نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشجوی دکترای کلام امامیه، گروه کلام امامیه، دانشکده الهیات، پردیس فارابی، دانشگاه تهران، قم، ایران
2 استادیار فلسفه اخلاق زیستی، گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران
چکیده
علامه طباطبایی (ره) فیلسوفی کلاسیک بر ممشای حکمت متعالیه و مفسر بزرگ قرآن کریم است اما اندیشه وی در این دو حوزه محدود و متمرکز نشده و در حوزه‌های معرفتی دیگر نیز دارای اندیشه‌های بدیعی است. یکی از این حوزه‌ها فلسفه اخلاق است. بی‌تردید اصلی‌ترین بحث در فلسفه اخلاق به تقسیم‌بندی واقع‌گرایی و غیرواقع‌گرایی اخلاقی تعلق دارد. هدف از این پژوهش پردازش این مسئله است که علامه طباطبایی در کدام‌یک از این دسته‌بندی‌ها جای دارد و تبیین آن با کدام موضوعات فلسفی انجام می‌پذیرد؟ این مقاله که با روشی اسنادی_تحلیلی تألیف شده است، تلاش دارد با تحلیل و تبیین مسئله «اعتباریات» و نگهداشت مسئله «احساس» ذیل عنوان اعتباریات به این موضوع بپردازد. نتیجه پژوهش این است که علامه طباطبایی (ره) یک واقع‌گرای اخلاقیِ تعریف‌گرا است.
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
Realism in the System of Moral Knowledge of Allameh Tabataba'i
نویسندگان [English]
- Abouzar Norouzi 1
- Mohsen Shiravand 2
1 PhD Student of Kalam Imamieh, Department of Kalam Imamieh, Faculty of Theology, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran
2 Assistant Professor of Ethics, Islamic knowledge Department, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
چکیده [English]
Allameh Tabataba'i (Seyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba'i) is a classic philosopher in the tradition of the Transcendent Philosophy and a great commentator of the Holy Qur'an. His thoughts are not, however, limited to these two areas. He has new ideas in other epistemic areas as well, including ethics. The main area in ethics is undoubtedly the division of schools into moral realism and non-realism. The purpose of this research is to analyze the issue of Allameh Tabataba'i's position in these categories and to gloss the philosophical subjects which describe this issue? This paper tries to address this issue by analyzing and explaining the issue of "Iʿtibārīyāt" (fictions) and "sensation".
Methods
This paper is written in a documentary-analytical way.
Results and Discussion
In the theory of Iʿtibārīyāt (Fictions), we have the following propositions:
Each of delusive meanings is based on the truth; each delusive limit that we present in a referent, has another real referent that has been taken from it; indeed, the consideration is not untruthful;
The moral propositions are the model and representation of the Causality, which even manifests itself in mental conceptions;
The obligation state of "ought" has been taken in all fictions from the obligation of “necessity” and, therefore, the state of prohibition will be taken from the necessity of “privation”.
Rational men’s Fictions are based on criterions and truths. They judge that justice or honesty are goodness, because they think that both of them are always helpful to the interests and purposes of society. Real effects are predicated on these Affairs. Accordingly, it can be deduced that the consideration of good and evil is the result of the general necessity that the pre-community human being considers inevitably. Goodness and badness are natural particulars. Their favorability and acceptance or unfavorability and disacceptance are perceived by the faculty of perception. Moreover, any freewill act is done with using the state of "necessity". therefore, when we do any action we believe that doing that action bases on the requirement of the active power (quwwat faʿʿālat).
Good and bad are defective and, unlike truth and falsity, are true sentences that describe the attributes of the action and the harmony between the action and the goal (telos). Whenever a person considers something to achieve his/her goal and interest of the action, and the consideration and goal are rational, it will be useful and otherwise abolished and unnecessary.
Moral judgments are not pure considerations, but based on the truths of the world, mankind, noumenal interests and evil aspects, and have their own real and special effects.
The difference between true knowledge and considerative (mentally-posited) one is that true knowledge is abstracted from the outside world of mind. True knowledge is called truth (ṣidq) Corresponding to truth in the outside world of mind, and is called right (ḥaq) because the outside world of mind corresponds to it. Consequently, the meaning of truth and right is that this mental truth is exactly the same as the external reality, and the external reality is the same as the truth that it is in the mind.
But considerative knowledge is realized only in the mind and does not correspond to the outside world of the mind unless an interest of our interests impels us considering it factual. The fact of predicate of these propositions of cases is depends on the consistency and mismatch with the opinions of scholars and rational men. The creation (inshāʾ) of scholars are not vain, and goes back to the realm of their understanding of realities.
Conclusion
Therefore, the following achievement can be guided: the considerative meanings are taken from the realities. The considerative obligation, through the scholar’s consideration, is taken from real obligation for acquisition of goal and interest of the action. The considerative propositions of ethics are based on the realities of the universe and mankind and the noumenal interests and evil aspects, and have their own real and special effects. Corresponding to Allameh's view, although propositions of ethics and creative propositions are cognate, and thus they are not in the cycle of real propositions that are capable of being truth or falsity, but the reality of moral propositions and judgments and judgments is explained in terms of their intentions and goals according to the beliefs of scholars and their perception of reality. Thus, the view of Allameh Tabataba'i in his epistemic system stays on defining moral realism.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
- Allameh Tabataba'i
- Good and Evil
- Necessity
- Fictions (Iʿtibārīyāt)
- Sensation
- Moral realism
- Defining realism
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