Manouchehr Shaami Nezhad; Hosein Atrak; mohsen jahed
Abstract
The issue of death is one of the most important issues of human existence and one of his existential concerns. From birth to death, humans always carry the anxiety of death with them. Many thinkers have proposed solutions to reduce death anxiety. Yalom and Mulla Sadra have also discussed the nature of ...
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The issue of death is one of the most important issues of human existence and one of his existential concerns. From birth to death, humans always carry the anxiety of death with them. Many thinkers have proposed solutions to reduce death anxiety. Yalom and Mulla Sadra have also discussed the nature of death based on their foundations. Yalom considers death as a pure nothingness and based on a naturalistic approach presents some existential solutions like relying on human communication, creativity, and rippling. Mulla Sadra based on a supernaturalistic approach also considers death as an existentiale. By analyzing his philosophical foundations some solutions like having a transformational and procedural approach to death could be deduced from his philosophy for reducing the anxiety of death. In this research, the authors first compare the views of these two thinkers and then try to find an integrated solution to reducing death anxiety.
Philosophy
fateme soleimani
Abstract
Introduction
An action is an external behavior formed through an interplay between knowledge and inner tendencies, and then actualized via will or volition. On this picture, an action begins from a conception and assent (affirmation) within an epistemic process, leading to decision-making and will. ...
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Introduction
An action is an external behavior formed through an interplay between knowledge and inner tendencies, and then actualized via will or volition. On this picture, an action begins from a conception and assent (affirmation) within an epistemic process, leading to decision-making and will. Several factors, such as the imaginative faculty, the faculty of theoretical and practical reason, the craving faculty, and will, contribute to this process. Accordingly, various types of human action are formed given the order of functioning as well as the intensity and strength of these faculties. Hence, the existence of various possibilities and circumstances for the interactions of these principles demand different models for human action. A consideration and comparison of these factors can play a role in analyzing and explaining the human action as well as presenting various solutions to change, modify, or even reinforce human behaviors. To do so, a survey was conducted in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā deploying the descriptive-analytic method to identify various models of human action and pinpoint their differences and the conditions in which they occur. The main problem of this research is:
What is the fundamental and basic model of the human action and what are the models branching from them?
The secondary questions include the following:
How do models of human action differ from each other and from the model of action in animals?
What is the role of temperament in the model of human actions?
Research Background
Thus far, several studies have been carried out concerning the philosophy of action and how an action is produced within the framework of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. Rezaee and Houshangi (2013) in “The process of the production of human voluntary action,” Shahgoli (2019) in “Principles of action in the views of Fārābī and Mullā Ṣadrā,” and Mirhadi (2018) in “Philosophy of action in Transcendent philosophy” aim to introduce the principles and preliminaries of action and the stages of the production of an action from the perspective of Muslim philosophers, particularly Mullā Ṣadrā. Vafaeian and Gharamaleki (2017) in “An ontological analysis of the process of the production of actions from the perspectives of Avicenna and Ṣadr al-Mutaʾallihīn” assert that they are concerned with the ontological status of the principles of the production of action. Soleimani (2020) in “The place of action in human existence in Mullā Ṣadrā’s view” provides an account of the formation of action and the longitudinal relationship between its principles, stating that Mullā Ṣadrā views the inner reality of an action as its longitudinal principles, while external action is solely a manifestation and expression of this longitudinal chain of the functioning of perceptual and motive faculties of the soul. Varzdar and Ketabchi (2022) in “The study of the function of practical reason in the process of action production in Transcendent philosophy” are focused on the role of practical reason in the process of the production of actions.
The contribution of the present research, which sets it apart from the above-mentioned studies, is that it addresses the numerous models and schemas of the order and mode of the functioning of the formative principles and elements of action.
Conclusion
When doing an action, the human individual employs the numerous faculties and powers of their soul, including perceptual and motive faculties. Given the order of functioning as well as the intensity and strength of these faculties, various types of human action are formed. Thus, a model and schema can be determined for each type of human action. All conceivable models of human action involve a transition from the cognitive principle to determination, will, and production of the outer overt action. In other words, all varieties of human actions are formed based on a basic model. This foundational model shows the general course of the soul’s linear motion from the highest to the lowest principles that contribute to the actualization of action.
Regarding the basic fundamental model of human action, stages can be devised as follows:
In the first stage, the desired goal and objective are determined by theoretical reason. In the second, the proper action to fulfil the goal is selected and confirmed by practical reason. In the third, the requisite proper urge and motivation are produced by the craving faculty under the governance of practical reason. In the fourth, rational urge prevails and intensifies and then determination and will are formed for doing the action.
In the model of deterministic action, the urge resulting from the confirmation by practical reason is not agreeable to nature, but the action is selected and preferred by the cognitive system and then confirmed by reason. Accordingly, an action not being agreeable is compatible with its volitional and free character.
In the model of animal action, humans just like animals have a presence-based comprehension of an instinctive impulse and need within themselves, then conceive a particular action in their imaginative faculty as well as the pleasure or pain associated with the action, and then through appetitive or irascible faculties, an urge or repulsion towards the action ill be produced in the individual. If the urge is bolstered and prevails, the will to do or omit the action will be formed.
In any event, Ṣadrā believes that urge and will in humans are governed by reason. It is only in this case that the will can be rational and human. However, if the urge and will are governed by instincts, senses, and imagination, which yields a speculative judgment by reason, the will is animal.
When the action occurs, its wanted or unwanted consequences can have an effect on the constitutive elements of the action. This means that they have a reinforcing or undermining effect on instincts and inner impulses, knowledge, desire, and will. Nevertheless, this effect is only indirect. In case there is a positive effect, which reinforces the principles of an action, the action will be repeated frequently. This will lead to a particular psychological habit in the individual, which is called a “temperament” or “character.” According to the principles of Sadraean philosophy, a soul that possesses a temperament changes its substantial form, and given the new stage of its psychological forms, it comes to have new and stronger faculties and powers. Later, the principles of the action will be further solidified and their functioning in inducing actions will be quicker, such that the actions associated with that stage of the soul will be produced more easily.
fereshte abolhassani niaraki
Abstract
By accepting the principle of human mutability, Mulla Sadra considers ethics as something between nature and intellectual will. In other words, he sees the origin of ethics in both nature (creation) and will, and considers it something between these two. Although the forces of human nature have an impact ...
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By accepting the principle of human mutability, Mulla Sadra considers ethics as something between nature and intellectual will. In other words, he sees the origin of ethics in both nature (creation) and will, and considers it something between these two. Although the forces of human nature have an impact on our creation, but they do not compel us to act in a certain way. Instead, humans perform ethical actions through their own intellectual will, and then through practice and habit, they acquire new ethical virtues. The ethical mechanism of humans involves a type of ethical thinking and reasoning that is stimulating to inclinations and emotional organization, which is influenced by the complex interplay of internal forces, external influences, and human will. Internal forces have various cognitive aspects (knowledge and beliefs), inclinations (emotions, feelings, natural tendencies, instincts), and even physical aspects (temperament, nutrition, brain, sensory tools, genetic backgrounds), as well as factors such as the faculties and secondary personality traits, self-purification, and so on, which are foundational and influential in this realm. Various environmental factors, such as the transmission of social or religious laws and norms (through religion/prophets) or modeling (with the influence of mentors, parents, etc.), and environmental consequences and socialization (socializing with others, associating with good people), affect human ethical growth, which is acquired in interaction with the internal-biological-acquired organism
Philosophy
Mansour Imanpour
Abstract
Introduction
Undoubtedly, the relations between existing entities can be viewed from various perspectives. One such perspective is the theory of causation and its implications. By adhering to this principle, Muslim philosophers engage in accounting for the relations between existents and existential ...
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Introduction
Undoubtedly, the relations between existing entities can be viewed from various perspectives. One such perspective is the theory of causation and its implications. By adhering to this principle, Muslim philosophers engage in accounting for the relations between existents and existential realms. This has faced them with puzzling questions, including the one pertaining to the relationship between constant (thābit) and changeable (mutaghayyir) existents.
To illustrate, it should be noted that, in Islamic philosophy, existential realms are generally divided into the realm of purely immaterial entities and that of material entities. On another division, they are partitioned into three realms: intellectual (ʿaqlī), imaginal (mithāl), and natural. The relations between entities existing in these realms is explained in terms of the principle of causation. Now, the question arises: given one of the implications of this principle, namely impossibility of the deviation of an effect from its cause, how could actual changeable entities in the natural world be issued forth from a constant immaterial entity? Let us elaborate the question as follows: in the natural world, there are various types of changes, including “generation” (kawn) and “corruption” (fisād), accidental changes (that is, changes in accidents or properties [aʿrāḍ]), and as per Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, substantial changes (changes in substance or jawhar). It goes without saying that if the changeable entity in question is attributed to a constant unchanging complete cause, then the effect has indeed deviated from its cause in two ways: (a) Why, despite the existence of the cause, does the changing effect, which is a part or stage of the motion, become nonexistent and deviate from its complete cause? (b) Why, despite the existence of the complete cause, does the effect (namely, the motion with all its parts) fail to become existent and deviate from its cause?
Muslim philosophers have offered various theories to solve this predicament. These theories were subject to debates over the history of Islamic philosophy. Many articles and books have been written in this regard, each tackling a dimension or some dimensions of this problem.
This article does not aim to reiterate or provide a literature review of these solutions. Instead, it provides a brief classification and analysis of these theories and then yields a novel theory by drawing upon the philosophical principles of Mullā Ṣadrā.
Research Methodology
This article begins with a classification and analysis of the accounts provided by the main books and studies on this question by deploying the descriptive and analytical method. Finally, it makes a case for a novel theory in terms of a final formulation of the theory of substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyya).
Discussion and Results
The problem of the relation between changeable and constant entities is proposed within the framework of Islamic philosophy, particularly its rendition of the law of causation and its implications. To address this formidable challenge, Muslim philosophers have proposed various accounts in terms of their philosophical principles and structures. However, these solutions have often faced challenges, either based on their assumptions in natural sciences or due to the structure and content of their solutions.
The finding of this article regarding the problem of relation between constant and changeable entities in terms of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Transcendent Philosophy is that, in final analysis, the problem involves two types of an effect’s deviation from its cause: (1) Despite the constancy of the cause, one part or stage of the effect becomes nonexistent, and (2) despite the existence of the constant cause, all parts or stages of the cause fail to become existent.
As for (1), it may be suggested that the renewed effect emanating from the constant cause does not lose any perfection. This way, it does not deviate from its cause. What becomes nonexistent in this process is not an existential perfection but an imperfection or flaw, the negation of which amounts to some sort of affirmation. Accordingly, in this process of continuous flourishing, the moving existence does not come to lack a perfection or an actuality, and hence, the effect does not deviate from its cause by losing part of it despite the cause’s existence. However, it is not straightforward to address (2), since it may be said that the realization of a subsequent part or stage of something depends on the realization of its preceding part or stage. That being the case, the failure of the subsequent parts and stages to come to existence in the first stage is not a deviation of the effect from its cause, but is because its condition or its preparatory cause has failed to exist. This means that, in this case too, the effect has not indeed deviated from its complete cause.
Conclusion
“Substantial motion” ultimately goes back to the evolution of a substantial existence. This perfection-seeking existence does not drive itself from potentiality to actuality; that is, it does not bestow perfection upon itself. It always has an emanating, perfection-giving entity that continuously emanates forms upon it, compensating its deficiencies and promoting its existence. During this continuous emanation, what happens to the changing effect is that its existence is constructed and becomes thriving. In this process, none of its parts or perfections disappear, and hence, no deviation from the cause occurs. Moreover, the emanating cause is not an absolute unconstrained for the subsequent parts or stages. Thus, their absence in the realm of the first part or stage does not count as deviation from the complete cause. On this account, the constant entity emanates an existence that inherently involves change, in light of which the existential perfection does not disappear, and hence, no deviation from the cause occurs.
Philosophy
Mahdi Baniasadi Baghmirani; Sayed Behshid Hosseini; Azadeh Shahcheraghi
Abstract
Epistemological issues in architecture are related to the movement of people in space. According to the philosophical concept of movement and MullāṢadrā's theory of substantial motion, perception refers to people's gradual perception of architectural spaces. Deep understanding of mosque-school spaces ...
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Epistemological issues in architecture are related to the movement of people in space. According to the philosophical concept of movement and MullāṢadrā's theory of substantial motion, perception refers to people's gradual perception of architectural spaces. Deep understanding of mosque-school spaces is not possible without movement. In order to achieve a deep understanding of these spaces, the observer must move in the space, and after experiencing physical and mental movements, he should promotes his perception level. The question of this research in the form of a case study is that, considering the variety of accesses in the Agha Bozor Mosque-School of Kashan; How does movement promote perception from the material level to the spiritual level? This research is descriptive-analytical and case study, and its results show that, despite the existence of separate paths (for prayer and educational performance) in the spaces of the mosque-school, the observer experiences three orders of movement (visual, physical and mental) by moving in each of these paths; in the form of four pillars in the mosque and three pillars in the school; It guides the observer's perception (in line with MullāṢadrā's perceptual hierarchy) from the sensory level to the imagination, and then to the intellectual level.
keramat varzdar; fatemeh ketebchi
Abstract
IntroductionMulla Sadra differentiates between "action" and "intentional action". He considers the intentional action as an action, which is caused by second-order consciousness of the purpose of the action (Mulla Sadra 1981, 2/223). His interpretation of this second-order consciousness is "awareness ...
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IntroductionMulla Sadra differentiates between "action" and "intentional action". He considers the intentional action as an action, which is caused by second-order consciousness of the purpose of the action (Mulla Sadra 1981, 2/223). His interpretation of this second-order consciousness is "awareness of purpose" (Mulla Sadra undated, 69). According to him, the voluntary Agent is different from the intentional Agent. An intentional Agent is an Agent who not only intends to perform the action, but also has second-order consciousness of the purpose of the action (Mulla Sadra, 1354, 134); That is, he knows what he is doing and what purpose he is trying to achieve. This second-order consciousness leads to the transformation of action into intentional action and the feeling of free will.It seems that this ability is specific to the human soul and the faculties that is specific to this soul. The basic issue of this research is the analysis of the role of "practical reason" as a consciousness-creating factor in this process - that is, the process of converting a "voitional act" into an "intentional action" - in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. For this purpose, by searching in the works of Mulla Sadra, the authors try to evaluate the functions of "practical reason" in the process of issuing action and reveal its position as an "consciousness-creating factor" among the principles of action.Methods and MaterialThe research method of this paper is descriptive-analytical method. In this way, by referring to the different works of Mulla Sadra, the authors try to provide a complete description of his opinions. Then, by analyzing his opinions based on logical requirements, it is tried to discover the functions of practical reason in the process of intentional action in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Results and DiscussionThe element of "second-order consciousness", which is the condition for turning a voluntary action into an "intentional action", is one of the characteristics of the human soul, and animals lack such an element (Mulla sadra 1981, 6/312). In other words, animal souls have perception through their faculties; but they don't have second-order consciousness to their faculties and their perceptions; but the human soul has the ability to aware of the "self" and "its faculties” as a part of its perception (Mulla sadra 1981, 6/251). This feature is achieved by "reason faculty" for this soul (Mulla sadra 1363, 133-132). It seems that practical reason with three functions transforms voitional act into intentional action and brings second-order consciousness to a person.The first function of practical reason is the positive function. According to Mulla Sadra, the only faculty that creates particular mental forms is not the “imaginal faculty”; Rather, the practical reason has also the ability to create them (Mulla sadra 1363, 516-516). According to him, the affirmation of benefits is done in the imaginary level by the imaginal faculty and in the rational level by the practical reason (Mulla sadra 1382, 2/1037). The rational level here does not mean general mental forms, because Mulla Sadra points out that decision of doing an action always require partial mental forms (Mulla sadra 1363, 516) and he states also that practical reason is the ability to perceive practical mental forms (Mulla sadra 1360, 200).The second function of "practical reason" refers to the judgment about the practical mental forms that the imaginal faculty has acknowledged their usefulness. In his sensory and imaginary encounters with the real world, a person creates images of action. When the imaginal faculty creates a practical image in the imagination and decides to issue it based on nature of body; practical reason evaluates its acceptance, and it judges the goodness and badness of that partial practical judgment based on general normative patterns (Mulla sadra 1354, 261).The third function of "practical reason" in the process of issuing an intentional action is managing the imaginary passions of a person towards performing an action. This role-playing actually occurs at a time when the imaginal faculty orders the performance of action A and in this way, arouses the lust or anger of a person to do it. This function is different from the previous function; because the practical reason in the previous function used to make judgments about the decision of the imaginal faculty; But in this function, practical reason manage lust or anger which is the result of the decision of the imaginal faculty. Mulla Sadra referred to this function as "caring" (Mulla sadra 1981, 3/419). ConclusionIn transcendental wisdom, the Reason is a self-aware power; this means that it can rationalize itself and achieve second-order self-consciousness. The Reason rationalizes not only itself, but also other perceptive and practical powers. Rationalizing here is not the understanding of the general mental form, but the acquisition of second-order consciousness.According to Mulla Sadra, "intentional action" is different from "voluntary action" because "intentional action" is an action that is the result of the will along with the "second-order consciousness of the agent" for the purpose of the action. According to the this explanation, the element of "second-order consciousness" is an element that is obtained by adding "practical reason" to the principles of action; Therefore, "intentional action" is a voluntary action in which "practical reason" plays a role in its process.Practical reason with three different functions brings second-order consciousness to the human soul: imagining particular and practical mental forms, acknowledging its usefulness and managing perceptual and motivational other faculties.
Philosophy
vahid khademzadeh; Fatemeh Kanaani
Abstract
Introduction:In the framework of the conceptual metaphor theory, abstract concepts are understood by conceptual metaphors so that by removing these metaphors, a large part of the meaning of these concepts is lost. Therefore, these metaphors don't have only an educational or aesthetic role but also our ...
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Introduction:In the framework of the conceptual metaphor theory, abstract concepts are understood by conceptual metaphors so that by removing these metaphors, a large part of the meaning of these concepts is lost. Therefore, these metaphors don't have only an educational or aesthetic role but also our understanding and even our behavior are based on such metaphors. In this theory, metaphors are inseparable parts of scientific and philosophical theories.The human mind and how it works has been one of the greatest philosophical and scientific mysteries in the history of thought. Various theories have been offered throughout history about the nature of the mind. In the context of conceptual metaphor theory, it can be said that these theories are based on various conceptual metaphors; Some of these metaphors have been universal and some have belonged to a particular culture and age. For example, "mind as a container" is a common metaphor among different ages and cultures. In the context of this metaphor, the mind has a definite boundary that distinguishes the mind world from the outside world. Metaphors such as "mind as machine" and "mind as computer" were considered in contemporary analytical philosophy. Each of these metaphors highlights only one aspect of the concept of mind and inevitably hides the others. The mind can not be reduced to any of these metaphors.One of the functions of the mind is to acquire knowledge. Various metaphors have been proposed to describe this mind function. One of the most important of these metaphors is the "knowing as seeing" metaphor. This metaphor has roots in human common experience in the childhood period. So, this metaphor is accepted in different cultures and Languages. In addition to its existence in everyday and customary language, this metaphor has also found its way into philosophical and mystical texts.One of the Muslim philosophical innovations is to introduce intuitive knowledge as one of the types of knowledge. Since intuitive knowledge is not available to ordinary people, the linguistic systems have not developed specific words and terms to describe such knowledge. This makes it impossible to describe and explain such knowledge literally. Therefore, Mulla Sadra has used conceptual metaphors to describe intuitive knowledge. One of the most important of these metaphors is the "knowing as seeing" metaphor. This metaphor has been developed in Sadra's system and many sub-metaphors have been formed under this metaphor.In this study, the role of this metaphor in Sadra's philosophical system and its various dimensions are examined.Methods and MaterialsWords literally refer to one of the elements related to the act of seeing, which were discovered and extracted in Sadra's texts. Most of these words have been used to describe intuitive knowledge. Then, these words were categorized and the conceptual metaphors, associated with them, were introduced.Results and discussionIn the act of seeing, three elements are distinguishable: seer, seeable, and relation between them. Each of the three elements is used to explain intuitive knowledge by other sub-metaphors; “Knower as Seer”, “Known as Seeable” and “Quality of Knowing as Relation between Seer and Seeable” metaphors are defined below the “Knowing as Seeing” metaphor. The “Knower as Seer” metaphor has the sub-metaphors of "the quality of the knower as the purity or pollution of the seer" and "ignorance as blindness". The “Quality of Knowing as Relation between Seer and Seeable” metaphor has the sub-metaphors of "obstacles to acquiring knowledge as obstacles to seeing", "intensity and weakness of knowledge as the seer's proximity, and remoteness from the seeable".ConclusionsThe "knowing as seeing" metaphor is an inseparable part of the theory of knowledge in Mulla Sadra's philosophy; In Sadra's thought, knowledge of the essence of God is not possible, and on the other hand, God is described as the light of lights, which is the most visible being. Mulla Sadra uses one of the conventional human experiences to reconcile these two propositions. In conventional human experience, the sun is the brightest object, but the intensity of light in the sun prevents man from seeing it directly. Mulla Sadra maps this conventional experience into the supernatural world and introduces the intensity of divine light as an obstacle to the intuitive observation of the divine essence.In the popular view among Muslim philosophers, rational perception is the understanding of general concepts, but Mulla Sadra considered rational perception as the observation of beings who are present in the intellectual world. However, Mulla Sadra has used this conceptual metaphor to adapt his theory to the popular view. He introduces the distant observation of intellectual beings as the cause of the formation of general concepts in the human mind; because, in conventional human experience, distant observation is accompanied by ambiguity. This ambiguity causes the concept formed in the mind to be able to adapt to several instances.Blindness due to light intensity and distant observation clearly shows the vital role of the "knowing as seeing" metaphor in Mulla Sadra's epistemological system.
Philosophy
ali mostajeran; ali arshad Riahi
Abstract
Introduction Mirza Javad Tehrani is one of the followers of the school of Tafkik and had been strongly influenced by the thoughts of Mirza Mehdi Isfahani and Sheikh Hadi Tehrani. According to school of Tafkik, the use of rational and philosophical methods has no place in proving or explaining ...
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Introduction Mirza Javad Tehrani is one of the followers of the school of Tafkik and had been strongly influenced by the thoughts of Mirza Mehdi Isfahani and Sheikh Hadi Tehrani. According to school of Tafkik, the use of rational and philosophical methods has no place in proving or explaining religious teachings. Also, one of the reasons, given by the deniers of the Sadra's philosophy is that this philosophy takes contradictory approach, and therefore they accuse the transcendent philosophy of methodological eclecticism. But Tehrani by proving the fundamental reality of quiddity and using it for the issue of monotheism, has confirmed the use of philosophical and rational discussions in the religious teachings. Tehrani by proposing eight critiques, he has criticized the principles and arguments of the fundamental reality of existence, and consequently, he considers the issue of essential monotheism to be provable only by the principles of the fundamental reality of quiddity. As for the background of the present research, the only article that has been published on this subject is "Critique of the arguments of the fundamental reality of existence in the thought of Mirza Javad Tehrani" by Hossein Soheili (Soheili and others، 1398) in the journal of Hikmat Muaser. The present research is structurally, contently and basically, from four aspects, different from this research.Research MethodIn this article the authors, firstly, relying on the descriptive method and analysis of the content, have studied and evaluated eight Tehrani’s critiques on the fundamental reality of existence. Consequently, it is specified that the origin of Tehrani's attitude to explaining the provable characteristic of the Essence of the Necessary Being, in order to support the principles of the fundamental reality of quiddity, is that he did not distinguish between acceptance of requirement and acceptance of causality regarding the Essence of the Necessary Being. On the other hand, it has been cleared that, relying on the Tehrani’s view -criticizing the fundamental reality of existence and strengthening the fundamental reality of quiddity- it is not possible to give a convincing answer to Ibn Kamuna's doubt and the arguments of the monotheism of Essence, attributes and actions envisage problem. But relying on the Sadra's fundamental reality of existence, although God is not a special being of any quiddity, to require His possibility, the supreme Divine Existence possesses all perfect entities. Accordingly, firstly, the existential attributes of creatures are attributed to God in the status of the act, not in the status of the Essence. Secondly, they are attributed to God in that they are existences. Therefore, it can be acknowledged that although creatures have perfections, there is no perfection other than the perfection of God. According to this interpretation, philosophical purification will not be in conflict with the appearance of verses and hadiths that limit existential attributes as well as activity and influence in God alone or attributed the actions of the creature to God.According to Tehrani, the adherents of the fundamental reality of existence believe that the truth of external objects is existence and the truth of existence is not something like other objects, so it cannot be perceived by the five senses, but its perception is possible with intuition. According to the authors' research, Tehrani, since he could not perceive the truth of existence with empirical knowledge, inevitably considered what he perceives with his five senses as truth, and finally came to believe that what exists externally is quiddity.Consequences These consequences are resulted from this article: 1- Tehrani’s criticisms on the fundamental reality of existence are not correct. In some positions, he quoted the words of the predecessors of the adherents of the fundamental reality of quiddity, and in other cases, he did not accept the principles of the adherents of the fundamental reality of quiddity. There are two central points in most of Tehran's criticisms: Firstly, he did not have a correct idea of how the object and the subject correspond to each other, because he considered the concrete to be a container-like reality in which external beings have taken place, while the subject and the subjective are the same thing, as well as object and objective are the same thing. Secondly, in most cases, he has meant what the adherents of the fundamental reality of existence mean, but in order to escape from this thesis, he has adhered to the fundamental reality of quiddity. 2- Considering the difference between requirement and causality, which is based on the fundamental reality of existence, the Essence of the Necessary Being can be considered as possessor of requirement, without any causality, because considering the issue of causality, the Essence of the Necessary Being will have caused and otherness of existence and quiddity in the contingents indicates the essential dependence of the contingent on the cause, but the sameness of existence and quiddity in the Necessary Being indicates the non-dependence of the Essence of Necessary Being on the cause, since His Essence is His Existence. But according to the fundamental reality of quiddity, relying on the unification of requirement and causality, in the Essence of the Necessary Being, the main problem is that the Essence of the Necessary Being can no longer be considered the Necessary Being of all aspects.
Philosophy
Nafiseh Nojaba; Mahdi Qiasvand
Abstract
Abstract IntroductionContemporary models of "specific divine actions", mostly and regardless of differences, have shaken with three metaphysical commitments, namely "The incompatibility of the divine act and the act of nature", "God's non-intervention" and also "the prescriptiveness of the ...
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Abstract IntroductionContemporary models of "specific divine actions", mostly and regardless of differences, have shaken with three metaphysical commitments, namely "The incompatibility of the divine act and the act of nature", "God's non-intervention" and also "the prescriptiveness of the laws of nature". What the following paper examines among these assumptions, is the first commitment or assumption. Neo-Thomism poses a serious challenge to the premises of incompatibilism within the frame of contemporary scientific theories and the only solution is to present alternative model. Nevertheless, the duality of nature and the supernatural as a common facet of compatibilism and incompatibilism is a berrier to both models providing a plausible explanation. Although, neo-Thomism s argument about longitudinal God–nature relationship fails to meet all expectations and they are faced with the dilemma between Deism and the denial of non-divine agency. Breaking the ontological boundaries between nature and the supernatural, there seem to be a possible solution to the dilemma. It seems monistic approach of Sadra developed two systems of unity “Tashkiky” and “Shakhsi” can be a solution to this problem. Thus, this essay examines Sadra argument to address the problem arised by “compatibilism” approach. MethodThis article is written in a descriptive-analytical method based on Mulla Sadra's principles.Results and DiscussionIn what follows, to address the issue by relying on Sadra s argument, firstly, double causality, causal closure and the difficulty of explanation of the supernatural effect on nature which makes difficult to explain “special divine action” in the frame of “compatibilism” approach, will be analysed. Sadra theory and Thomistic view have tried to solve the problem through rejecting causal duality, that is, they deny the adequacy of physical causes. The possibility of the supernatural effect on nature by excluding the ontological aspects between them is one of the significant components provided by this paper. Given the key role of the concept of “existence” and “essence” in Sadra and Thomistic view in explanation of the supernatural and nature, by appealing to different versions of Sadra s argument about “Asalat al-wujud” and Thomistic view, analysis of the relationships between these two concepts has been done. Finally, it is argued that the dualistic approach of Thomistic view and one of the version of “Asalat al-wujud” which is the identity of “existence” and “essence” fail to prove the possibility of the effect of the supernatural on nature. However, there are two other versions of “Asala al-wujud” can provide the solution to this problem.ConclusionWhat is suggested in this paper is only to show the power of Sadra s theory in breaking of the ontological boundaries between nature and Supernatural. Even two systems of “tashkiky unity” and “shakhsi unity” support this possibility. To solve the problem of “special divine action” through the breaking of the ontological aspects requires to be committed to components such as, the adequacy of the natural sciences, the laws of nature and noninterventionism commitment.
Philosophy
efat alsadat hashemi; Alireza Kohansal; seyed morteza hoseini shahrudi,
Abstract
There are Quranic verses that cannot be interpreted without rational or intellectual exegeses and merely by drawing on their prima facie meanings, such as those that do not square with explicit Quranic doctrines, including those in which “hands” or “face” are attributed to God. ...
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There are Quranic verses that cannot be interpreted without rational or intellectual exegeses and merely by drawing on their prima facie meanings, such as those that do not square with explicit Quranic doctrines, including those in which “hands” or “face” are attributed to God. Another group of verses of a similar vein are those concerning “treasuries of Allah” (khazāʾin Allāh). The predicament is that people tend to collect valuable things in treasuries only because they have a limited power and cannot have what they want whenever they do, but this is not true of God, because of His unlimited, unconstrained power and knowledge.
According to Quranic exegetes, there are two types of “divine treasuries”:
Worldly treasuries
Otherworldly treasuries (those of the absolute hidden world)
There are different views of the nature of “divine treasuries” proposed by exegetes of the Quran and Muslim philosophers. We begin with views propounded by Quranic exegetes in philosophical-theological exegeses of the Quran. Major views of this sort have been offered in the exegesis of verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr in the Quran. These views might be classified into four:
Rains
Material elements and occasions of creation
Divine predestinations
Divine knowledge
In a number of his exegetical and philosophical works, Mullā Ṣadrā has presented his account of “divine treasuries.” In line with his philosophical principles, he construes divine treasuries as intellectual entities; that is, as a particular stage of divine knowledge (after that of divine grace or ʿināyat), which mediates the emanation of divine blessings or grace to creatures—a stage in which the forms of everything inheres in an intellectual way. A systematic, rational rendering of Mullā Ṣadrā’s account of divine treasuries requires a proper elaboration of his philosophical principles associated with divine knowledge, including the primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd), gradation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), objectivity of knowledge and existence, etc.
The following are the questions we consider in this paper:
How do theological exegeses of the Quran account for the notion of “divine treasuries”? What problems do they face?
What are Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles underlying his account of divine treasuries? How does his account treat the problems faced by other accounts?
What other account of divine treasuries might be yielded, which is still compatible with the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy?
To answer these questions, we begin with a literal definition of “treasuries of Allah” and then overview the accounts provided by exegetes and their problems. Next, we offer a detailed account of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles as preliminary to a proper account of “divine treasuries.”
Articles have been published about “divine treasuries,” including “Divine treasuries” by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ḥishmatpūr (2005), “A critical analysis of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of treasuries in light of structural semantics” by Mahdī Bāqirī and Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalikī (2018) and “A critical application of the theory of conceptual mixture in al-Mīzān’s reading of divine treasuries” again by Mahdī Bāqirī and Aḥad Farāmarz Qarāmalikī (2017).
We conclude that, of the four accounts outlined in this paper, the first three suffer from numerous problems, and thus they fail to yield an adequate account of the Quranic notion of divine treasuries. In our view, the fourth view—that is, Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical account—has failed to offer a full-fledged account of instances of divine treasuries. Accordingly, we propounded a fourth view, which is an extension of Mullā Ṣadrā’s account. We argue how a proper, reasonable account of the notion of divine treasuries can be made possible by an elaboration of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical principles concerning divine knowledge and its degrees, and by drawing on characteristics of divine treasuries as outlined in the Quran, particularly verse 21 of Sura al-Hijr. We show that this revised Sadraean account is immune to the objections raised against other theories. On this account, divine treasuries suggest God’s knowledge of the measures of everything before its descent; that is, its creation. Moreover, on Mullā Ṣadrā’s principles, treasuries are of two sorts: worldly and otherworldly, where the latter is of two kinds in turn: objective and subjective (or cognitive). Objective treasuries are entities existing in imaginal (mithāl) and intellectual (ʿaql) worlds, and subjective treasuries are entities existing in the world of divine names and attributes. This is an “existential account of divine treasuries,” which might apply to all degrees of existence and creation.
zohre zarei; Qodratullah Qorbani
Abstract
IntroductionThis research deals with Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections to constructed (iʿtibārī) concepts in Illuminationist philosophy. A major philosophical issue in Islamic philosophy today is a division of universal concepts into quiddity-based (māhuwī), logical, and philosophical. Suhrawardī ...
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IntroductionThis research deals with Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections to constructed (iʿtibārī) concepts in Illuminationist philosophy. A major philosophical issue in Islamic philosophy today is a division of universal concepts into quiddity-based (māhuwī), logical, and philosophical. Suhrawardī and philosophers before him had just discerned the difference between real (ḥaqīqī) and constructed concepts, placing them respectively into objective and subjective categories, and until Mullā Ṣadrā’s time, the division was restricted to first intelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-ūlā) or quiddity-based concepts and secondaryintelligibles (al-maʿqūlāt al-thāniya) or logical concepts, and the place of philosophical concepts was not clear.Accordingly, Suhrawardī subsumes concepts such as existence, unity, multiplicity, necessity, possibility, and colorfulness under constructed concepts without drawing a distinction between logical and philosophical concepts. This was mainly because there is no distinction between these concepts in the external world, and because repetition and vicious regress would follow if infinite attributes coextensively existed.In addition to his critique of Suhrawardī for having distinguished concepts into subjective and objective, Mullā Ṣadrā challenged Suhrawardī’s views of each of these concepts.Research Method or ApproachThis research adopts a fundamental descriptive-analytic method and relies on Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentaries on Suhrawardī’s Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq (Exposition of the wisdom of illumination) to elaborately deal with Suhrawardī’s remarks concerning constructed concepts and Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections to these views. Data of the research have been collected through a library method, and cases were extracted by indexing. Finally, by drawing on the intellectual method, the indexed contents were analyzed and criticized, and the views were critically analyzed and considered.Discussion and ConclusionHere is a summary of findings of the research:A major contribution of Suhrawardī concerning concepts was a division of concepts into subjective and objective, by which all philosophical concepts such as existence, unity, multiplicity, necessity, possibility, colorfulness, and relation are subsumed under purely constructed concepts, without corresponding to anything in the external reality.Suhrawardī’s main reason for the negation of external distinction in the case of philosophical concepts is that the coextensive existence of infinite attributes implies vicious regress and repetition, since in his Talwīḥāt, Suhrawardī proposes a criterion for the distinction between the subjective and the objective and for the impossibility of the distinction in the external world, according to which everything whose occurrence implies repetition and regress counts as constructed.Major objections raised by Mullā Ṣadrā against Suhrawardī’s account of constructed concepts, which serves as the foundation and tenet of the rest of his objections, are as follows:Absence of any distinction between philosophical and logical secondaryintelligiblesConfusion between concepts and their instancesFailure to take account of the organic composition (al-tarkīb al-ittiḥādī) between quiddities and existencesConflation of the name and what is namedConfusion between primary essential predication (al-ḥaml al-awwalī al-dhātī) and common technical predication (al-ḥaml al-shāʾiʿ al-ṣunāʿī).Given these findings, the obstacles, problems, and proposals of the research are as follows:While most of Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections are accurate and based on his insights into the problem of intelligibles, some of his objections are not plausible because of their anachronistic nature.Although in some cases, Suhrawardī’s remarks are attacked and even undermined by Mullā Ṣadrā’s objections, in some cases it is open to us to criticize and adjudicate the two parties and even offer novel contributions to the debate since Mullā Ṣadrā has rested content with Avicenna’s views, among other predecessors, and did not offer an alternative account.
maryam abbasabbadi arabi; Ali Haghi; Alireza Kohansal
Abstract
Philosophers and intellectuals have always been concerned with the problem of life. Many have considered it from different points of view. In ancient philosophy, life was attributed to the soul. Pythagoras was the first to treat the soul as the origin of life. He was followed by Anaxagoras who referred ...
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Philosophers and intellectuals have always been concerned with the problem of life. Many have considered it from different points of view. In ancient philosophy, life was attributed to the soul. Pythagoras was the first to treat the soul as the origin of life. He was followed by Anaxagoras who referred to the life force, which gave life to the material world, as Nous (intellect or spirit). Just like his predecessors, Plato believed that the soul was the origin of life, and in the case of real entities, life, spirit, motion, and reason are inseparable. Following Plato’s lead, Aristotle traced the cause or origin of life to the soul. These ideas left a great impact on Muslim philosophers. Avicenna—a prominent philosopher in the Islamic world—appealed to Plato’s and Aristotle’s accounts to argue that life is essential to the soul, believing that the soul is by itself alive, and physical objects come to be alive by virtue of the soul. Accordingly, the criterion of life for Avicenna is perception and action. After Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā provided the same definition, developing it by drawing on his own philosophical principles.Mullā Ṣadrā argues that life is the origin of “perception” and “action,” incorporating the two notions in his definition of life. In his view, a living being is a perceiving acting entity; that is, an entity with knowledge and consciousness, which does certain actions. In other words, it should be such that it knowingly and consciously does the action. Given his philosophical principles such as the primacy of existence, its simplicity, and its gradation (tashkīk), he establishes the idea that life is a graded entity pervasive throughout all stages of existence. On this account, every living being’s life is the way of its existence, which determines its vital effects. The nobler and stronger the existence is, the more perfection the perception and the firmer the action will be. Hence, every being enjoys life as much as it enjoys existence. We refer to certain existing entities as non-living because we cannot perceive the effects of life in them. For volitional sensation and motion are indications of life, and beings that tangibly have such characteristics are living, and this is not to deny life in other beings. For instance, Quranic verses affirm that there is such a life in beings which cannot be perceived by human senses. Thus, according to Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, all existing entities are ipso facto alive, whereas pre-Sadraean philosophies attributed life only to animals and humans on account of their perceptive and motive faculties, lacked by plants and solid objects, and thus they saw these entities as non-living. This is incompatible with Quranic verses and the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy. There are Quranic verses referring to the exaltation of God by all beings—something not perceived by human senses. These verses indicate that all beings enjoy consciousness and life. Mullā Ṣadrā argued for such general consciousness and life by drawing on his philosophical principles. In this way, the widespread view that only some beings are alive is implausible in terms of Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy, and once life is proved for a stage of existence, it will be proved for all other stages of existence by dint of the principles of the primacy, simplicity, and gradation of existence. This is compatible with many Quranic verses and hadiths in which the power to talk, to hear, and to know is attributed to apparently non-living beings, which implies a degree of life in them.On this account, life is a graded reality that exists as an existential perfection in the necessary being, humans, animals, plants, and solid objects in different degrees. Thus, the necessary being is essentially alive, giving existence and life to other entities. Such existence is the same as life, and solid objects, plants, animals, and humans enjoy degrees of life to the extent that they enjoy degrees of existence. The view is confirmed by Quranic verses, denoting that all beings exalt God, which imply that all beings are alive. Mullā Ṣadrā cites the Quranic verse, “There is not a thing but celebrates His praise, but you do not understand their glorification,” and then comments that all beings prostrate for God and praise Him in a volitional conscious manner, and perfective attributes such as life, knowledge, and power are not separable from these beings.
somayeh malleki; Mahdi Emami Jome; nafiseh ahl sarmadi
Abstract
Introduction: Superficial theology and superficial understanding of religion, as a current of thought and belief throughout the history of Islam, has been presented in the form of various ideas and has been influential in social, cultural and moral fields. Mulla Sadra (979-1050 AH) in most of ...
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Introduction: Superficial theology and superficial understanding of religion, as a current of thought and belief throughout the history of Islam, has been presented in the form of various ideas and has been influential in social, cultural and moral fields. Mulla Sadra (979-1050 AH) in most of his works enters into the study and critique of this trend and its consequences in the society of his time. The main issue for him is the critique of superficial theology, which has limited the understanding of religion to the apparent level of texts and religious practice to individual jurisprudence. In most of his works, Mulla Sadra has criticized this kind of understanding of religion and believes that if we put all our efforts in grammar, we cannot provide a correct understanding of religion and religious texts. Therefore, one of the main axes of Sadra's thought is the critique of this type of understanding and the study of its social, political, moral and cultural consequences. In this study, we will conclude that if the ostensible understanding of religion prevails in society, the false moral values will prevail in society, and therefore the people of society will move towards cultural and moral decline every day. Basically, the goal of religion and morality is to value human beings and life. In fact, it should be said that from Mulla Sadra's point of view, there can be a significant relationship between this kind of understanding and interpretation of religion on the one hand and ethics, culture, people and even social and political sovereignty in a society on the other hand. Based on our best knowledge, no article or book has been written independently on the subject of this article in Persian, Arabic and English. However, we can indirectly use the following works to some extent; Emami Jome (2012) in an article entitled Hermeneutic Horizons of Transcendent Wisdom and Social, Cultural Mulla Sadra has studied the hermeneutic foundations of transcendent wisdom and its historical, social and cultural mission. Also, Arshad Riahi and Tabatabai (2016) in an article as strategies for reviving morality in society from the perspective of Sadr al-Muta'allehin to examine the strategies for reviving morality in societies that have been ruled by moral depravity or in the path of separation from values. Divine morality has been established, paid for. Method and Material: In this study, we have assumed that from Mulla Sadar's point of view, there is a significant relationship between a superficial understanding and interpretation of religion and moral, cultural and social issues. To prove this hypothesis, we had a comprehensive overview on documentary, library and content analysis and descriptive methods. Results and Discussion: The type of knowledge of societies about religion is influential in the ethics and culture of the society. Mulla Sadra has had a special view on this issue. He considers religious communities to be prone to religious violence due to the superficiality of scholars also he beleives that unreal scholars at any time, under the support of their rulers, have interpreted the verses of the Qur'an superficially in accordance with their thoughts and ideas, and in fact have imposed their opinions and prejudices on the Qur'an in order to achieve their goals. They have hired religion. The result of using unrealistic scholars for the government is that the government gains legitimacy through them,Therefore, it should be said that Mulla Sadra expresses the situation of his time not only as a complaint but also as a lesson. and it seems that his main concern to be about the future. Basically, the goal of morality should be to value human beings and their lives, and to stand against God's creatures is against human values, and Mulla Sadra pays special attention to this issue. According to Mulla Sadra, as science and knowledge spread in the society, the cultural, moral and existential perfection of the citizens increases and vice versa. If we want to express Mulla Sadra's conception of his time correctly, we must say that in his opinion, his time was a time of decline and a kind of deviation from the main path of human life. Although he could not take a step towards social, cultural and moral education due to the social conditions of his time, but today, with the help of his views, it is possible to provide the necessary and appropriate social, cultural and moral contexts. In this area, it is necessary to pay attention to the material, spiritual and planning needs for the cultural and moral flourishing of Islamic societies at the same time. As a result, it should be said that Mulla Sadra's philosophy is not just a collection of dry philosophical topics; rather, it is a coherent, well-founded, purposeful, dynamic, and practical system of thought, and if its content is considered, it can have a positive impact on human individual and social life. Conclusion: The type of societies' knowledge of religion influences the ethics and culture of that society. Lack of a rational approach to religion can severely adversely affect the family, society, culture, and moral system. Mulla Sadra considers religious communities to be prone to religious violence due to the superficiality of scholars. Unrealistic scholars in every age and time, under the protection of their rulers, have interpreted the verses of the Qur'an superficially according to their thoughts and ideas, and in fact, instead of interpreting the Qur'an, they have imposed their opinions and prejudices on the Qur'an. They have used religion to achieve their goals, as a result of which Mulla Sadra considers the mixing of imperfect scholars with sages and sultans as the cause of any sedition that has taken place in religion. Because religious scholars have a deep-rooted spiritual base among the people, the government can increase its popularity among the people by approaching unrealistic scholars. Mulla Sadra describes the situation of his time not only as a complaint but also as a lesson, and it seems that Mulla Sadra's main concern is with the future.
Ali Torabi; zeynab sadeghi; mehran najafi; zahra lotfi
Abstract
Introduction Two complicated and difficult problems in the Islamic philosophy are knowledge and intellect. These were of great significance to philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to such Muslim philosophers as Avicenna, Fakhr al-Razi, Suhrawardi, and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi as well as to the Schools ...
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Introduction Two complicated and difficult problems in the Islamic philosophy are knowledge and intellect. These were of great significance to philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to such Muslim philosophers as Avicenna, Fakhr al-Razi, Suhrawardi, and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi as well as to the Schools of Shiraz and Isfahan. Following them, Mulla Sadra raised the question of knowledge throughout his philosophical work. As the Sadrai thought is still dynamic and can be pursued, examined, critiqued or reconstructed, Muslim thinkers continue to publish their research in the form of books, dissertations, and articles on the issue of knowledge and the intellect. It goes without saying that in order to prevent doing what others already do or have already done the evolution of research on a problem needs to be brought to the researcher’s attention. Therefore, literature plays an important role in the research process, and the present article intends to assist researchers on Mulla Sadra with the literature review. It goes over scientific productions in the area of dissertations and articles from 2001 to 2020 on the subject of knowledge in Sadra’i philosophy. This includes 218 works, out of which 85 articles, 32 master’s degree dissertations and 9 PhD theses are written in the field of the intellect. Master’s degree dissertations and PhD theses on the subject of knowledge are 35 and 9 titles respectively, which does not show a marked difference to the field of the intellect. This is while the articles in the field of knowledge are 45 titles i.e. half as many as the articles written in the field of intellect. The research method As a systematic review, using the search engines and data bases such as Noormags, Comprehensive Portal of Human Sciences, Magiran, and the Treasure System (sāmāni-yi ganj) in the Iranian Research Institute for Information, Science and Technology (IranDoc), and Islamic World Science Citation Center (ISC), this article has searched titles of articles, dissertations, and PhD theses and conducted a statistical study of those Farsi titles written between 2001 and 2020 in Iran in the areas of knowledge and intellect in Mulla Sadra’s transcendent wisdom. A discussion of results More attention has been paid to the question of knowledge than that of the intellect. Within the subject of knowledge, discussions of divine knowledge are of the highest frequency, but less attention has been paid to the levels of the Creator’s knowledge and the status of the Creator’s knowledge in creation, or, to put it the other way, to the levels of knowledge in parallel to the levels of creation. When it comes to theology in the more specific sense, less attention has been paid to the knowledge-led Shia theology versus power-led Sunni theology, and the basics and results of such a discussion are not examined. Within the subject of intellect, discussions of the epistemology of the intellect are of the highest frequency, whereas less attention has been paid to various meanings and usages of the intellect in Islamic sciences including theosophy, philosophy, ethics, and to their distinction from the intellect in common parlance. Conclusion Among the conclusions is that there are methodological limitations: lack of attention to a needs assessment in the process of deciding research topics; lack of proper attention to other researchers’ findings (which leads up to many problems including repetitious work and lack of attention to certain topics, as witnessed by the results of the present study); lack of variety in the articles (for the most part, they are written for academic research journals, while a helpful research activity of high efficiency and influence relies on a whole variety of introductory studies, including reviews, which are visibly missing in the field of Islamic philosophy); and finally the lack of information about research activities in the field in the international arena and even Islamic countries.
Mohsen Habibi; Fatemeh Karimi Mazidi
Abstract
One of the important issues of the field of religious studies in contemporary times is the ability to understanding the language of religion. those who belive that this language is understandable, they are against each other that this is the common sense(all being intelligible) or the mysterious and ...
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One of the important issues of the field of religious studies in contemporary times is the ability to understanding the language of religion. those who belive that this language is understandable, they are against each other that this is the common sense(all being intelligible) or the mysterious and symbolic.Mulla Sadra has paid attention to the exegesis of the Qur'an, therefore he has paid attention to some kind of language of religion. He considers ontology the only existence as genuine, in the sense that he sees only the existence of reality.In addition, he believes in Gradation of being, that is, existence is a unic fact and with intensity and weakness.He emphasizes the dignity of knowledge in the language of religion.Because he considers the Qur'an to be far-reaching, he supposes the external language of the Qur'an as a symbol of their inner meanings, and because of the mysterious nature of the Quranic verses and the words of the elders of religion, they give them appearance ,inwardness, exegesis and interpretation.And believes that anything in addition to appearance has an esoteric, so that the appearance and the inner one are twice as many as an object.In his view, there are no fundamental contradictions between the inner meanings of the apparent meaning and therefore the interpretation which appears to contradict it, interprets the vote (without foundation).He also believes that the purpose of the "Truth"is a unit that can be obtained through three ways of revelation (Quran)and rational analyzes (proofs) and refinement of the soul (mysticism).
Amir Delzendehnezhad; Yadollah Rostami
Abstract
In this article we examine the commonalities between some epistemological views of Mulla Sadra (circa 1571-1636) from Persia and Nishida Kitaro from Japan (1870-1945). Our research method was descriptive and analytical, and using the two philosophers’ main texts we compared their ideas and remarks. ...
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In this article we examine the commonalities between some epistemological views of Mulla Sadra (circa 1571-1636) from Persia and Nishida Kitaro from Japan (1870-1945). Our research method was descriptive and analytical, and using the two philosophers’ main texts we compared their ideas and remarks. Although Nishida Kitaro still has not been properly introduced in Iran, during the 2010s efforts were made to do so, including studies conducted by Dr. Muhammad Asghari, which were first published as a few articles, and later collected in the form of a book released in 2017 by Quqnus Publications. Until now there has been no comparative study of the two thinkers in terms of particular epistemological subjects. We can nonetheless refer to a kindred study: Muhammad Asghari’s article entitled “The Possibility of Dialogue between the Kyoto School and Islamic Wisdom” in which he concludes that the dialogue is indeed possible. It might be asked what theoretical and practical uses finding commonalities between two philosophers from two different countries might have. The answer is that it can lay the ground for a universal and combinational philosophy and/or pave the way for mutual understanding and dialogue in meta-history. Prevailing in this universal and combinational philosophy is a macro and integral rather than micro and differential view. The type of comparison which pays more attention to commonalities than differences proposes an intercultural formulation of philosophical questions. The questions intended to be answered in this article are as follows. 1. What are the commonalities between the ontological foundations of the two thoughts? 2. What are their commonalities in terms of the process of knowledge and perception of the world? The two thinkers have common ontological foundations and their epistemologies are based on ontology. We explain in the form of comparative statements the commonalities first in their ontologies and then in their epistemologies. Their common ontological foundations In Nishida reality is identical to consciousness, and in Mulla Sadra being is concomitant (mūsawīq) with knowledge. In Nishida reality has an ultimate foundation from which all the beings are created. In Mulla Sadra the Necessary Being (wājīb al-wūjūd) creates beings. In Nishida the foundation of reality is in a place called Basho, which is neither physical nor determined. Nor does it have a form. It is absolute nothingness, yet not nothingness versus being, but rather a transcendental nothingness from which being is created. In Mulla Sadra the Necessary Essence does not have any determination and form, but rather is unconditional and free from any limits or denotations. Its status is the status of the absolute unseen. For Nishida entities and beings are the actualization and manifestation of that ultimate foundation, and also for Mulla Sadra the Necessary Being, which is pure being, has manifestations and actions, so that beings are actualized. Human consciousness in Nishida’s view is the best place for the manifestation of the ultimate, and in Mulla Sadra’s the human soul is described as God-like. Their common epistemological views Nishida thinks that a process beyond the soul, more transcendental than the soul, is involved in the process of knowledge, which can be called the field of knowledge or the unconscious dimension of knowledge. For Mulla Sadra, the active intellect, which is more transcendental than the soul, is involved in human perceptions. The soul is not passive in the process of knowing the reality and perceptional forms have subsistence by emergence (al-qīyām al-ṣūdūrī) from the soul, the agency of the soul having a part in the process. According to both thinkers the realities of the percipient and perceived are unified and there is no duality between the two. They both believe that human beings construct and shape themselves through their own activities, and that reality is manifested in the soul. In Nishida, the truth and falsity and correspondence with reality are attributes of propositional and conceptual knowledge, and in Mulla Sadra those are attributes of acquired knowledge (al-īlm al-ḥuṣūlī). Both concur that the perfect soul is less weakened by obstacles and gains more intuition of reality.
mahbobeh rajaei; seyd morteza hosseini shahroudi; Abbas Javareshkyan
Abstract
In Mulla Sadra’s work, we encounter two different meanings of the terms substance and accident. One is the well-known meaning according to which contingent beings divide into substances and accidents: like first philosophers Mulla Sadra defines substance as a being not in the subject, and accident ...
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In Mulla Sadra’s work, we encounter two different meanings of the terms substance and accident. One is the well-known meaning according to which contingent beings divide into substances and accidents: like first philosophers Mulla Sadra defines substance as a being not in the subject, and accident as a being in the subject. More precisely, substance is a quiddity which is not in the subject, not a property of something else, and accident is a quiddity in the subject, not needed by the subject, a property of something else. Thus, from this point of view both substance and accident are quiddities. God falls into neither of the two above defined categories, because in the division it is the quiddity which is divided; hence Mulla Sadra considers “non-substance” as a negative divine attribute, providing some arguments for his claim. He proposes another meaning for the duality of substance and accident founded upon components of his own philosophy such as the primacy of existence (asālat al-wūjūd), hypostatic unity of being (waḥdat shakhsī wūjūd), and ontological indigence (faqr wūjūdi). Based on the primacy of existence, he redefines quiddity as a shade (ẓīl) of existence. Therefore, quiddity is not divided into substance and accident, but the latter two are both existential. Next, invoking the principle of hypostatic unity of being, he states that it is only the true unified Being who deserves the title substance, describing as accidents other beings which are his manifestations. Through explaining ontological indigence he also proves that the realization of indigent existence depends on rich existence and compared to him everything in the universe is pure dependence (rabṭ) and mere indigence, and considered a mode and manifestation of him. The substance is he who is independent and essentially rich, and the rest which are the manifestation of dependence count as accidents. Mulla Sadra matches the two meanings together. Everything in the universe is a manifestation of a particular name of God. Thus, just as parts of the universe are divided into genus, species, individuals, and substances, so the division is found in the names of God; and just as the truth of substances is veiled by accidents, so the divine essence is veiled by its names and attributes; and just as attributes such as species - some of which are more general and some more particular as with close and distant species and their correlatives – together with which the substance is a particular genus or type, so some of divine attributes are more general and more permeating and some more particular and less permeating. Each of the innumerable beings in the universe which are its parts is a manifestation of a particular name among divine names; and just as parts of the universe divide into genus, species, individuals, substances, and accidents (including quantity, quality, relation, habitus, time, location, situation (or position), action, and passion ("being acted on)), so the names of God divide into genus, species, substantial, accidental, etc. names. Everything in the visible universe is a shade testifying to what is in the invisible the world of names, as the manifestation of the substantiality of the Creator, called Allah by Mulla Sadra, is “the perfect man” In the light of foundations specific to his philosophy, Mulla Sadra’s novel explanation demonstrates that the duality of substance and accident both make sense and have examples in the external world (although in his wisdom in accordance with the well-known meaning of the terms an immediate cognition of substance is not possible, and it is only accidents which are knowable). But also his analysis paves the way for the demonstration of dependent existence (i.e. the existence of beings which are not God). If considered in comparison to the Necessary, everything is dependent, or, accidental, as Mulla Sadra calls it. The impact of the concept of dependence (or accidentality) upon philosophical discussions is that it dispenses with the need for quiddities and linking quiddity-bound concepts to the concepts not bound by quiddity. Thanks to the analysis, the fact of God being together with names and attributes (called accidents by Mulla Sadra) takes on a novel interpretation: it is not like the coincidence of the accidental and essential; nor like the coincidence of substance and accident in the well-known sense of the terms; nor like the coincidence of quiddity and existence, because God is not a general quiddity at all. Instead, his truth is a pure, simple, sacred Being that has no names, shapes or limits, and for which no proof is invoked. Rather, he is the proof for everything, a witness to every manifestation. The main concern of this article is to compare, examine and match the two views, since despite the fact that there are numerous books and articles addressing the issue of substance and accident, there is not a discrete study of the two perspectives; hence the necessity of explaining Mulla Sadra’s view. Because this aim is fulfilled through studying and researching into his books, the present article’s research method is conceptual analysis written in an analytic-descriptive form.
Ali Motahari
Abstract
Contingency in line with general concepts such as “existence and non-existence” , “unity and plurality” , and “ causality and being caused” is one of the fundamental and remarkable philosophical issues. The proper explanation of the different meanings of contingency ...
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Contingency in line with general concepts such as “existence and non-existence” , “unity and plurality” , and “ causality and being caused” is one of the fundamental and remarkable philosophical issues. The proper explanation of the different meanings of contingency and of the relationship of these meanings to each other make it possible to correctly understand and prove many other principal philosophical problems. Essential contingency and dispositional contingency are among the important meanings of contingency , so that the way we explain them will change basically the destiny of problems such as “coming into being and eternity” , “ potentiality and actuality” , and “causality and being caused” . Sheikh Ishraq for the first time has raised the issue of dispositional contingency , while contradicting Ibn Sina's argument for the rule that “ every event is preceded by potentiality and by matter that possesses that potentiality” . MullaSadra has dealt with the differences between essential contingency and dispositional contingency , and MullaHadiSabzevari has categorized these differences into six groups.At least in sixteen pieces of his works, MullaSadra has expressed his views on the relationship between essential contingency and dispositional contingency, therefore compatibility between these ideas seems very difficult . Indeed, It can be said that these views are contradictory. In this article , using professor Motahhari 's philosophical researches , we have tried to explain the new relationship , obtained in the light of genuineness of existence , between these two meanings of contingency , while judging MullaSadra's different positions concerning essential contingency and dispositional contingency.
malihe khodabande bigy; seyd morteza shahroudi; jafar morvarid
Abstract
Abstract: Mulla Sadra's existential look into the Temperament, His own theory of the physical creation of soul, Special attitude with his body and soul, And Golden Transcendent Theosophy category Namely Trans-Substantial Motion, All together, The narrator of practical wisdom, Let varying steps in the ...
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Abstract: Mulla Sadra's existential look into the Temperament, His own theory of the physical creation of soul, Special attitude with his body and soul, And Golden Transcendent Theosophy category Namely Trans-Substantial Motion, All together, The narrator of practical wisdom, Let varying steps in the field of ethics in The body and corporeality, In order to warrant the presence of moral statements about nutrition, reproduction and human thinking, issue. So the author of this article has attempted to explain theory about the relationship between temperament and ethics, The corresponding, If the identity of the embryo into primary human and physical Sperm of temperance and moderation in favorable conditions, be concluded, Then the effects, results and appliances and it's clearly evident in the emotions and ethics qualities seen, And man will see, The top to bottom of her affairs, justice, decency, Nzaht, holiness, wisdom and spirituality to form.
zohre salahshur sefidsangi
Abstract
Notion of consciousness is one of the most important problems in the history of philosophy. Because of the difficulty of defining consciousness, some philosophers have divided it into phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, self-consciousness, and monitoring consciousness. Philosophers who associate ...
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Notion of consciousness is one of the most important problems in the history of philosophy. Because of the difficulty of defining consciousness, some philosophers have divided it into phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness, self-consciousness, and monitoring consciousness. Philosophers who associate consciousness with the soul, such as Mulla Sadra, from which he refers to the knowledge of presence and on that basis, it explains the characteristics of consciousness, all types of consciousness refer to something beyond the material. This, in his view, can not reduce consciousness to matter.This is while the physicalist views, such as the theory of connectivity, attribute consciousness to matter. According to connectors, consciousness can be explained using artificial neural networks. Contrary to its claims, this theory is incapable of explaining the types and characteristics of knowledge. In this theory, the reason that attributes awareness to neural networks is to make awareness equal to the processing of information. While, according to Mulla Sadra, consciousness (understanding of information) involves processing information.But it is also possible to process information without consciousness. According to Mulla Sadra's view, therefore, the relation between consciousness and information processing cannot be equated.
fateme soleimani
Abstract
According to philosophers intellect is the rational faculty of the soul, by which one can understand the truth universally. Now the question is how much this definition of intellect conforms to the Quran's view. Islamic Philosophers believe that intellect has got various capabilities to reach differing ...
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According to philosophers intellect is the rational faculty of the soul, by which one can understand the truth universally. Now the question is how much this definition of intellect conforms to the Quran's view. Islamic Philosophers believe that intellect has got various capabilities to reach differing degrees. In the lower degrees intellect can deduce, analyze and synthesize the concepts. Through contemplation, reflection as well as purification, this faculty could develop and would be able to connect with the world beyond and unify with separated intelligences and reach the truth immediately. Thus, the intellect controls the whole cognitive activities of human being including understanding, deduction, assessment, development, spiritual observation and his practical actions. In other words, the real existential dimension of man always thinks and acting accordingly. This concept of intellect is the one Quran verses admitted.
maryam saneapour
Abstract
The dichotomy of mind/body, and form/matter are two of most problematic questions in western philosophy, which could be retraced to ancient Greece and have been lasted until age of enlightenment. Post-modernists hold that this dualism and dichotomy are reflected in the most aspects of civilization explicitly, ...
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The dichotomy of mind/body, and form/matter are two of most problematic questions in western philosophy, which could be retraced to ancient Greece and have been lasted until age of enlightenment. Post-modernists hold that this dualism and dichotomy are reflected in the most aspects of civilization explicitly, and that, the I/Other dualism is a sequence of it. Thus, the philosophical contrasting between mind/body, and form/matter should be a subject of our thinking. The resolution of the mind/body dualism is sought based on the Sadrian unity of being, in this paper. The employed method is dialectics and communicational and it is tried to find and advanced a resolution of the mind/body dualism in a intercultural philosophy space, with an eye on Sadrian philosophy. Mulla Sadra’s resolution to this problem is explained from two points of view; from an ontological viewpoint, resolve mind/body problem is possible by imagination world intermediating. From a epistemological viewpoint, resolve mind/body problem is possible by imagination faculty intermediating, as well. Mulla Sadra also look into soul intermediating for pushing mind and body into a kind of unity.
seyd mehdi mirhadi
Abstract
The aim of the present article is to investigate the relationship between imagination and emotions and to explain the role and way of the involvement of imagination in the emotional domain. The essence of the imagination, the nature of the affections and the relation between the imagination and emotions, ...
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The aim of the present article is to investigate the relationship between imagination and emotions and to explain the role and way of the involvement of imagination in the emotional domain. The essence of the imagination, the nature of the affections and the relation between the imagination and emotions, are the three main questions in the current research. Analysis and inference method was used to explain the subject. Preserving the faces after the sensory perception of phenomena, seizure in the repository faces, and the transformation of perceptual faces, are the main functions of imagination in the field of cognitive activity and self-stimulation. Instincts, natures and emotions are considered as the infrastructures of human tendencies. Emotions, while being acquired, are human tools for survival and excellence. According Mulla Sadra, emotions create motivation to move in human, and focus on self-esteem from scattered efforts and willing, in a single direction. According to him, emotions can be considered a kind of heart action by being activated in our existence, and since the activities of the soul are united with the oneself and are the part of it, then they can be the constructor of the ultimate entity of human and his/her overwordly face. The imagination is the origin of the emergence of emotions, the cause of the survival and decline of the emotions, and is the reason for meaning and revival of the emotions.
soghra babapour; jafar shanazari
Abstract
From the complex and controversial issues of epistemology, both in Islamic philosophy and in Western philosophy, is the question of how the mind and the reality communicate with one another. The main argument in the epistemology of the debate is to reconcile the concepts with what is present in reality, ...
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From the complex and controversial issues of epistemology, both in Islamic philosophy and in Western philosophy, is the question of how the mind and the reality communicate with one another. The main argument in the epistemology of the debate is to reconcile the concepts with what is present in reality, That is, how to adapt mental forms to objective forms. The realists believe in the correspondence between the mind and the reality. But a group of philosophers have opposed this idea and considered mental concepts apart from foreign ones, or even consider foreign objects as images of mental concepts. This is while the consistency of mind and real in the transcendent philosophy one of the most principled issues. Mullasadra intended to resolve the issue by discussing unity quiddity in mental existence and the objective gradation unity of supreme existence. Kant proposes his Copernican Revolutionary Theory that if the known conform to our minds, this is more consistent with the prior knowledge of objects. Therefore, the mind has a special activity and Specifies the type of epistemic it gains. The present article examines the quality of matching the mind and the real from the viewpoint of MullaSadra and Kant, and looks for similarities and differences between them in conformity.
hossein hosseiniamin; fatemeh moinoldini
Abstract
Wise Sabzevari, who is one of the advocates of the issue of unity of subject and object, in addition to describing the arguments of Sadr al-Muta'lehīn, has put forward some arguments in support of this issue. In this research, the three arguments of matter and form; sensible immaterial; and transformation ...
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Wise Sabzevari, who is one of the advocates of the issue of unity of subject and object, in addition to describing the arguments of Sadr al-Muta'lehīn, has put forward some arguments in support of this issue. In this research, the three arguments of matter and form; sensible immaterial; and transformation of derivative to origin , which are based on his original arguments, have been criticized and evaluated formally and materially. The argument of matter and form is confiscated to principii petito, in which the claim principle is taken in the argument. The sensible immaterial argument, is misleading and fundamentally void, because in the third premise, there is a great confusion between the first carriage and the rushing carriage. In the third argument, the wise and sensible conversion to intellect does not mean that they will be united. Therefore, none of the three arguments are sufficient to prove unify of subject and object and reasonable, and does not have the ability to prove the claim. The formulation of arguments and criticisms is all new and the result of the writers' reflections
