abdol rasoul kashfi; matin tayefehrostami
Volume 6, Issue 3 , October 2017, , Pages 75-100
Abstract
Abstract
According to the theological fatalism, future matters are necessary and this necessity makes them unalterable; so, human beings are not able to make the future by their free will and this is incompatible with human freedom.
Based on theological fatalism, there are four alternatives: ...
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Abstract
According to the theological fatalism, future matters are necessary and this necessity makes them unalterable; so, human beings are not able to make the future by their free will and this is incompatible with human freedom.
Based on theological fatalism, there are four alternatives: first, accepting divine foreknowledge and denying human freedom, which is in fact affirming theological fatalism; second, accepting human freedom and rejecting divine foreknowledge; third, accepting both; and fourth, refusing both.
Allameh Tabatabaei and William Craig accept the compatibility between divine foreknowledge and human freedom; consequently both thinkers believe that divine knowledge about human free actions is due to His knowledge of conditions and properties of the action. Thus, God knows what the subject will freely do in any circumstance.
Mohammad Saeedimehr; Saeed Moghaddas
Volume 3, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 99-123
Abstract
There are two main philosophical theories concerning the explanation of the relation between the causal necessity and the human freedom: 1. Compatibilism, which believes that the causal necessity is compatible with the human freedom, and incompatibilism, which sees these two incompatible. Allamah Tabatabaii ...
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There are two main philosophical theories concerning the explanation of the relation between the causal necessity and the human freedom: 1. Compatibilism, which believes that the causal necessity is compatible with the human freedom, and incompatibilism, which sees these two incompatible. Allamah Tabatabaii proposes a specific version of compatibilism based on the notion of “comparative contingency” (al-imkan al-bilqiyas). According to his theory, the principle of causal necessity does not require more than that the human free action possess comparative contingency in comparison with the human agent and comparative necessity in comparison with its complex perfect cause (al-illah al-tammah). Moreover, the very nature of the human freedom is nothing but the action’s being contingent in relation to his agent. Therefore, the causal comparative necessity of the action in relation to its complex perfect cause does not contradict its being free. This compatibilist view has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers. In this paper we first give a short explication of Tbatabaii’s theory and then examine the arguments of its critics.
