davood hosseini
Abstract
In the contemporary literature on Mullasadra there is a controversy on his view on the reality of quiddity; on whether, according to his texts, quiddity is in-the-World or just in-the-Mind. This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. Among Mullasadra’s expressions ...
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In the contemporary literature on Mullasadra there is a controversy on his view on the reality of quiddity; on whether, according to his texts, quiddity is in-the-World or just in-the-Mind. This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. Among Mullasadra’s expressions about quiddity, these are mostly supposed to be against quiddity’s being in-the-World: first that quiddity is abstract; second that quiddity, in itself, is non-existent; and third that quiddity is a predicate of existence. In order to show that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, quiddity is in-the-World, I will argue, based on textual evidences, first that if the context is considered, those texts that normally are supposed to be counter-evidence for quiddity’s being in-the-World from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, are just apparently so; and second that if all relevant texts are examined, there is just one possible reading of Mullasadra’s view about the reality of quiddity: he constantly takes quiddity in-the-World.
Davood Hosseini
Abstract
There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions ...
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There is a controversy in the contemporary literature on Mullasadra’s view on the reality of quiddity; is quiddity in-the-World or just in-the-Mind? This paper aims to argue that from Mullasadra’s viewpoint, it is in-the-World. For this end, I will argue that some of Mullasadra's expressions concerning quiddity (namely, quiddity’s being an abstract entity and its being true of existence) when attached to his theses about abstraction and truth, entails that quiddity is in-the-World; though it exists just secondarily. If these arguments turn out to be sound, a question arises: what is the difference between existence’s being primarily existent and quiddity’s being secondarily so? In order to answer this question, I will propose that one can understand and explain primary and secondary existence and being in-the-World by means of effectiveness and mind-independence. I will give some textual evidence which show that this proposal is not far from Mullasadra’s own viewpoint.
