In the present work, Alfiya has ...
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Extended abstract Introduction In this poem of one thousand couplets (alfīya) which was composed in the eighteenth century, the treatise The Temples of Light has been poetized. There is a separate commentary on the treatise which shall be introduced in a moment. In the present work, Alfiya has been edited and published alone. An introductory discussion of Alfiya and the commentary The author of the treatise is a person named Hassan al-Kurdi who has described himself as the “versifier” (nāẓim) and Suhrawardi as “the author”. In his commentary on The Temples of Light, he has used the commentary by Jalal al-Din Davani (d. 1502 AD) on The Temples of Light and the one by Qutb al-Din Shirazi (d.1311 AD) on The Philosophy of Illumination. He has also used several philosophical works to supplement his content. He names Suhrawardi as “Abu al-Faraj Muhammad Suhrawardi”. In some of his couplets the author has referred to Quranic verses and used their themes in his poetry. This Alfiya is subsumed under pedagogical poetry, where the form of poetry is utilized to facilitate learning and memorization of various types of knowledge. In Arabic, this kind of poetry is more in the metre rajaz, which is why it is called arjūza. The first couplet of Alfīya is as follows: Yā ḥayyu yā qayyūm yā dha-l-qūdra / Ayyid wa-thabbitni bi-nūr al-ḥikma The treatise is the second book in which one of Suharawardi’s work is poetized. Prior to that, in the fourteenth century, Imad al-Din Arabshahi Yazdi had versified Suharawardi’s The Lovers’s Companion (Munis al-Ushshaq). Composition’s date As it can be inferred from the introduction to the script, Hassan al-Kurdi lived in Damascus, and he had been writing his commentary from the first day of Ramadan until the Day of Arafa (the ninth day of the month dhi-l-hajja according to the Islamic calendar), i.e. in about one hundred days. At the end of his commentary, he has equated, under the abjad system, the date of finishing his work (1170 AH/ 1756 AD) with the word “ghasqī”. The stamp of Ottoman Sultan Selim III’s Royal Library has been put on the margin of Alfiya and its commentary. On the author In biographical dictionaries, there are different people named Hassan al-Kurdi, but none of them could definitely be said to be the author of the treatise; hence no available information about him. A description of the copies The unique copy of Alfiya numbered 2486 and the commentary script numbered 2515 are housed in Turkey’s Suleymaniyī Library. There are some lacunas in Alfiya, but checked against the couplets in the commentary, finally the number of Alfiya’s couplets is exactly 1000, and the couplets are completely diacriticized. The text of the commentary is mixed with verses of Alfiya, and it has no diacritical marks. From the commentator’s introduction, it can be inferred that Alfiya and the commentary were written by the same person. Scripting is in naskh style and very legible. There are lacunas and errors in both Alfiya and the commentary, which have been corrected on the margins. Research method Because of the uniqueness of the script of Alfia, in editing this treatise the method of editing based upon the original copy was employed. Those verses that have repeated themselves as a result of being mixed with the text of the commentary have been used as the second copy, and the differences are reported in the footnotes. Conclusion Publication of the work can make a contribution to research on Suhrawardi and the history of Islamic philosophy and its impacts.
