mahbobeh rajaei; seyd morteza hosseini shahroudi; Abbas Javareshkyan
Abstract
In Mulla Sadra’s work, we encounter two different meanings of the terms substance and accident. One is the well-known meaning according to which contingent beings divide into substances and accidents: like first philosophers Mulla Sadra defines substance as a being not in the subject, and accident ...
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In Mulla Sadra’s work, we encounter two different meanings of the terms substance and accident. One is the well-known meaning according to which contingent beings divide into substances and accidents: like first philosophers Mulla Sadra defines substance as a being not in the subject, and accident as a being in the subject. More precisely, substance is a quiddity which is not in the subject, not a property of something else, and accident is a quiddity in the subject, not needed by the subject, a property of something else. Thus, from this point of view both substance and accident are quiddities. God falls into neither of the two above defined categories, because in the division it is the quiddity which is divided; hence Mulla Sadra considers “non-substance” as a negative divine attribute, providing some arguments for his claim. He proposes another meaning for the duality of substance and accident founded upon components of his own philosophy such as the primacy of existence (asālat al-wūjūd), hypostatic unity of being (waḥdat shakhsī wūjūd), and ontological indigence (faqr wūjūdi). Based on the primacy of existence, he redefines quiddity as a shade (ẓīl) of existence. Therefore, quiddity is not divided into substance and accident, but the latter two are both existential. Next, invoking the principle of hypostatic unity of being, he states that it is only the true unified Being who deserves the title substance, describing as accidents other beings which are his manifestations. Through explaining ontological indigence he also proves that the realization of indigent existence depends on rich existence and compared to him everything in the universe is pure dependence (rabṭ) and mere indigence, and considered a mode and manifestation of him. The substance is he who is independent and essentially rich, and the rest which are the manifestation of dependence count as accidents. Mulla Sadra matches the two meanings together. Everything in the universe is a manifestation of a particular name of God. Thus, just as parts of the universe are divided into genus, species, individuals, and substances, so the division is found in the names of God; and just as the truth of substances is veiled by accidents, so the divine essence is veiled by its names and attributes; and just as attributes such as species - some of which are more general and some more particular as with close and distant species and their correlatives – together with which the substance is a particular genus or type, so some of divine attributes are more general and more permeating and some more particular and less permeating. Each of the innumerable beings in the universe which are its parts is a manifestation of a particular name among divine names; and just as parts of the universe divide into genus, species, individuals, substances, and accidents (including quantity, quality, relation, habitus, time, location, situation (or position), action, and passion ("being acted on)), so the names of God divide into genus, species, substantial, accidental, etc. names. Everything in the visible universe is a shade testifying to what is in the invisible the world of names, as the manifestation of the substantiality of the Creator, called Allah by Mulla Sadra, is “the perfect man” In the light of foundations specific to his philosophy, Mulla Sadra’s novel explanation demonstrates that the duality of substance and accident both make sense and have examples in the external world (although in his wisdom in accordance with the well-known meaning of the terms an immediate cognition of substance is not possible, and it is only accidents which are knowable). But also his analysis paves the way for the demonstration of dependent existence (i.e. the existence of beings which are not God). If considered in comparison to the Necessary, everything is dependent, or, accidental, as Mulla Sadra calls it. The impact of the concept of dependence (or accidentality) upon philosophical discussions is that it dispenses with the need for quiddities and linking quiddity-bound concepts to the concepts not bound by quiddity. Thanks to the analysis, the fact of God being together with names and attributes (called accidents by Mulla Sadra) takes on a novel interpretation: it is not like the coincidence of the accidental and essential; nor like the coincidence of substance and accident in the well-known sense of the terms; nor like the coincidence of quiddity and existence, because God is not a general quiddity at all. Instead, his truth is a pure, simple, sacred Being that has no names, shapes or limits, and for which no proof is invoked. Rather, he is the proof for everything, a witness to every manifestation. The main concern of this article is to compare, examine and match the two views, since despite the fact that there are numerous books and articles addressing the issue of substance and accident, there is not a discrete study of the two perspectives; hence the necessity of explaining Mulla Sadra’s view. Because this aim is fulfilled through studying and researching into his books, the present article’s research method is conceptual analysis written in an analytic-descriptive form.
davood hosseini
Abstract
In the contemporary literature on Mullasadra there is a controversy on his view on the reality of quiddity; on whether, according to his texts, quiddity is in-the-World or just in-the-Mind. This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. Among Mullasadra’s expressions ...
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In the contemporary literature on Mullasadra there is a controversy on his view on the reality of quiddity; on whether, according to his texts, quiddity is in-the-World or just in-the-Mind. This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. Among Mullasadra’s expressions about quiddity, these are mostly supposed to be against quiddity’s being in-the-World: first that quiddity is abstract; second that quiddity, in itself, is non-existent; and third that quiddity is a predicate of existence. In order to show that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, quiddity is in-the-World, I will argue, based on textual evidences, first that if the context is considered, those texts that normally are supposed to be counter-evidence for quiddity’s being in-the-World from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, are just apparently so; and second that if all relevant texts are examined, there is just one possible reading of Mullasadra’s view about the reality of quiddity: he constantly takes quiddity in-the-World.
Khadijeh Hashemi Attar; saeed anvari
Abstract
Mulla-Sadra writes in al-shavahed al-robubieh, after negating the gradation in quiddity that he contrasted with this idea in al-Asfar. In spite of the fact that he has refused to accept the gradation in quiddity in some of his works, he has given theories such as the Platonic idea and the eternal essences ...
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Mulla-Sadra writes in al-shavahed al-robubieh, after negating the gradation in quiddity that he contrasted with this idea in al-Asfar. In spite of the fact that he has refused to accept the gradation in quiddity in some of his works, he has given theories such as the Platonic idea and the eternal essences that some of the necessary acceptance of them has been considered in gradation in quiddity. This article explains and justifies this incoherency by identifying Mulla Sadra's different views on the gradation in quiddity. of the discussion and discussing the issues that they are required to accept in gradation in quiddity. To this end, various justifications have been raised and criticized about this apparent disagreement with Mulla Sadra. These views include: gradation in quiddity in defense of the iluminationists, changing his view in gradation in quiddity, the gradation in quiddity means gradation in essence, gradation in graduated concepts, gradation in quiddity persons, gradation in quiddity in subordinate with existence.
Davood Hosseini
Abstract
There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions ...
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There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions concerning quiddity (namely, quiddity’s being an abstract entity and its being true of existence) when attached to his theses about abstraction and truth, entails that quiddity is in-the-World; though it exists just secondarily. If these arguments turn out to be sound, a question arises: what is the difference between existence’s being primarily existent and quiddity’s being secondarily so? In order to answer this question, I will propose that one can understand and explain primary and secondary existence and being in-the-World by means of effectiveness and mind-independence. I will give some textual evidence which show that this proposal is not far from Mullasadra’s own viewpoint.
Bagar Hossinlo; Hamed Naji
Volume 5, Issue 4 , February 2015, , Pages 37-66
Abstract
The root and source of the unity of existence is mysticism, and it has been entered into philosophy from this realm. Perhaps the first philosophical explanation of the mystics’ unity of existence doctrine has been done by Dawwani. But this philosophical explanation has some unjustified and irrational ...
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The root and source of the unity of existence is mysticism, and it has been entered into philosophy from this realm. Perhaps the first philosophical explanation of the mystics’ unity of existence doctrine has been done by Dawwani. But this philosophical explanation has some unjustified and irrational consequences and accessories. Sadra, also, makes his best efforts to give a philosophical explanation of mystics’ unity of existence of doctrine. He did that through abandoning the theory of analogical unity of existence and suggesting a new philosophical system, whose pieces have been mentioned in Asfar (Volume II) and other places of the book and also in the book of Igaz an-naimin (Awakening the sleepers). By this way, he not only has not ended philosophy, but has brought it into a new realm of philosophical thoughts. So, we must design this new philosophical system to understand this important stage of his philosophy, especially to understand his philosophical explanation of personal unity and its valuable accessories.
In this paper we describe briefly the philosophical system and the ontology of Dawwani’s approach, and attempt, as much as possible, express his philosophical explanation of unity of existence through an optimistic outlook. Then we will show that even though there are some the similarities between this explanation and Sadra's philosophical explanation, Dawwani’s approach is self-inconsistent and that is why we will criticize it ultimately. Afterwards, we continue to express the Sadra's philosophical explanation of mystical unity of existence. So the object of this paper is to compare these two philosophical explanation, reveal their strengths and weaknesses, also the relationship between these two explanations. It will be clear that Sadra's philosophical explanation is worthy and reasonably defensible through a new philosophical system which has been followed by Sadra and he has referred to it in his books, not in the analogical unity of existence
Seyed Abbas Zahabi
Volume 4, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 81-100
Abstract
Unlike the Christian philosophy, in the Islamic philosophy, the question of individuality was emerged and grew gradually in a philosophical ground. The naïve form of the problem can be found in the Farabi and Ibn Sina's works, and its perfect form can be seen in Bahmanyar’s writings. Then, ...
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Unlike the Christian philosophy, in the Islamic philosophy, the question of individuality was emerged and grew gradually in a philosophical ground. The naïve form of the problem can be found in the Farabi and Ibn Sina's works, and its perfect form can be seen in Bahmanyar’s writings. Then, Suhrawardi considered the problem at a totally different view and separated from Peripatetics basically. After Suhrawardi, Nasir al-Din Tūsi and Mulla Sadra, were dealt with the problem, while the differences between the two philosophers’ approaches were more than their agreements.
The issues related to the ‘individuality’ can be divided into four distinct debates: The conceptual bases of individuality; the affirmative principles of individuality; the Criterion of Individuality, and its justification. In the affirmative principles of individuality they are almost consentaneous, but in the other debates we can see some serious disagreements. The quiddity’s ability to justify “individuality” is the most important controversy between them. Nasir al-Din Tūsi considers quiddityas Criterion of Individuality, but Mulla Sadra belives that it is just ‘existence’ which can be the Criterion of Individuality.
Mehdi Dehbashi
Volume 2, Issue 2 , October 2011, , Pages 53-78
Abstract
In Western and Islamic philosophy, one of the most complex and controversial ontological topics has do with the relationship between mind and phenomenal objects, that is the relationship between the form in the mind and the material and objective form. This issue has stirred great confusion for philosophers ...
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In Western and Islamic philosophy, one of the most complex and controversial ontological topics has do with the relationship between mind and phenomenal objects, that is the relationship between the form in the mind and the material and objective form. This issue has stirred great confusion for philosophers seeking to explain the relationship of knowledge and the "outside world". In this article we present and compare Kant and Mulla Sadra's philosophical solutions to this problem.
Although in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, mind and phenomenal objects do not stand on the same ontological levels, however according to the "primacy of existence" (Aṣālat al-wujūd) principle, the two are alongside each other. Knowledge is not separate from ontology and relies on the outside world in its process of perception occurring through the help of the senses, the imagination, reason, and intuition. What occurs between the outside world and the mind is called by Mulla Sadra the construction of quiddity. Quiddity is neither bound to the mind or the outside world; however it is necessary on every ontological level and participates in all the levels of perception. Mulla Sadra can explain the relationship between the intuitions of the mind and the outside world first by positing a soul which creates forms and elements related to perception and secondly, by filling the gap between mind and phenomenal objects by postulating a division of ontological levels.
According to Kant, knowledge requires two things: a) observation, which is given to us in space and time and b) the reception of an intelligible upon what has been observed. For the process to occur the phenomenal object and the intelligible must share a similarity. Some intelligibles have no similarity with anything from the experiential level. Kant, in trying to reconcile mind and the phenomenal objects uses the concept of Transcendental Schemata, that is forms produced in time by the imagination. By arguing for a direct reciprocity between the phenomena and the intelligible, Kant is bound to uphold the reciprocity between phenomena and transience.
Gholam Hossein Khedri; Mohammad Hadi Tavakkoli
Volume 2, Issue 2 , October 2011, , Pages 35-52
Abstract
In Western and Islamic philosophy, one of the most complex and controversial ontological topics has do with the relationship between mind and phenomenal objects, that is the relationship between the form in the mind and the material and objective form. This issue has stirred great confusion for philosophers ...
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In Western and Islamic philosophy, one of the most complex and controversial ontological topics has do with the relationship between mind and phenomenal objects, that is the relationship between the form in the mind and the material and objective form. This issue has stirred great confusion for philosophers seeking to explain the relationship of knowledge and the "outside world". In this article we present and compare Kant and Mulla Sadra's philosophical solutions to this problem. Although in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, mind and phenomenal objects do not stand on the same ontological levels, however according to the "primacy of existence" (Aṣālat al-wujūd) principle, the two are alongside each other. Knowledge is not separate from ontology and relies on the outside world in its process of perception occurring through the help of the senses, the imagination, reason, and intuition. What occurs between the outside world and the mind is called by Mulla Sadra the construction of quiddity. Quiddity is neither bound to the mind or the outside world; however it is necessary on every ontological level and participates in all the levels of perception. Mulla Sadra can explain the relationship between the intuitions of the mind and the outside world first by positing a soul which creates forms and elements related to perception and secondly, by filling the gap between mind and phenomenal objects by postulating a division of ontological levels. According to Kant, knowledge requires two things: a) observation, which is given to us in space and time and b) the reception of an intelligible upon what has been observed. For the process to occur the phenomenal object and the intelligible must share a similarity. Some intelligibles have no similarity with anything from the experiential level. Kant, in trying to reconcile mind and the phenomenal objects uses the concept of Transcendental Schemata, that is forms produced in time by the imagination. By arguing for a direct reciprocity between the phenomena and the intelligible, Kant is bound to uphold the reciprocity between phenomena and transience.
