Reza Akbarian; Siavash Asadi
Volume 3, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 21-43
Abstract
This paper tries to answer to these questions: what is Mulla Sadra and Williamson’s solution to state the problem of non-existent objects and what are their similarities and differences and, moreover, challenges of these views. Following affirmation to “being” and “thing” ...
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This paper tries to answer to these questions: what is Mulla Sadra and Williamson’s solution to state the problem of non-existent objects and what are their similarities and differences and, moreover, challenges of these views. Following affirmation to “being” and “thing” concomitance, Williamson brings forward “necessary existence” theory in which “possibility” is referred to properties, including concrete existence, of things. But “necessary” is referred to logical existence for the solution to state the non-existent problem. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra’s solution, following graded unity of existence theory, is based on “mental existence”. In this case, mental existence is one of the ontological stages of “equivocal unique truth” of existence and “quiddity” is preserved in mind and exterior of mind. Therefore, since we express some statements about external non-existents, they must be existent in mind and their quiddities are manifestations of their mental existence. But, each of these solutions has some philosophical challenges: Mulla Sadra has not said how non-existents can be conceived; moreover preserving of quiddity in philosophical structure of Mulla Sadra is unjustified. On the other hand, “necessary existence” theory can’t be an explanation of reality. Allameh Tabatabaii, notwithstanding Mulla Sadra’s point of view, says that reality is absolute or limited existence (not existence and quiddity) and quiddities are mental (not external) manifestations of limited existents. Then non-existence can be abstracted by human mind from limited existents. On this basis, we do a mental act related with reality, when we state a proposition with a non-existent subject. This paper shows that Allameh’s theory can obviate the challenges of Mulla Sadra and Williamson’s theory.
Mohammad Saeedimehr; Saeed Moghaddas
Volume 3, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 99-123
Abstract
There are two main philosophical theories concerning the explanation of the relation between the causal necessity and the human freedom: 1. Compatibilism, which believes that the causal necessity is compatible with the human freedom, and incompatibilism, which sees these two incompatible. Allamah Tabatabaii ...
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There are two main philosophical theories concerning the explanation of the relation between the causal necessity and the human freedom: 1. Compatibilism, which believes that the causal necessity is compatible with the human freedom, and incompatibilism, which sees these two incompatible. Allamah Tabatabaii proposes a specific version of compatibilism based on the notion of “comparative contingency” (al-imkan al-bilqiyas). According to his theory, the principle of causal necessity does not require more than that the human free action possess comparative contingency in comparison with the human agent and comparative necessity in comparison with its complex perfect cause (al-illah al-tammah). Moreover, the very nature of the human freedom is nothing but the action’s being contingent in relation to his agent. Therefore, the causal comparative necessity of the action in relation to its complex perfect cause does not contradict its being free. This compatibilist view has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers. In this paper we first give a short explication of Tbatabaii’s theory and then examine the arguments of its critics.