Philosophy
fateme soleimani
Abstract
Introduction
An action is an external behavior formed through an interplay between knowledge and inner tendencies, and then actualized via will or volition. On this picture, an action begins from a conception and assent (affirmation) within an epistemic process, leading to decision-making and will. ...
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Introduction
An action is an external behavior formed through an interplay between knowledge and inner tendencies, and then actualized via will or volition. On this picture, an action begins from a conception and assent (affirmation) within an epistemic process, leading to decision-making and will. Several factors, such as the imaginative faculty, the faculty of theoretical and practical reason, the craving faculty, and will, contribute to this process. Accordingly, various types of human action are formed given the order of functioning as well as the intensity and strength of these faculties. Hence, the existence of various possibilities and circumstances for the interactions of these principles demand different models for human action. A consideration and comparison of these factors can play a role in analyzing and explaining the human action as well as presenting various solutions to change, modify, or even reinforce human behaviors. To do so, a survey was conducted in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā deploying the descriptive-analytic method to identify various models of human action and pinpoint their differences and the conditions in which they occur. The main problem of this research is:
What is the fundamental and basic model of the human action and what are the models branching from them?
The secondary questions include the following:
How do models of human action differ from each other and from the model of action in animals?
What is the role of temperament in the model of human actions?
Research Background
Thus far, several studies have been carried out concerning the philosophy of action and how an action is produced within the framework of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Rezaee and Houshangi (2013) in “The process of the production of human voluntary action,” Shahgoli (2019) in “Principles of action in the views of Fārābī and Mullā Ṣadrā,” and Mirhadi (2018) in “Philosophy of action in Transcendent philosophy” aim to introduce the principles and preliminaries of action and the stages of the production of an action from the perspective of Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā. Vafaeian and Gharamaleki (2017) in “An ontological analysis of the process of the production of actions from the perspectives of Avicenna and Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn” assert that they are concerned with the ontological status of the principles of the production of action. Soleimani (2020) in “The place of action in human existence in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view” provides an account of the formation of action and the longitudinal relationship between its principles, stating that Mullā Ṣadrā views the inner reality of an action as its longitudinal principles, while external action is solely a manifestation and expression of this longitudinal chain of the functioning of perceptual and motive faculties of the soul. Varzdar and Ketabchi (2022) in “The study of the function of practical reason in the process of action production in Transcendent philosophy” are focused on the role of practical reason in the process of the production of actions.
The contribution of the present research, which sets it apart from the above-mentioned studies, is that it addresses the numerous models and schemas of the order and mode of the functioning of the formative principles and elements of action.
Conclusion
When doing an action, the human individual employs the numerous faculties and powers of their soul, including perceptual and motive faculties. Given the order of functioning as well as the intensity and strength of these faculties, various types of human action are formed. Thus, a model and schema can be determined for each type of human action. All conceivable models of human action involve a transition from the cognitive principle to determination, will, and production of the outer overt action. In other words, all varieties of human actions are formed based on a basic model. This foundational model shows the general course of the soul’s linear motion from the highest to the lowest principles that contribute to the actualization of action.
Regarding the basic fundamental model of human action, stages can be devised as follows:
In the first stage, the desired goal and objective are determined by theoretical reason. In the second, the proper action to fulfil the goal is selected and confirmed by practical reason. In the third, the requisite proper urge and motivation are produced by the craving faculty under the governance of practical reason. In the fourth, rational urge prevails and intensifies and then determination and will are formed for doing the action.
In the model of deterministic action, the urge resulting from the confirmation by practical reason is not agreeable to nature, but the action is selected and preferred by the cognitive system and then confirmed by reason. Accordingly, an action not being agreeable is compatible with its volitional and free character.
In the model of animal action, humans just like animals have a presence-based comprehension of an instinctive impulse and need within themselves, then conceive a particular action in their imaginative faculty as well as the pleasure or pain associated with the action, and then through appetitive or irascible faculties, an urge or repulsion towards the action ill be produced in the individual. If the urge is bolstered and prevails, the will to do or omit the action will be formed.
In any event, Ṣadrā believes that urge and will in humans are governed by reason. It is only in this case that the will can be rational and human. However, if the urge and will are governed by instincts, senses, and imagination, which yields a speculative judgment by reason, the will is animal.
When the action occurs, its wanted or unwanted consequences can have an effect on the constitutive elements of the action. This means that they have a reinforcing or undermining effect on instincts and inner impulses, knowledge, desire, and will. Nevertheless, this effect is only indirect. In case there is a positive effect, which reinforces the principles of an action, the action will be repeated frequently. This will lead to a particular psychological habit in the individual, which is called a “temperament” or “character.” According to the principles of Sadraean philosophy, a soul that possesses a temperament changes its substantial form, and given the new stage of its psychological forms, it comes to have new and stronger faculties and powers. Later, the principles of the action will be further solidified and their functioning in inducing actions will be quicker, such that the actions associated with that stage of the soul will be produced more easily.
Philosophy
Keramat Varzdar; Fatemeh Sadat Ketabchi
Abstract
Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent ...
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Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent qualities of the elemental components (Avicenna, 1383: 57; Suhrawardī, 1373: 198; Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 5: 320). Notably, the constitution of the "temperament" differs between living and non-living entities due to varying degrees of element combination, prompting a consideration: why not attribute the distinctive accomplishments of living beings to "temperament" rather than to the "soul"? In "De Anima," Aristotle recounts advocates of this notion and offers critique (Aristotle, 2011, 407b 25 - 408a 10). Aristotle distinguishes between the concepts of "soul" and "temperament," affirming their disparity (Ibid).
In Avicenna's works, he formulates seven arguments to establish the non-identity of temperament and soul, based on criteria such as non-identity of temperament with its collector and maintainer, its active and ultimate cause, the involvement in the movements of living things, the composition as the constituent substance of living entities, the perceiver of perception, the perceiver of rational cognitions, and the self-aware nature in humans. These arguments uniquely position temperament as distinct from the soul, as there is no other candidate for these seven criteria except the soul.
This research aims to critically examine and analyze Avicenna's seven arguments rejecting the identity of "soul" and "temperament," with the purpose of highlighting the limitations of these arguments in distinguishing temperament from the plant soul and the deficiencies in four of these proofs.
Methods and Material
The research methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. This approach involves thoroughly referencing Avicenna's various works to furnish a comprehensive depiction of his arguments. Subsequently, a meticulous analysis of these arguments is conducted through logical formulation to assess their effectiveness in establishing the non-identity between soul and temperament.
Results and Discussion
The first argument posits that the opposition among the four elements leads to their repulsion and conflict, necessitating a factor beyond temperament for their combination and sustenance — namely, the soul (Tusi, 1375, Vol. 2: 302-301; Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26). Similarly, the second argument identifies the purpose of elemental intermingling as the creation of temperament, raising questions about the cause behind this interaction. If temperament is the prime mover of elemental motion, it would imply self-creation, a logical impossibility (Avicenna, 1404B: 63). The third argument contends that living beings' temperament exists in two states: either at pure equilibrium or dominated by a single element's quality. However, it faces criticism due to flawed assumptions about nature's formation from four elements and their inherent locations (Avicenna, 1371: 150).
The credibility of the first and second arguments is questioned due to outdated premises. Modern scientific discoveries reveal that bodies comprise numerous fundamental particles, each with distinct characteristics. Additionally, these particles do not inherently conflict; instead, certain particles, like electrons and protons, naturally attract one another due to opposite charges (Munowitz, 2005: 182). The third argument's foundation on the formation of nature from four elements and the assignment of inherent places to each element is also flawed.
The fourth argument contends that the origin of life in living beings is essential because it is intrinsic to their essence, which is substance (Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26; Bahmanyār, 1375: 728-725; Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 8: 27). However, it falls prey to the fallacy of circular argument by assuming that living beings' species are inherently "substantive species."
The fifth argument posits that sensory perceptions are not within the realm of temperament. This assertion is rooted in the observation that temperament doesn't fall into two definitive situations when confronted with sensory forms. It is argued that either temperament does not exhibit any passivity when engaging with perceptual forms, which would imply a lack of foundational conditions for perception (since sensory perception inherently involves passivity). Alternatively, if temperament becomes passive upon perceiving forms, it transforms into another temperament, thereby losing its status as the perceiver of perceptible forms (Tusi, 1375, vol.2: 301-301). Avicenna's sixth argument focuses on human rational perceptions and knowledge. He asserts that neither temperament nor any physical entity possesses the capacity to perceive intellectual forms. This conclusion leads to the impossibility of perceiving rational things through any physical body (Avicenna, 1382: 141-142). The seventh argument employs "self-awareness" to delineate the non-identity between the soul and temperament (Avicenna, 1404 A, Vol. 2: 13). This argument underscores the distinction between the self-awareness associated with the soul and the functions or properties of temperament, aiming to establish their fundamental differences.
It appears that the fifth argument could be supported by accepting certain modifications, effectively demonstrating the discrepancy between temperament and the entity perceiving perceptions. However, Ibn Sina's assertion that plants lack sensory perceptions renders this argument ineffective in establishing the non-identity between the temperament of plants and the plant soul. Regarding the sixth and seventh arguments, if Ibn Sina's arguments for proving the separation of sensible forms from matter are comprehensive, these arguments might not only establish the separation of the human soul from matter but also highlight the distinction between the soul and temperament. However, these arguments primarily focus on demonstrating the variability of the human soul and temperament. As a result, the sixth and seventh arguments primarily just emphasize the non-identity between the human soul and temperament, rather than effectively addressing the non-identity between the animal and plant soul with temperament.
Conclusion
"The theory advocating the identity of soul and temperament found numerous proponents historically, gaining support from many theologians and scholars in the field of medicine. Avicenna aimed to refute the validity of this theory through his elaborate set of seven proofs, seeking to establish the distinction between the souls of plants, animals, and humans from the temperament of their respective bodies.
In this research, it was revealed that the first three proofs are incomplete in proving the non-identity of the soul and temperament due to the fact that the principle of physical issues has been invalidated. The fourth argument is subject to circular argument. The last three proofs prove non-identity between temperament and soul; but these three proofs only reveal the difference between animal and human soul with temperament, and they do not have the ability to show the difference between plant temperament and soul.
malihe khodabande bigy; seyd morteza shahroudi; jafar morvarid
Abstract
Abstract: Mulla Sadra's existential look into the Temperament, His own theory of the physical creation of soul, Special attitude with his body and soul, And Golden Transcendent Theosophy category Namely Trans-Substantial Motion, All together, The narrator of practical wisdom, Let varying steps in the ...
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Abstract: Mulla Sadra's existential look into the Temperament, His own theory of the physical creation of soul, Special attitude with his body and soul, And Golden Transcendent Theosophy category Namely Trans-Substantial Motion, All together, The narrator of practical wisdom, Let varying steps in the field of ethics in The body and corporeality, In order to warrant the presence of moral statements about nutrition, reproduction and human thinking, issue. So the author of this article has attempted to explain theory about the relationship between temperament and ethics, The corresponding, If the identity of the embryo into primary human and physical Sperm of temperance and moderation in favorable conditions, be concluded, Then the effects, results and appliances and it's clearly evident in the emotions and ethics qualities seen, And man will see, The top to bottom of her affairs, justice, decency, Nzaht, holiness, wisdom and spirituality to form.