Mohammadkazem Elmisola; zohreh salahshour; Alireza Kohansal; Ali Moghimi
Abstract
Memory is a potency which makes man to be able to fix and to deposit those data which are being grasped through senses, and to use them whenever are needed. That is why our data remain unchanged and we can clearly remember our past. For Mulla Sadra the memory is unchanged because it is an abstract entity. ...
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Memory is a potency which makes man to be able to fix and to deposit those data which are being grasped through senses, and to use them whenever are needed. That is why our data remain unchanged and we can clearly remember our past. For Mulla Sadra the memory is unchanged because it is an abstract entity. Based upon his theory, all corporeal entities are constantly moving. Therefore if the memory is corporeal, it has to be subject to the change. But neuroscientists do not consider all motions as change. So for them the motions at the level of subatomic or atomic world do not make any change in the biological world. Even if it is considered to be a change by transcendent theosophy, but for neuroscientists only those changes at the level of neuron sells can change the memory, thus they attribute the fixity of the memory to the fixity of coding the genes and accordingly coding the neurons, and if any kind of confusion occurs in this function, we will lose our memory. Therefore for them the memory is corporeal, and in spite of being so, in normal conditions no change occurs in its deposited data. Thus to prove the abstractness of the memory we have to utilize other reasons.
Davood Hosseini
Abstract
There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions ...
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There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions concerning quiddity (namely, quiddity’s being an abstract entity and its being true of existence) when attached to his theses about abstraction and truth, entails that quiddity is in-the-World; though it exists just secondarily. If these arguments turn out to be sound, a question arises: what is the difference between existence’s being primarily existent and quiddity’s being secondarily so? In order to answer this question, I will propose that one can understand and explain primary and secondary existence and being in-the-World by means of effectiveness and mind-independence. I will give some textual evidence which show that this proposal is not far from Mullasadra’s own viewpoint.