Abstract
The main problem of this research is that evidentialism, as an epistemological theory, emphasizes the necessity of sufficient evidence for belief; however, the variety of its types and its relationship with al-Farabi's thought requires investigation. Using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on Anthony Robert Booth's reading, this research examines the types of evidentialism and their relationship with al-Farabi's epistemological foundations. The findings show that Booth considers al-Farabi to advocate "Islamic moderate evidentialism," whereby absolute certainty is exclusive to prophets, and only in their case does complete evidentialism find meaning; other individuals have access only to a lower degree of evidentialism, and their evidence, unlike the universal evidence of prophets, contains gaps that undermine epistemic certainty. In this regard, the role of prophethood in epistemic guidance and the difference between epistemic and non-epistemic evidence are explained. Finally, one consequence of this moderate evidentialism is the identification of extremist beliefs, meaning that non-elite individuals who hold certain beliefs without definitive evidence are considered extremist and must always accept the possibility of error; based on this view, there is no conflict between revelation and reason or religion and philosophy, and the necessity of prophetic guidance for human perfection becomes clear.

Keywords: al-Farabi, Anthony Robert Booth, evidentialism, anti-evidentialism, moderatism, normativity
1. Introduction
This research examines the position of "evidentialism" in al-Farabi's philosophy. Evidentialism, as an epistemological theory, considers belief justification contingent upon sufficient evidence, deeming mere faith or emotional inclination insufficient. The main question is whether al-Farabi can be counted among evidentialists, and if so, what characterizes this evidentialism? The study focuses on Anthony Booth's theory, which coins "Islamic moderate evidentialism," introducing al-Farabi as a moderate approach representative. Booth claims al-Farabi distinguished between absolute certainty (exclusive to prophets) and relative certainty (exclusive to philosophers and the general public). While accepting Booth's general framework, this research argues his analysis, rather than being directly extracted from al-Farabi's texts, is influenced by commentators such as Deborah Black and Leo Strauss. Therefore, the present study systematizes this theory through direct reference to al-Farabi's works. Reviews indicate that although numerous articles address reason and revelation, imagination, and prophethood in al-Farabi's philosophy, "moderate evidentialism" with focus on Booth's views lacks sufficient background. This article's distinction lies in direct reference to "Conditions of Certainty" (Sharā'iṭ al-Yaqīn), "The Principles of the Views of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City" (Mabādi' Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila), and "The Attainment of Happiness" (Taḥṣīl al-Sa'āda) to test Booth's claims.


2. Materials & Methods
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical method, relying on direct reference to al-Farabi's primary texts to systematize and evaluate Booth's theoretical framework of Islamic moderate evidentialism. The primary sources include "Conditions of Certainty" (Sharā'iṭ al-Yaqīn), "The Principles of the Views of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City" (Mabādi' Ārā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila), and "The Attainment of Happiness" (Taḥṣīl al-Sa'āda). By engaging directly with these works, the study examines Booth's claims and evaluates whether his interpretations derive from al-Farabi's texts or are influenced by secondary commentators.
3. Discussion & Result
This research begins by delineating the Islamic world's intellectual atmosphere. From Booth's perspective, Mu'tazilites represent evidentialism, insisting on independent rational argumentation for justifying religious belief. Conversely, Ash'arites, through their theory of "acquisition" (kasb) and prioritizing divine will, represent "anti-evidentialism," where God's command alone suffices for belief justification. Al-Farabi went beyond Mu'tazilite theology and turned to philosophy to offer knowledge certain and superior to theological dialectics.
Based on Booth's reading of al-Farabi's "Conditions of Certainty," certainty possesses six fundamental conditions, most importantly "being essential" and "actual and complete correspondence with reality." Booth concludes this absolute certainty is exclusively available to prophets. This exclusivity lies in the supreme imaginative faculty and the prophet's complete connection with the Active Intellect. Since non-elites lack this imaginative faculty, their certainty remains relative and mixed with doubt and probability. In this system, religion transmits truths to the masses. The masses lack capacity to comprehend pure rational demonstrations; therefore, they must be guided through rhetorical, representational, and persuasive methods. Consequently, religious beliefs of common people, though not philosophical demonstrations, are not false; rather, they are "imitations" (muḥākāt) and "representations" of truth.
An important result of al-Farabi's moderate evidentialism is resolving the apparent conflict between religious and philosophical propositions. First, the metaphorical aspect of religious teachings for masses: these are imaginative and representational forms of philosophical truths. Although their epistemic evidence is weaker than demonstration, they are true and necessary within their domain and do not conflict with philosophy. Second, the practical aspect of certain religious beliefs: these must be accepted based on practical evidence. Validity conditions for such beliefs differ from truth conditions of theoretical philosophical knowledge.
This research addresses that belief in absolute certainty for non-prophets is itself "extremist belief" and deviation. Human perfection for ordinary people consists in following laws and representations brought by the prophet and moving toward happiness according to their existential capacity. Since we lack voluntary control over our certainty, extremist belief is deficient due to "non-correspondence with available evidence." With this provision, al-Farabi justifies the political and epistemic order of the virtuous city based on epistemological hierarchy (the prophet at the apex, the philosopher in the middle, and common people at the base).
4. Conclusion
This research demonstrates that Booth's effort to formulate "moderate evidentialism" in al-Farabi's thought provides a useful framework for understanding the complex relationship between reason and faith in Islamic philosophy. According to this reading, al-Farabi is neither an absolute rationalist nor an Ash'arite fideist, but a philosopher granting distinguished epistemological status to "absolute prophetic certainty." Non-elites are bound to live in religious representations' shadow, while the philosopher operates at the boundary between philosophical demonstration and practical necessity of guiding society. Thus, philosophy and religion are both justified and necessary, with no inherent conflict, although their epistemological levels are not identical. The author emphasizes that, contrary to Booth, who remained confined within the Straussian interpretive framework, direct examination of al-Farabi's texts reveals profound coherence between the soul's faculties and the ultimate goal of human happiness.