Biannual Journal
Hossein Atrak
Abstract
This paper in the field of Islamic theology scrutinizes the implication of the verse Aṭīʿū on the infallibility. The verse (اطِیعُوا اللَّهَ وَ أَطِیعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَ أُولِی الْأَمْرِ مِنْکُمْ) “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger ...
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This paper in the field of Islamic theology scrutinizes the implication of the verse Aṭīʿū on the infallibility. The verse (اطِیعُوا اللَّهَ وَ أَطِیعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَ أُولِی الْأَمْرِ مِنْکُمْ) “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in authority” (Q. Nisa /59) is one of the most important Quranic reasons that Islamic theologians have prepared for proving the infallibility of prophets, especially Islam prophet. Muslim theologians have made a reason like this: 1) God has absolutely commended Muslim believers to obey the Messenger and those who have authority on others among them. 2) If they were not infallible, God’s absolute command to obey them would be wrong. 3) But God never is wrong. 4) Therefore, they were infallible. The author thinks that this reasoning is wrong. According to some evidences, God’s command to obey the Messenger and who are in authority is not absolute. On the other hand, there is no correlation between God’s absolute command to obey someone and his infallibility. Introduction The Infallibility of God’s prophets is one the most significant issues in Islamic theology (Kalam). Muslim theologians have posed some rational and traditional reasons to prove the infallibility of prophets. One the main traditional reasons is this verse of the Quran which says: (أَطِیعُوا اللَّهَ وَ أَطِیعُوا الرَّسُولَ وَ أُولِی الْأَمْرِ مِنْکُم); “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in authority” (Nisa, 59). The aim of this paper is criticizing this reason after explaining. Explaining the Reasoning to the Verse The logical form of Muslim theologians’ reasoning to the verse ʾAṭīʿū (اطیعوا) is like this: 1) God has absolutely commanded people to obey the Prophet. 2) The absoluteness of the command indicates that the Prophet is infallible. 3) Then, the Prophet is infallible. In explaining the correlation between the absoluteness of God’s command and infallibility (premise 2), Muslim theologians say that if the Prophet was not infallible and it was probable that he committed a sin or lapse, it was wrong that God absolutely commanded people to obey him. Since, the absolute command to obey a fallible man will lead people into obey him in his wrong commands and sins. This is against God’s aim of sending the Prophet. However, God never is wrong. Therefore, the absoluteness of God’s command implies that the Prophet is infallible (see: Hillī, 1365: 183-184; Muẓaffar, 1422: 4/ 221; Āmidī, 1423: 5/ 217). Shiite theologians also assert this reason for affirming the infallibility of their Imams, since they believe that the word ‘أُولِی الْأَمْرِ مِنْکُم’ (those of you who are in authority), which has been mentioned after the prophet’s name, refers to their Imams. Critique of the Reasoning The author thinks that Muslim theologian’s reasoning is wrong in both premises 1 and 2. Firstly, God’s command to obey the prophets is not absolute in a way that people are obligated to obey their all commands even their wrong commands. Secondly, the absoluteness of the command to obey someone does not indicate that his is infallible. In explaining the first objection, I must to mention a subject in Islamic ʿIlm al-ʿUsūl which is called Muqaddamāt Ḥikmat (the premises of wisdom). This subject deals with the condition of understanding an absolute meaning from a statement that some unconditional words has been used in. Islamic jurisprudents are not in agreement about the number of these conditions, but there is general consensus about both of them. The first one is that the speaker who uses an absolute proposition to be in the state of asserting his complete intention not in the state of saying a brief outline. Sometimes a speaker is in a position that just wants to say a brief outline of his/her opinion and intention, then he/she uses general words and propositions without saying details. However, he/she will state the details and conditions of his/her general judgments in other situations. Here, it is wrong if someone thinks that his/her main intention of those words and propositions has been general and absolute. The second premise of Muqaddamāt Ḥikmat is lack of continuous or discontinuous conditions. It is clear that when a speaker states a condition for his absolute statement, it is wrong to take his main intention absolute. Sometime the speaker uses a continuous condition and sometime discontinuous. A continuous condition is like saying first “buy meat. I mean lamb meat”. A discontinuous condition is a condition that the speaker add after a while, short or long. The author thinks that both of these conditions are absent in the verse ʾAṭīʿū (اطیعوا). In this verse, God is in the state of giving the outline of His law about obeying the Prophet. The reason for this claim is citing three different subjects in one proposition. These are God, the Prophet and the ʾUlulʿamr (those who have authority on others). God is an eternal, omniscience, omnipotent, omnibenevolent existent and the creator of humans who has absolute authority on the world. The Prophet is a human being who receives God’s revelation, the man who God has said about him “The Prophet is more protective towards the believers than they are themselves” (Ahzab/ 6). And ʾUlulʿamr which literally means the governor and who has authority and sovereignty on others. God has never made the meaning of this word clear in the Quran. Muslims are not in agreement about its meaning. Shiite says they are our Imams, ʿAli and his children. Sunni says they are our Islamic caliphs. By the way, ʾUlulʿamr are individuals who are in lower state of the Prophet. They have never received God’s revelation. Therefore, due to these differences, the extents of obeying these three subjects are not the same. Hence, we can conclude that the order of obeying them in one statement is a brief outline. On the other hand, by a brief search we can find several evidences that show the conditions and qualifications of obeying the prophets. The first evidence is rational. According to the idea of rational goodness and badness which most Islamic sects like Shiite and Muʿtazilites believe in, understanding moral principles is done by reason. Therefore, observing moral principles is necessary for all people and rational beings even for God. Thus, if someone, God or the Prophet, gives a command against apparent moral principles, like killing an innocent person, we are not obligated to obey it. Also, there are some traditional (naqlī) evidences in the Quran that make clear where people can disobey the prophets’ commands. The Quran says: “No person to whom God had given the Scripture, wisdom, and prophethood would ever say to people, ‘Be my servants, not God’s” (Āl-ʿImrān/ 79). And in another verse: “It is inconceivable that a prophet would ever dishonestly take something from the battle gains” (Āl-ʿImrān/ 161). In these verse, God has put two conditions for obeying the prophets’ command. First, if they say: “Be my servants, not God’s”, people are not obligated to obey. Second, if they want dishonestly to take something from the battle gains. The third case is when their order is against God’s judgment in the Scripture. As we read in the Quran: “Mankind was a single community, then God sent prophets to bring good news and warning, and with them He sent the Scripture with the Truth, to judge between people in their disagreements” (al-Baqara/ 213); “We revealed the Torah with guidance and light, and the prophets, who had submitted to God, judged according to it for the Jews”. In addition, there are some traditions from the Prophet and Shiite Imams that we can put them as the conditions of the verse ʾAṭīʿū (اطیعوا) like this: “No obedience of a creature is permissible as long as the creator is being disobeyed”, the Prophet said (Hurr ʿĀmilī, 1409: 11/ 157). The second objection to Muslim theologians’ reasoning to the verse is criticizing the correlation between the absoluteness of God’s command to obey the Prophet and his infallibility. Since, it is reasonable to say people that have to absolutely obey that man in whatever said, who is most knowledgeable and righteous among them. Although, he is not infallible and it might be that he makes a mistake, but obeying him has more advantages than disobeying. Conclusion According to the mentioned objections, the author of this paper thinks that Muslim theologians’ reasoning to the verse ʾAṭīʿū (اطیعوا) for proving the Prophet’s infallibility is not correct.
Biannual Journal
hasan ahmadizade
Abstract
Mysticism in Islamic and western tradition has been raised many important issues about God, nature and being as a whole especially human being and his relation to God and to himself. Of course, these issues have been noticed also by other thinkers and traditions other than mystical traditions, but in ...
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Mysticism in Islamic and western tradition has been raised many important issues about God, nature and being as a whole especially human being and his relation to God and to himself. Of course, these issues have been noticed also by other thinkers and traditions other than mystical traditions, but in this article we will try to notice to the mystical tradition in Islam and western. So, the most important subject for this article is the quality of the relation between human and God. We will notice to two famous thinkers in Islamic and western mystical traditions, Saenoddin Ibn Torke and Spinoza. As we already said, the relationship between God and His creatures, especially with human beings, have been noticed in the Islamic and western mysticism and many books has been written on this issue. For mystics it is important to believe to the God's transcendence and at the same time, believe to this idea that God is in a real relation with His creatures. Indeed, mystics for explanting the possibility of relationship between God and His creatures, and also for preserving God's transcendence beyond creatures, paid more attention to this issue. Saenoddin Ibn Torke, one of the prominent mystics in the eighth and ninth AH, have been noticed to this issue by using the term Surrounding Distinction. We can see in the Spinoza's writings, issues like the Ibn Torke's Surrounding Distinction in his mystical writings. Both thinkers have been paid attention to the issue of God's nature, His attributes and His relationship to creatures. And also both thinkers by using the kinds of distinctions, tried to show that the distinction between God and His creatures, in not a contrasting one but a Surrounding one. In another word, both try to demonstrate the transcendence and incarnate (albeit not materiality) for God. Surrounding Distinction is an important concept in Islamic mysticism that mystics by using it have been tried to solve the challenging problem about the possibility of relationship between God and His creatures. Of course, they have been explained different kinds of distinction: confrontational distinction and surrounding distinction. The first kind is a metaphysical or philosophical distinction and is between two things that have characterizes differently, so one is characteristically different from another. In confrontational distinction, there in only Otherness between two things and there is not Identity between them. But, on the other hand, there is another kind of distinction that, as we said, is raised by mystics and for them is most important from confrontational distinction that is philosophically or metaphysically distinction. The necessity of surrounding distinction for mystics is in this problem that many humans sometimes say something about the relation between God and themselves but maybe they understand this relationship as an identical one. But this is not the same thing that mystics have in mind. For them God has direct relation to His creatures but God is not His creatures and is not identical with them. So this is one of most important issuers for Islamic and western mystical traditions that try to show that God is not identical with His creatures but has a direct and real relationship with them. This approach in mysticism helps to mystics for interpretation the quranicverse and many Hadiths in Islamic tradition. Also mystics can demonstrate that mysticism is not characteristically paradoxical. Spinoza too like some of Muslim mystics, explained different kind of distinction and try to show that God has direct relation to His creatures but God is not His creatures and is not identical with them. Of course, there are different interpretations on the Spinoza's view on God and His relation to creatures especially to human beings. Two kinds of these interpretations that are most important from other interpretations are logical interpretation and causal one. In this article we will try to compare between Ibn Torke and Spinoza's thought on the Surrounding Distinction between God and His creatures, according to their books. These two thinkers have similarities in their view on the Surrounding Distinction between God and His creatures. Methodically Ibn Torke and Spinoza use a compositional method means a composition of their philosophical, religious and mystical traditions. But Spinoza is in Cartesian tradition and so notice to the philosophical and geometric methods in his writings. In addition, there are some differences in Ibn Torke and Spinoza's view on God and His attributes so this subject affected on their explanation on the relation between God and His creatures.
Biannual Journal
Hadi Vakili; mehdi baratifar; esmail mansouri larijani
Abstract
The "mystical morality" is a kind of morality that requires the truth based on direct communication with the ultimate/ unseen reality, the adornment to the specific traits that are similar to those of the trait. The components of mystical morality are the basis of revelation, attention to the source ...
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The "mystical morality" is a kind of morality that requires the truth based on direct communication with the ultimate/ unseen reality, the adornment to the specific traits that are similar to those of the trait. The components of mystical morality are the basis of revelation, attention to the source and resurrection, comprehensiveness, the shari'ah, the apparent change caused by esoteric transformation and the use of gradual education. The purpose of the mystical morality is to adhere to the divine ethos, ie, to give the names of Allah and to reconcile the divine attributes. Divine admiration for divine attributes, due to their division into Beauty (Jamal) and Majesty (Jalal), is possible due to the likeness and likeness of God. Therefore, when we consider God as incommensurable with other creatures, we can understand him in relation to the attributes that signify differentiation, transcendence, and difference. In this regard, human beings find God as a great existence, dear, great, supreme, sultan, zealous, and environment. Now, if the similarity between God and His creatures is emphasized, God is considered as a creature and is considered to be in the form of attributes such as kindness, mercy, beauty, love, forgiveness, forgiveness, grace and favor.
Extension scientific
Mohsen Habibi; Fatemeh Karimi Mazidi
Abstract
One of the important issues of the field of religious studies in contemporary times is the ability to understanding the language of religion. those who belive that this language is understandable, they are against each other that this is the common sense(all being intelligible) or the mysterious and ...
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One of the important issues of the field of religious studies in contemporary times is the ability to understanding the language of religion. those who belive that this language is understandable, they are against each other that this is the common sense(all being intelligible) or the mysterious and symbolic.Mulla Sadra has paid attention to the exegesis of the Qur'an, therefore he has paid attention to some kind of language of religion. He considers ontology the only existence as genuine, in the sense that he sees only the existence of reality.In addition, he believes in Gradation of being, that is, existence is a unic fact and with intensity and weakness.He emphasizes the dignity of knowledge in the language of religion.Because he considers the Qur'an to be far-reaching, he supposes the external language of the Qur'an as a symbol of their inner meanings, and because of the mysterious nature of the Quranic verses and the words of the elders of religion, they give them appearance ,inwardness, exegesis and interpretation.And believes that anything in addition to appearance has an esoteric, so that the appearance and the inner one are twice as many as an object.In his view, there are no fundamental contradictions between the inner meanings of the apparent meaning and therefore the interpretation which appears to contradict it, interprets the vote (without foundation).He also believes that the purpose of the "Truth"is a unit that can be obtained through three ways of revelation (Quran)and rational analyzes (proofs) and refinement of the soul (mysticism).
Biannual Journal
habibullah daneshshahraki; mostafa malekshahi sefat
Abstract
Ayatollah Javadi Amoli's position in Iran after the revolution is very similar to that of the Jewish Philo in Alexandria in the first century AD; In a way that can and should be the root of many of the great ideas of both philosophers in their social conditions; Because a person's way of thinking cannot ...
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Ayatollah Javadi Amoli's position in Iran after the revolution is very similar to that of the Jewish Philo in Alexandria in the first century AD; In a way that can and should be the root of many of the great ideas of both philosophers in their social conditions; Because a person's way of thinking cannot be unrelated to his or her social status. But in the meantime, Alexandria, due to its time precedence and diverse cultural arrangement, has been the origin of the first historical sparks in questioning the relationship between religion and philosophy; And again, in the meantime, the position of Philo of Alexandria has been very significant. Philo's interest in Greek culture and philosophy, on the one hand, and his attribution to the Hebrew tradition and Judaism, on the other, led him to present a plan for the establishment of religious philosophy; The components of Philo's design are still considered by religious philosophers; In a way, a character like Javadi Ameli, who is 2,000 years away from Philo, has also used them in his collective plan; The summary of both plans is this: All the sciences in the breadest sense of the word _which particullarly includes philosophical teaching_ directly derive from revelation and teachings of the prophets (AS) or is referred to it. Finally it must be said that philosophers such Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, are payroll of great prophets such as Abraham and Moses.
Biannual Journal
Amir Delzendehnezhad; Yadollah Rostami
Abstract
In this article we examine the commonalities between some epistemological views of Mulla Sadra (circa 1571-1636) from Persia and Nishida Kitaro from Japan (1870-1945). Our research method was descriptive and analytical, and using the two philosophers’ main texts we compared their ideas and remarks. ...
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In this article we examine the commonalities between some epistemological views of Mulla Sadra (circa 1571-1636) from Persia and Nishida Kitaro from Japan (1870-1945). Our research method was descriptive and analytical, and using the two philosophers’ main texts we compared their ideas and remarks. Although Nishida Kitaro still has not been properly introduced in Iran, during the 2010s efforts were made to do so, including studies conducted by Dr. Muhammad Asghari, which were first published as a few articles, and later collected in the form of a book released in 2017 by Quqnus Publications. Until now there has been no comparative study of the two thinkers in terms of particular epistemological subjects. We can nonetheless refer to a kindred study: Muhammad Asghari’s article entitled “The Possibility of Dialogue between the Kyoto School and Islamic Wisdom” in which he concludes that the dialogue is indeed possible. It might be asked what theoretical and practical uses finding commonalities between two philosophers from two different countries might have. The answer is that it can lay the ground for a universal and combinational philosophy and/or pave the way for mutual understanding and dialogue in meta-history. Prevailing in this universal and combinational philosophy is a macro and integral rather than micro and differential view. The type of comparison which pays more attention to commonalities than differences proposes an intercultural formulation of philosophical questions. The questions intended to be answered in this article are as follows. 1. What are the commonalities between the ontological foundations of the two thoughts? 2. What are their commonalities in terms of the process of knowledge and perception of the world? The two thinkers have common ontological foundations and their epistemologies are based on ontology. We explain in the form of comparative statements the commonalities first in their ontologies and then in their epistemologies. Their common ontological foundations In Nishida reality is identical to consciousness, and in Mulla Sadra being is concomitant (mūsawīq) with knowledge. In Nishida reality has an ultimate foundation from which all the beings are created. In Mulla Sadra the Necessary Being (wājīb al-wūjūd) creates beings. In Nishida the foundation of reality is in a place called Basho, which is neither physical nor determined. Nor does it have a form. It is absolute nothingness, yet not nothingness versus being, but rather a transcendental nothingness from which being is created. In Mulla Sadra the Necessary Essence does not have any determination and form, but rather is unconditional and free from any limits or denotations. Its status is the status of the absolute unseen. For Nishida entities and beings are the actualization and manifestation of that ultimate foundation, and also for Mulla Sadra the Necessary Being, which is pure being, has manifestations and actions, so that beings are actualized. Human consciousness in Nishida’s view is the best place for the manifestation of the ultimate, and in Mulla Sadra’s the human soul is described as God-like. Their common epistemological views Nishida thinks that a process beyond the soul, more transcendental than the soul, is involved in the process of knowledge, which can be called the field of knowledge or the unconscious dimension of knowledge. For Mulla Sadra, the active intellect, which is more transcendental than the soul, is involved in human perceptions. The soul is not passive in the process of knowing the reality and perceptional forms have subsistence by emergence (al-qīyām al-ṣūdūrī) from the soul, the agency of the soul having a part in the process. According to both thinkers the realities of the percipient and perceived are unified and there is no duality between the two. They both believe that human beings construct and shape themselves through their own activities, and that reality is manifested in the soul. In Nishida, the truth and falsity and correspondence with reality are attributes of propositional and conceptual knowledge, and in Mulla Sadra those are attributes of acquired knowledge (al-īlm al-ḥuṣūlī). Both concur that the perfect soul is less weakened by obstacles and gains more intuition of reality.
Biannual Journal
mahbobeh rajaei; seyd morteza hosseini shahroudi; Abbas Javareshkyan
Abstract
In Mulla Sadra’s work, we encounter two different meanings of the terms substance and accident. One is the well-known meaning according to which contingent beings divide into substances and accidents: like first philosophers Mulla Sadra defines substance as a being not in the subject, and accident ...
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In Mulla Sadra’s work, we encounter two different meanings of the terms substance and accident. One is the well-known meaning according to which contingent beings divide into substances and accidents: like first philosophers Mulla Sadra defines substance as a being not in the subject, and accident as a being in the subject. More precisely, substance is a quiddity which is not in the subject, not a property of something else, and accident is a quiddity in the subject, not needed by the subject, a property of something else. Thus, from this point of view both substance and accident are quiddities. God falls into neither of the two above defined categories, because in the division it is the quiddity which is divided; hence Mulla Sadra considers “non-substance” as a negative divine attribute, providing some arguments for his claim. He proposes another meaning for the duality of substance and accident founded upon components of his own philosophy such as the primacy of existence (asālat al-wūjūd), hypostatic unity of being (waḥdat shakhsī wūjūd), and ontological indigence (faqr wūjūdi). Based on the primacy of existence, he redefines quiddity as a shade (ẓīl) of existence. Therefore, quiddity is not divided into substance and accident, but the latter two are both existential. Next, invoking the principle of hypostatic unity of being, he states that it is only the true unified Being who deserves the title substance, describing as accidents other beings which are his manifestations. Through explaining ontological indigence he also proves that the realization of indigent existence depends on rich existence and compared to him everything in the universe is pure dependence (rabṭ) and mere indigence, and considered a mode and manifestation of him. The substance is he who is independent and essentially rich, and the rest which are the manifestation of dependence count as accidents. Mulla Sadra matches the two meanings together. Everything in the universe is a manifestation of a particular name of God. Thus, just as parts of the universe are divided into genus, species, individuals, and substances, so the division is found in the names of God; and just as the truth of substances is veiled by accidents, so the divine essence is veiled by its names and attributes; and just as attributes such as species - some of which are more general and some more particular as with close and distant species and their correlatives – together with which the substance is a particular genus or type, so some of divine attributes are more general and more permeating and some more particular and less permeating. Each of the innumerable beings in the universe which are its parts is a manifestation of a particular name among divine names; and just as parts of the universe divide into genus, species, individuals, substances, and accidents (including quantity, quality, relation, habitus, time, location, situation (or position), action, and passion ("being acted on)), so the names of God divide into genus, species, substantial, accidental, etc. names. Everything in the visible universe is a shade testifying to what is in the invisible the world of names, as the manifestation of the substantiality of the Creator, called Allah by Mulla Sadra, is “the perfect man” In the light of foundations specific to his philosophy, Mulla Sadra’s novel explanation demonstrates that the duality of substance and accident both make sense and have examples in the external world (although in his wisdom in accordance with the well-known meaning of the terms an immediate cognition of substance is not possible, and it is only accidents which are knowable). But also his analysis paves the way for the demonstration of dependent existence (i.e. the existence of beings which are not God). If considered in comparison to the Necessary, everything is dependent, or, accidental, as Mulla Sadra calls it. The impact of the concept of dependence (or accidentality) upon philosophical discussions is that it dispenses with the need for quiddities and linking quiddity-bound concepts to the concepts not bound by quiddity. Thanks to the analysis, the fact of God being together with names and attributes (called accidents by Mulla Sadra) takes on a novel interpretation: it is not like the coincidence of the accidental and essential; nor like the coincidence of substance and accident in the well-known sense of the terms; nor like the coincidence of quiddity and existence, because God is not a general quiddity at all. Instead, his truth is a pure, simple, sacred Being that has no names, shapes or limits, and for which no proof is invoked. Rather, he is the proof for everything, a witness to every manifestation. The main concern of this article is to compare, examine and match the two views, since despite the fact that there are numerous books and articles addressing the issue of substance and accident, there is not a discrete study of the two perspectives; hence the necessity of explaining Mulla Sadra’s view. Because this aim is fulfilled through studying and researching into his books, the present article’s research method is conceptual analysis written in an analytic-descriptive form.
Biannual Journal
malek shojaei jeshvaghani
Abstract
This Paper, By referring to the different approaches to Islamic philosophy and wisdom in the contemporary world, examines Abdul Javad Falaturi's different approach to Islamic philosophy. Contrary to the predominantly Orientalist readings of Islamic philosophy, which understand this tradition under the ...
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This Paper, By referring to the different approaches to Islamic philosophy and wisdom in the contemporary world, examines Abdul Javad Falaturi's different approach to Islamic philosophy. Contrary to the predominantly Orientalist readings of Islamic philosophy, which understand this tradition under the Neo-Platonic tradition, Falatouri seeks to explain the role of the Qur'an in Islamic philosophy through contemporary comparative and linguistic studies. According to his analysis, Islamic philosophy and wisdom resulted from the fusion of two different worldviews, namely, the worldview of Greek science and philosophy and the Qur'anic worldview. So this philosophy was neither purely Greek nor purely Qur'anic nor a mixture of the two, but rather a separate and distinctive process arising from their synthesis and consequence. Introduction The discussion of the relationship between Greek philosophy and Islamic philosophy is one of the most important and crucial issues among philosophers and historians of philosophy, and the study of main topics in this field clearly shows the diversity of views on this subject. Approach and method Hermeneutical-comparative analysis Discussion and results Due to the predominance of Mulla Sadra's philosophy in the recent approaches of philosophy and theology in Iran, reading the Peripatetic (Ḥikmat-iMashā'), Illumination (Ḥikmat-i Ishrāq), traditions of Islamic philosophy and even Islamic theology is strongly influenced by this philosophical current and attention to research such as Falaturi reading of Qur'anic origins of Islamic philosophy. Despite the criticisms that have been made and discussed in this paper, it can be a conquest of dialogue between contemporary Mulla Sadra's philosophy and its intellectual rivals, so that through this philosophical struggle, the possibilities and limitations of the dominant Islamic philosophy can be overcome. Result It seems that Falaturi, who considers his style of research and questioning to be different, has empathized with Heidegger while reading the developments in key concepts of Greek philosophy such as "time" and its methodological implications, and in a negative step in the pathology of philosophical theology. The more closely we compare these themes of Heidegger's philosophy with Falaturi's methodology, the more seriously the question arises as to whether only considered Heidegger in the historical-comparative study of the evolution of philosophical concepts in Greek and Islamic philosophy. Or is it beyond this comparative-historical study of all the methods of Heidegger's reading of the history of philosophy? It seems that a very positive answer cannot be found for judging in this case.
Biannual Journal
azam ghasemi; arya younesi
Abstract
There is a will which is attributed to Razi which have been a controversial topic from ancient times until now. Preferring Qur’anic method to theology and philosophy, some scholars, such as Ibn Emad Hanbali and Fathalla Kholeif, think of that as a kind of repentance from rational discussion. There ...
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There is a will which is attributed to Razi which have been a controversial topic from ancient times until now. Preferring Qur’anic method to theology and philosophy, some scholars, such as Ibn Emad Hanbali and Fathalla Kholeif, think of that as a kind of repentance from rational discussion. There is a statement which is apparently narrate by Ibn Salah, quote Razi’s word that he regretted studying theology and philosophy; that he said: “I regretted studying theology (Kalam)” and then he wept. This quote support former interpreting. We proved, in this paper, that that interpretation is not authentic and the meaning and purpose of it is different; thus it is not a kind of repent, but rather it is a moderate rationalism (opposite to both classical rationalism and fideism), which he held in his life and could be found in his works. And, it is showed that what is quoted from Ibn Salah is not reliable; because could not be found in Ibn Salah’s works, perhaps it is a transited saying from him. Those writers, who quoted from Ibn Salah, a few centuries after him; thus it is not acceptable. Therefore, this narration is not authentic. This story is important, because it targeted reasoning in Fakhr system of thoughts; if it is true, then it shows that Kalam is not in harmony with real, orthodox Islam, as those who mentioned it maintain. But if not true, it shows that Razi did not believe that theology (Kalam) is not a real part of Islamic sciences. As a matter of historic facts, there is not an authentic source for the story. Therefore, it seems that someone made it up to justify their fanatic, extremist, fundamental interpretation of Islam, in which they have not tolerated any kind of reasoning, including Islamic theology (Kalam), the field of study that Razi well represent. For Ash’ari scholars like Fakhr Razi, reasoning is a useful, discursive tool to assess and study claims and beliefs, and particularly to defend religious doctrines. However, their attitude toward reasoning and intellect (Aql) itself is far from their Mu’tazali opponents. While Mutazalis see reasoning as a source for inferring truth, their Ash’ari opponents see it as a tool to assess claims, interpreting holy texts, including Qur’anic verses. On the other hand, for Fakhr’s part, in the will we could find him in a mediocre rationality position. He stated that what he discussed in his life was not of stubbornness, carelessness or recklessness, but just for the sake of reason. In other works he can be seen committed to Quranic verses and holy texts, beyond reasoning as a source superior to the text; so to speak, he only used reasoning for understanding; and that he put the “Quranic method” on the top of the list, do not imply that he denied reasoning and respective fields of study totally. But a few figures, like Ibn Emad al-Hanbali or Kholief, saw it as a kind of repentance of discursive methods, which is impossible to justify such a position. As to Razi we could see that he had held such a position in his whole career, as he had scrutinized philosophical doctrines, assessing every claim, and always put the Quran on the top of everything else. Therefore, to say Razi repented Kalam is not a valid, authentic conclusion.
Biannual Journal
Ali Motahari
Abstract
Contingency in line with general concepts such as “existence and non-existence” , “unity and plurality” , and “ causality and being caused” is one of the fundamental and remarkable philosophical issues. The proper explanation of the different meanings of contingency ...
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Contingency in line with general concepts such as “existence and non-existence” , “unity and plurality” , and “ causality and being caused” is one of the fundamental and remarkable philosophical issues. The proper explanation of the different meanings of contingency and of the relationship of these meanings to each other make it possible to correctly understand and prove many other principal philosophical problems. Essential contingency and dispositional contingency are among the important meanings of contingency , so that the way we explain them will change basically the destiny of problems such as “coming into being and eternity” , “ potentiality and actuality” , and “causality and being caused” . Sheikh Ishraq for the first time has raised the issue of dispositional contingency , while contradicting Ibn Sina's argument for the rule that “ every event is preceded by potentiality and by matter that possesses that potentiality” . MullaSadra has dealt with the differences between essential contingency and dispositional contingency , and MullaHadiSabzevari has categorized these differences into six groups.At least in sixteen pieces of his works, MullaSadra has expressed his views on the relationship between essential contingency and dispositional contingency, therefore compatibility between these ideas seems very difficult . Indeed, It can be said that these views are contradictory. In this article , using professor Motahhari 's philosophical researches , we have tried to explain the new relationship , obtained in the light of genuineness of existence , between these two meanings of contingency , while judging MullaSadra's different positions concerning essential contingency and dispositional contingency.
Biannual Journal
Zahra Mazaheri; mohammadkazem alavi
Abstract
One of the contemporary controversies about Islamic philosophy is the controversy over its originality that makes it possible. This identification issue has a great impact on the history of Islamic philosophy and the future of Islamic philosophy. In this regard, the opinions ...
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One of the contemporary controversies about Islamic philosophy is the controversy over its originality that makes it possible. This identification issue has a great impact on the history of Islamic philosophy and the future of Islamic philosophy. In this regard, the opinions of three contemporary thinkers, Mustafa Malekian, Gholam Hossein Ebrahimi Dinani and Reza Davari Ardakani, have been investigated. By reducing Islamic philosophy to theology, Malekian denies the originality and possibility of any religious philosophy, including Islamic philosophy. On the other hand, Dinani and Davari not only emphasize the originality of Islamic philosophy and its possibility, but also speaking of the necessary interaction between philosophy and Islam. This research has been done in four axes and in the form of these axes, their views have been studied. In analyzing these views, their agreement to oppose religious philosophy and their differences in considering Islamic philosophy as a religious philosophy is mentioned and it has been stated that it is possible to defend the possibility of Islamic philosophy by considering the demonstrative method and the argumentative process of Islamic philosophy. The impossibility of Islamic philosophy is considered incompatible with the historical reality of Islamic philosophy and its possibility has not been denied, but the continuation and the realization of the possibility of its advancement is only possible if current and future philosophical issues are taken into account.
Extension scientific
Mostafa Momeni
Abstract
Afḍal al-Dīn Muḥammad in Nāmāvar Khūnajī (d. 1248/646 AH) was a 13th-century logician who wrote eminent logical works such as Kashf al-Asrār ‘an Ghawāmiḍ al-Afkār [Uncovering the Secrets from Abstruse Thoughts], al-Mūjaz fi-l-Manṭiq [The Succinct in Logic], and al-Jumal fi-l-Manṭiq ...
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Afḍal al-Dīn Muḥammad in Nāmāvar Khūnajī (d. 1248/646 AH) was a 13th-century logician who wrote eminent logical works such as Kashf al-Asrār ‘an Ghawāmiḍ al-Afkār [Uncovering the Secrets from Abstruse Thoughts], al-Mūjaz fi-l-Manṭiq [The Succinct in Logic], and al-Jumal fi-l-Manṭiq [The Outlines in Logic]. This paper is concerned with textual criticism and verification of the latter essay. Although Kashf al-Asrār is Khūnajī’s most important work, it does not obviate our need to other works by him. It is, therefore, necessary to provide a refined text of these works, including his al-Jumal. This succinct essay counts as an abstract of Kashf al-Asrār, and was taught as a textbook for a long time. As evidence for the significance of the essay, it should suffice that several commentaries and expositions were written for it. The essay involves Khūnajī’s own views in Kashf al-Asrār as well. In my textual criticism of the work, I have relied on four manuscripts and one printed edition deploying the intermediary method (between copy-text editing and eclecticism) in order to provide scholars of logic with a refined text of the work. The significance of al-Jumal is attested by the fact that it was taught as part of the curriculum in northwestern Africa, and many expositions were written for it in this region. Although Khūnajī’s innovative ideas appears in his elaborate book, Kashf al-Asrār, a comparison between the two works reveals that the former is indeed an extended abstract of the latter. In fact, al-Jumal contains everything that appears in Kashf al-Asrār except for certain elaborations and objections raised by Khūnajī to others. Al-Jumal involves Khūnajī’s own views as well. Therefore, al-Jumal is a very succinct essay on important logical issues, serving as an introduction to logic and the rules of accurate thinking. It only includes the issues of definition and syllogism as part of arguments. In this essay, the author embarks on the core logical rules without going into preliminaries and without engaging in controversial problems. The method of textual criticism and an introduction of the manuscripts and copies: in the textual criticism of this book, I have deployed the “intermediary” method, relying on the following manuscripts: Two original manuscripts of al-Jumal both of which are close to the author’s time, and two other manuscripts of expositions of al-Jumal. “M”: the manuscript in Malek National Library, associated with Astan Quds Razavi, in microfilm no. 640, written between 1258 (657 AH) and 1268 (667 AH), and as it seems, it was proof-read by Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. “Q”: a manuscript of Jumal al-Qawā‘id [Outlines of the Rules] in Central Library of Astan Quds Razavi, no. 981. It was written in 1341 (742 AH) in Mecca. The manuscript is stamped as “precious.” “Sh”: a manuscript of Sharḥ al-Jumal [Exposition of the Outlines]. This manuscript also belongs to Malek National Library and was written in 1320 (720 AH). “A”: This is a very elaborate exposition of al-Jumal by Sayyid Sharīf Tilimsānī under Sharḥ Jumal al-Khūnajī fi-l-Manṭiq [Exposition of Khūnajī’s Outlines in Logic]. This manuscript belongs to Fazili Library in Khansar, available in Markaz Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami (Center for the Revival of Islamic Heritage) in Qom. I did not regard this as an important alternative copy.
Book introduction
Asadollah Fallahi
Abstract
Khunaji’s logic deal with the logical novelties Afzal al-din al-Khunaji in his Kashf al-asrar an ghawamiz al-afkar. Among all the novelties of Kashf on concepts, defintion, propositons, and categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, Khunaji’s logic just deals with the following titles: real ...
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Khunaji’s logic deal with the logical novelties Afzal al-din al-Khunaji in his Kashf al-asrar an ghawamiz al-afkar. Among all the novelties of Kashf on concepts, defintion, propositons, and categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, Khunaji’s logic just deals with the following titles: real and external (haqiqi and khariji) propositions (five chapters), tautologies (five chapters), modalities (three chapters), and convesion (three chapters). In Khunaji’s logic, his points of views have been compared with those of his predessesors such as Avicenna and Fakhr al-din al-Razi. All these have been acomplished using methods of the modern mathematical logic.
