mehdi golparvar rouzbahani
Abstract
Abstract.Willard Van Orman Quine, one of the dominant figures in the 20th-century Anglo-American philosophy, is said to have joked that “there are two sorts of people interested in philosophy, those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of philosophy”. Quine seems to ...
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Abstract.Willard Van Orman Quine, one of the dominant figures in the 20th-century Anglo-American philosophy, is said to have joked that “there are two sorts of people interested in philosophy, those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of philosophy”. Quine seems to suggest, in a humorous manner, that the history of philosophy lies completely out of the realm of real philosophy. If taken seriously, philosophy would have nothing to do with the history of philosophy. I argue in this article that Professor Quine and others of his mindset are wrong in that they mix up things that should be discriminated.As is well known, attitudes toward philosophy may be categorized in a variety of ways, among them is the familiar division of schools of “Analytic” and “Continental” in the Western philosophy, and the schools of “Peripatetic”, “Illuminationist” and “Transcendental” in the Islamic tradition of philosophy. In the same line of drawing contrast between different modes of philosophical thought and according to their relation with the history of the enterprise of philosophy, this article differentiates between two kinds of philosophizing, namely “trendy” and “historical”.Those loyal to the trendy way of philosophizing see their professional practice as independent from philosophy’s past, and rely solely on the ability of their “presentist” reason to address the currently existing challenges. This may be called a memoryless way of philosophizing, as there would be no need from this outlook to be concerned with philosophy’s past or to keep a memory of what has already happened in the enterprise. Philosophy as expected to be practiced now may be said to be detached from philosophy’s past, just as is the case in sciences. Those people who may be interested in the historical issues may of course refer to the history of philosophy, but this would not be philosophy proper. One could regard the contemporary Analytic philosophy which is the mainstream in Anglo-American circles as an exemplar of this attitude, whose pioneers give a demeaning look at the history of philosophy. As Wittgenstein has put in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, “most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.” If this is the case, why should philosophers bother themselves with the history of philosophy at all?Adherents of the historical way of philosophizing, on contrary, turn to philosophy’s past seeking philosophical truth, and shape their philosophy in exchange with it. According to this outlook, history of philosophy is like a precious mine of problems and ideas that were explored partially by some brilliant minds in the past. We may take benefit of their efforts by taking their philosophical concerns serious and move forward the enterprise by engaging with their problems and ideas. Many updates from different aspects would be needed for sure, but the essence of philosophical problems remains the same through the history of ideas. We would therefore need to do philosophy historically, that is to master the past as the key to understand the present. This type of philosophizing seems to have been realized by Islamic philosophers, who typically position themselves within a lineage of preceding thinkers. Just take the example of Mulla Sadra’s Asfar, a masterpiece in transcendental school of Islamic philosophy, and see the vast amount of discussions devoted to the thought of past thinkers.The way of philosophizing adopted by the advocates of each camp would have crucial impacts on their philosophy’s pedagogy and writing style, as well as on their historiography of philosophy. Especially, both are very susceptible to historical anachronism, namely to shape a distorted narrative of the past as viewed from the supposed vantage point of the present. Moreover, each attitude has also its peculiar characteristics. On one hand we see that the writings of trendy philosophers are typically overwhelmed with philosophical jargon; i.e., expressions that have gained very specialist and narrow meanings. On the other hand, the relations of ideas explored by historical philosophers and their development over centuries are usually very complicated to be captured, so the need for long years, even decades, for a scholar to be able to enter the circle of interlocutors.The present article characterizes trendy and historical ways of philosophizing separately, details their implications, and finally put them in comparison against each other. This problem falls within the scope of what is usually called metaphilosophy, and would make salient some features in the enterprise of philosophy that otherwise would have remained obscure. Another metaphilosophical issue is the probable unnoticed effects of the history of philosophy on the work of philosophers, whether trendies or historicals. This issue remains to be investigated further in a subsequent research.
Zahra Mazaheri; mohammadkazem alavi
Abstract
One of the contemporary controversies about Islamic philosophy is the controversy over its originality that makes it possible. This identification issue has a great impact on the history of Islamic philosophy and the future of Islamic philosophy. In this regard, the opinions ...
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One of the contemporary controversies about Islamic philosophy is the controversy over its originality that makes it possible. This identification issue has a great impact on the history of Islamic philosophy and the future of Islamic philosophy. In this regard, the opinions of three contemporary thinkers, Mustafa Malekian, Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani and Reza Davari Ardakani, have been investigated. By reducing Islamic philosophy to theology, Malekian denies the originality and possibility of any religious philosophy, including Islamic philosophy. On the other hand, Dinani and Davari not only emphasize the originality of Islamic philosophy and its possibility, but also speaking of the necessary interaction between philosophy and Islam. This research has been done in four axes and in the form of these axes, their views have been studied. In analyzing these views, their agreement to oppose religious philosophy and their differences in considering Islamic philosophy as a religious philosophy is mentioned and it has been stated that it is possible to defend the possibility of Islamic philosophy by considering the demonstrative method and the argumentative process of Islamic philosophy. The impossibility of Islamic philosophy is considered incompatible with the historical reality of Islamic philosophy and its possibility has not been denied, but the continuation and the realization of the possibility of its advancement is only possible if current and future philosophical issues are taken into account.
Morteza Bahrani; Seyed Mohsen Alavipour
Abstract
In the wake of the Greek classic philosophers, ‘friendship’ as a philosophical and political concept has also been considered in the political philosophy of Muslim thinkers. However, they considered this category differently due to the differences between Islamic thought and Greek thought ...
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In the wake of the Greek classic philosophers, ‘friendship’ as a philosophical and political concept has also been considered in the political philosophy of Muslim thinkers. However, they considered this category differently due to the differences between Islamic thought and Greek thought in thier totality. Downplaying the importance of this concept in the context of political thinking and taking advantage of some auxiliary concepts, Islamic philosophers sought to put aside the concept in their political philosophy. Examining the concept of friendship in the opinions of philosophers such as Kennedy, Farabi, Ameri and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi through a content analysis of their works, this paper shows that Muslim scholars in borrowing ideas from Greek philosophers, represented a special narrative of the constitutive concepts of political system, based on their intellectual contexts, which in some cases is in contradiction with the approach of the Greek philosophers.
mohammad asghari
Volume 6, Issue 4 , March 2016, , Pages 29-51
Abstract
Abstract
Despite the temporal or historical and geographical differences between Japanese Kyoto Philosophical School in twentieth Century and Islamic Philosophy, there are remarkable similarities for doing comparative studies and therefore, according to the author, ‘the possibility of dialogue’ ...
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Abstract
Despite the temporal or historical and geographical differences between Japanese Kyoto Philosophical School in twentieth Century and Islamic Philosophy, there are remarkable similarities for doing comparative studies and therefore, according to the author, ‘the possibility of dialogue’ between them is conceivable. However, this article does not claim that a full logical correspondence between these two schools can be established. Kyoto is rooted in traditional Japanese school of Zen Buddhism and mystical and philosophical thoughts of the West. Key representatives of the school are Kitaro Nishida, Nishitany Keiji and Tanabe Hajime, which, in this article, we will focus mainly on religious and mystical ideas of Nishida and Nishitany. Nishida Kitaro is considered as the founder of Kyoto School. The prevailing thought of the school is based on the concepts of nothingness, God, manifestation, love, religion and soul. On the other hand, we encounter almost the same concepts in Islamic philosophy in the thoughts of its prominent representatives such as Rumi, Ibn Arabi, Sadra affected by religious tradition, the Quran, and Greek philosophy (including the Neo-Platonic philosophy). Focusing on concepts like God, divine manifestation, divine love, religion and soul on both sides, this paper seek to show the ‘possibility’ of dialogue between them.
Najibullah Shafagh; Mohammad Fanaei Eshkevari
Volume 4, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 101-123
Abstract
The aim of this article is to explain possibility of Islamic Philosophy and describe its main characteristics and schools. Concerning the question of possibility and actuality of Islamic Philosophy, our approach in the article is that the question has a historical nature. So, to answer questions like ...
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The aim of this article is to explain possibility of Islamic Philosophy and describe its main characteristics and schools. Concerning the question of possibility and actuality of Islamic Philosophy, our approach in the article is that the question has a historical nature. So, to answer questions like ‘is Islamic Philosophy possible?’ And if yes: ‘has it ever been actualized?’ should consider philosophy, in this historical development, as a progressive discipline which from its entrance into the Islamic world has been continuously changed. In the development process of this philosophy, a variety of perspectives, theories, issues, and problems have arisen, some of them have been placed in the core of the philosophical mainstream, and some of them have been laid aside or ignored. So, in this process, this discipline has experienced some philosophical expansions and contractions, has taken some theories, problems, issues …, and has laid away some other.
These changes and developments bring about a distinguished nature for Islamic philosophy. We can say that this discipline has three general and distinct characteristics: looking comprehensiveness (looking at physical and metaphysical worlds comprehensively); certainty (as a common core of knowledge); and God- oriented (regarding God as most importance being in the human life). In this paper, first of all, we will describe the main characteristics of main Islamic philosophy’s schools, Peripatetic, Illumination, and transcendent philosophy, and then argue that there is no inconsistency between ‘Islamic philosophy’ concept and open intellectual development.
Reza Akbari
Volume 2, Issue 1 , October 2011, , Pages 1-18
Abstract
Fideism, evidentialism and pragmatism are three major models of theism in contemporary religious epistemology. Each of these major models includes minor models. In Fideism we find three models according to them faith is in contrast with intellectual reasoning, without any relation to intellectual ...
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Fideism, evidentialism and pragmatism are three major models of theism in contemporary religious epistemology. Each of these major models includes minor models. In Fideism we find three models according to them faith is in contrast with intellectual reasoning, without any relation to intellectual reasoning or without any need to intellectual reasoning. Evidentialism covers syllogistic and probabilistic evidentialism and pragmatism can be world-centered or hereafter-centered. Surveying Muslim philosophers' thoughts and reconstructing their theories in a new way allows us to have dialog with contemporary theories in the realm of religious epistemology. For example with contemplating on Avicenna's philosophy we can reconstruct his theory in the frame of syllogistic evidentialism and studying Sadra's philosophy permits us to remodel his theory in the frame of the third model of fideism. We also can rebuild Ghazali's theory in the frame of pragmatism. Understanding models of theism in contemporary era and endeavoring for reconstructing Muslim philosophers' thoughts let us act well when we encounter atheism and its different models.
Abdurrazzaq Hesamifar
Volume 2, Issue 1 , October 2011, , Pages 43-59
Abstract
Since 17th century, western philosophy experienced a basic change in philosophical research and discussing the formation of knowledge and its validity became the most important problem in philosophy. This change, however, was reflected in Islamic philosophy three century later, because there was ...
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Since 17th century, western philosophy experienced a basic change in philosophical research and discussing the formation of knowledge and its validity became the most important problem in philosophy. This change, however, was reflected in Islamic philosophy three century later, because there was no relation between these two worlds of philosophy. As a great expert in Islamic philosophy, Motahhari attempted at first to be informed of the ideas of the modern and contemporary philosophers and afterwards to review them. One of these ideas on which he was concerned, was the problem of knowledge. There are two counter views on perception and its representation. The first one is realism which affirms the existence of physical things as the objects of perception and thinks that the external world is represented in the perceptions. The other one is subjective idealism which denies this matter. In their The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism, Tabatabaei and Motahhari by reliance on the realistic foundations of Islamic philosophy, criticize subjective idealism on the one hand and dialectic materialism on the other. Motahheri's view in this book which has been written in 1330s H. differs from his view in his Detailed Account of Manzoumeh which has been written in 1350s H. In the former book he regards idealism as equal to sophism and thinks of the idealist philosophers like Berkeley and Schopenhauer as equal to the sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias, because they all deny the external world, but in the later he presents some deeper analysis of the theory of knowledge and proving the existence of external world. In this paper Motahheri's views on epistemology and his critics against idealism will be discussed and reviewed.
