Philosophy
Keramat Varzdar; Fatemeh Sadat Ketabchi
Abstract
Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent ...
Read More
Fateme Sadat Ketabchi[1]
Introduction
Ancient physical principles assert that all bodies are constituted of four fundamental elements, each possessing distinct qualities. The amalgamation of these elements engenders a unique attribute within bodies termed "temperament," divergent from the inherent qualities of the elemental components (Avicenna, 1383: 57; Suhrawardī, 1373: 198; Mulla Sadra, 1981, vol. 5: 320). Notably, the constitution of the "temperament" differs between living and non-living entities due to varying degrees of element combination, prompting a consideration: why not attribute the distinctive accomplishments of living beings to "temperament" rather than to the "soul"? In "De Anima," Aristotle recounts advocates of this notion and offers critique (Aristotle, 2011, 407b 25 - 408a 10). Aristotle distinguishes between the concepts of "soul" and "temperament," affirming their disparity (Ibid).
In Avicenna's works, he formulates seven arguments to establish the non-identity of temperament and soul, based on criteria such as non-identity of temperament with its collector and maintainer, its active and ultimate cause, the involvement in the movements of living things, the composition as the constituent substance of living entities, the perceiver of perception, the perceiver of rational cognitions, and the self-aware nature in humans. These arguments uniquely position temperament as distinct from the soul, as there is no other candidate for these seven criteria except the soul.
This research aims to critically examine and analyze Avicenna's seven arguments rejecting the identity of "soul" and "temperament," with the purpose of highlighting the limitations of these arguments in distinguishing temperament from the plant soul and the deficiencies in four of these proofs.
Methods and Material
The research methodology employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. This approach involves thoroughly referencing Avicenna's various works to furnish a comprehensive depiction of his arguments. Subsequently, a meticulous analysis of these arguments is conducted through logical formulation to assess their effectiveness in establishing the non-identity between soul and temperament.
Results and Discussion
The first argument posits that the opposition among the four elements leads to their repulsion and conflict, necessitating a factor beyond temperament for their combination and sustenance — namely, the soul (Tusi, 1375, Vol. 2: 302-301; Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26). Similarly, the second argument identifies the purpose of elemental intermingling as the creation of temperament, raising questions about the cause behind this interaction. If temperament is the prime mover of elemental motion, it would imply self-creation, a logical impossibility (Avicenna, 1404B: 63). The third argument contends that living beings' temperament exists in two states: either at pure equilibrium or dominated by a single element's quality. However, it faces criticism due to flawed assumptions about nature's formation from four elements and their inherent locations (Avicenna, 1371: 150).
The credibility of the first and second arguments is questioned due to outdated premises. Modern scientific discoveries reveal that bodies comprise numerous fundamental particles, each with distinct characteristics. Additionally, these particles do not inherently conflict; instead, certain particles, like electrons and protons, naturally attract one another due to opposite charges (Munowitz, 2005: 182). The third argument's foundation on the formation of nature from four elements and the assignment of inherent places to each element is also flawed.
The fourth argument contends that the origin of life in living beings is essential because it is intrinsic to their essence, which is substance (Avicenna, 1404A, Vol. 2: 26; Bahmanyār, 1375: 728-725; Mulla Sadra, 1981, Vol. 8: 27). However, it falls prey to the fallacy of circular argument by assuming that living beings' species are inherently "substantive species."
The fifth argument posits that sensory perceptions are not within the realm of temperament. This assertion is rooted in the observation that temperament doesn't fall into two definitive situations when confronted with sensory forms. It is argued that either temperament does not exhibit any passivity when engaging with perceptual forms, which would imply a lack of foundational conditions for perception (since sensory perception inherently involves passivity). Alternatively, if temperament becomes passive upon perceiving forms, it transforms into another temperament, thereby losing its status as the perceiver of perceptible forms (Tusi, 1375, vol.2: 301-301). Avicenna's sixth argument focuses on human rational perceptions and knowledge. He asserts that neither temperament nor any physical entity possesses the capacity to perceive intellectual forms. This conclusion leads to the impossibility of perceiving rational things through any physical body (Avicenna, 1382: 141-142). The seventh argument employs "self-awareness" to delineate the non-identity between the soul and temperament (Avicenna, 1404 A, Vol. 2: 13). This argument underscores the distinction between the self-awareness associated with the soul and the functions or properties of temperament, aiming to establish their fundamental differences.
It appears that the fifth argument could be supported by accepting certain modifications, effectively demonstrating the discrepancy between temperament and the entity perceiving perceptions. However, Ibn Sina's assertion that plants lack sensory perceptions renders this argument ineffective in establishing the non-identity between the temperament of plants and the plant soul. Regarding the sixth and seventh arguments, if Ibn Sina's arguments for proving the separation of sensible forms from matter are comprehensive, these arguments might not only establish the separation of the human soul from matter but also highlight the distinction between the soul and temperament. However, these arguments primarily focus on demonstrating the variability of the human soul and temperament. As a result, the sixth and seventh arguments primarily just emphasize the non-identity between the human soul and temperament, rather than effectively addressing the non-identity between the animal and plant soul with temperament.
Conclusion
"The theory advocating the identity of soul and temperament found numerous proponents historically, gaining support from many theologians and scholars in the field of medicine. Avicenna aimed to refute the validity of this theory through his elaborate set of seven proofs, seeking to establish the distinction between the souls of plants, animals, and humans from the temperament of their respective bodies.
In this research, it was revealed that the first three proofs are incomplete in proving the non-identity of the soul and temperament due to the fact that the principle of physical issues has been invalidated. The fourth argument is subject to circular argument. The last three proofs prove non-identity between temperament and soul; but these three proofs only reveal the difference between animal and human soul with temperament, and they do not have the ability to show the difference between plant temperament and soul.
Batool Ahmadi; Forouzan Rasekhi
Abstract
The question of the immortality of the soul – which is directly relevant to any discussion on the true nature of human being - is an important and even central theme of both Plotinus and Suhrawardi, the latter being known as the founder of the Perso-Islamic Illuminationistschool of philosophy.Plotinus ...
Read More
The question of the immortality of the soul – which is directly relevant to any discussion on the true nature of human being - is an important and even central theme of both Plotinus and Suhrawardi, the latter being known as the founder of the Perso-Islamic Illuminationistschool of philosophy.Plotinus and Suhrawardiboth considered the soul to be the essence of the human being, hence,both thinkers engaged in some kind of ‘dualist anthropology’, although through two different approaches.In other words, they believed that man is not a simple thing, but a composite of ‘soul’ and ‘body’. Plotinus’ discussion of the relation of ‘soul’ to ‘body’ is a particular instance of his doctrine of participation, where higher is related to lower, intelligible to sensible, and form to matter.Individual human beings are composed of ‘soul’ and ‘body’, but body itself consists of ‘matter’ and ‘form’. Soul as the ‘form’ of the body, is a part of the World-Soul, but the individual soul is immaterial and immortal and linked with the ‘Intellect’ (nous).Suhrawardidid not concern himself with any kind of causal relation between ‘body’ and ‘soul’.In his teachings, the ‘Lordly Light’(nūr-iispahbad)- i.e. the vicegerent of the ‘Light of lights’ (nūr al-anwār)in the human soul – is connected with the body by means of the ‘animal soul’ (rūḥḥayawāniyya) and leaves the body for its original home in the angelic realm as soon as death destroys the equilibrium of the bodily elements.
Forough al- Sadat Rahimpour; mohammad nasr esphahay
Volume 6, Issue 3 , October 2017, , Pages 19-50
Abstract
Abstract
The purpose of this research is to study, in a descriptive-analytic way, one important similarity, among the other, between the philosophical views of Plotinus and Mulla Sadra on ‘soul’ in three periods: before, along, and after the body.
Both have accepted the existence ...
Read More
Abstract
The purpose of this research is to study, in a descriptive-analytic way, one important similarity, among the other, between the philosophical views of Plotinus and Mulla Sadra on ‘soul’ in three periods: before, along, and after the body.
Both have accepted the existence of soul before the body with minor differences. Regarding the second period, Plotinus believes that soul is essentially separated from body despite some interactions. But Mulla Sadra holds that soul in some periods is united with body but due to substantial motion it gradually leaves the body and finally departs the body entirely by death.
According to Plotinus, soul returns to its essential position by death but retains worldly imaginations. But Mulla Sadra holds that soul totally leaves the body and lives in self-created formal and otherworldly body.
The major difference between the two philosophers is that Plotinus believes in reincarnation for undeveloped humans, while Mulla Sadra totally rejects the idea of reincarnation.
