Philosophy
Mansour Imanpour
Abstract
Introduction
Undoubtedly, the relations between existing entities can be viewed from various perspectives. One such perspective is the theory of causation and its implications. By adhering to this principle, Muslim philosophers engage in accounting for the relations between existents and existential ...
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Introduction
Undoubtedly, the relations between existing entities can be viewed from various perspectives. One such perspective is the theory of causation and its implications. By adhering to this principle, Muslim philosophers engage in accounting for the relations between existents and existential realms. This has faced them with puzzling questions, including the one pertaining to the relationship between constant (thābit) and changeable (mutaghayyir) existents.
To illustrate, it should be noted that, in Islamic philosophy, existential realms are generally divided into the realm of purely immaterial entities and that of material entities. On another division, they are partitioned into three realms: intellectual (ʿaqlī), imaginal (mithāl), and natural. The relations between entities existing in these realms is explained in terms of the principle of causation. Now, the question arises: given one of the implications of this principle, namely impossibility of the deviation of an effect from its cause, how could actual changeable entities in the natural world be issued forth from a constant immaterial entity? Let us elaborate the question as follows: in the natural world, there are various types of changes, including “generation” (kawn) and “corruption” (fisād), accidental changes (that is, changes in accidents or properties [aʿrāḍ]), and as per Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, substantial changes (changes in substance or jawhar). It goes without saying that if the changeable entity in question is attributed to a constant unchanging complete cause, then the effect has indeed deviated from its cause in two ways: (a) Why, despite the existence of the cause, does the changing effect, which is a part or stage of the motion, become nonexistent and deviate from its complete cause? (b) Why, despite the existence of the complete cause, does the effect (namely, the motion with all its parts) fail to become existent and deviate from its cause?
Muslim philosophers have offered various theories to solve this predicament. These theories were subject to debates over the history of Islamic philosophy. Many articles and books have been written in this regard, each tackling a dimension or some dimensions of this problem.
This article does not aim to reiterate or provide a literature review of these solutions. Instead, it provides a brief classification and analysis of these theories and then yields a novel theory by drawing upon the philosophical principles of Mullā Ṣadrā.
Research Methodology
This article begins with a classification and analysis of the accounts provided by the main books and studies on this question by deploying the descriptive and analytical method. Finally, it makes a case for a novel theory in terms of a final formulation of the theory of substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyya).
Discussion and Results
The problem of the relation between changeable and constant entities is proposed within the framework of Islamic philosophy, particularly its rendition of the law of causation and its implications. To address this formidable challenge, Muslim philosophers have proposed various accounts in terms of their philosophical principles and structures. However, these solutions have often faced challenges, either based on their assumptions in natural sciences or due to the structure and content of their solutions.
The finding of this article regarding the problem of relation between constant and changeable entities in terms of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy is that, in final analysis, the problem involves two types of an effect’s deviation from its cause: (1) Despite the constancy of the cause, one part or stage of the effect becomes nonexistent, and (2) despite the existence of the constant cause, all parts or stages of the cause fail to become existent.
As for (1), it may be suggested that the renewed effect emanating from the constant cause does not lose any perfection. This way, it does not deviate from its cause. What becomes nonexistent in this process is not an existential perfection but an imperfection or flaw, the negation of which amounts to some sort of affirmation. Accordingly, in this process of continuous flourishing, the moving existence does not come to lack a perfection or an actuality, and hence, the effect does not deviate from its cause by losing part of it despite the cause’s existence. However, it is not straightforward to address (2), since it may be said that the realization of a subsequent part or stage of something depends on the realization of its preceding part or stage. That being the case, the failure of the subsequent parts and stages to come to existence in the first stage is not a deviation of the effect from its cause, but is because its condition or its preparatory cause has failed to exist. This means that, in this case too, the effect has not indeed deviated from its complete cause.
Conclusion
“Substantial motion” ultimately goes back to the evolution of a substantial existence. This perfection-seeking existence does not drive itself from potentiality to actuality; that is, it does not bestow perfection upon itself. It always has an emanating, perfection-giving entity that continuously emanates forms upon it, compensating its deficiencies and promoting its existence. During this continuous emanation, what happens to the changing effect is that its existence is constructed and becomes thriving. In this process, none of its parts or perfections disappear, and hence, no deviation from the cause occurs. Moreover, the emanating cause is not an absolute unconstrained for the subsequent parts or stages. Thus, their absence in the realm of the first part or stage does not count as deviation from the complete cause. On this account, the constant entity emanates an existence that inherently involves change, in light of which the existential perfection does not disappear, and hence, no deviation from the cause occurs.
Mohammad Nejati; Ahmad Beheshti
Volume 4, Issue 1 , October 2013, , Pages 117-129
Abstract
Analysis of Ibn Sina's Approach in motion theory shows he has doubt in proving certain types of accidental movements and in denying the substantial motion process. This doubt is indicative of sheikh’s philosophical foundations in essentiality of existence and is accompanied by proof of certain ...
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Analysis of Ibn Sina's Approach in motion theory shows he has doubt in proving certain types of accidental movements and in denying the substantial motion process. This doubt is indicative of sheikh’s philosophical foundations in essentiality of existence and is accompanied by proof of certain types of accidental movements such as Quantity and quality of motion in the creatures because of negating gradation in quiddity and believe its mentally posited in sinavy thought. Yet Ibn Sina Submitted to its accuracy because the moving process in Quantity and quality is evident. But on the other hand, he refuses to accept the motion in creatures" substance Due to the lack of serious concern in essentiality of existence and its abstraction Principles. It is reflected in some positions of his thought. In these positions Ibn Sina implicitly and even explicitly has acknowledged the incomplete immateriality of soul and possibility of ishtidad, despite of denial of substantial motion of souls.
