Philosophy
Morteza Motavalli; Mahdi Azimi
Abstract
AbstractIntroductionIt is only in the last few decades that testimony has been seriously studied in epistemology. But in the Islamic world, testimony by necessity has been paid attention earlier. Epistemology of testimony, in Islamic tradition, began by jurists, who had nothing in their hand but the ...
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AbstractIntroductionIt is only in the last few decades that testimony has been seriously studied in epistemology. But in the Islamic world, testimony by necessity has been paid attention earlier. Epistemology of testimony, in Islamic tradition, began by jurists, who had nothing in their hand but the testimony of others for understanding religion and legal injunctions of God. Another line of study were philosophers and logicians, who regarded testimony as one of the principles of judgement. At the same time that he was participating in these two lines of studies, Suhrawardī initiated a third line of study in his theology. In this paper, we will show Suhrawardī's contribution in this topic with two analytical and historical approaches.Suhrawardī's Epistemology of TestimonySuhrawardī has spoken about testimony in three places of his works: in logic when enumerating the principles of judgements, in methodology of jurisprudence when discussing religious proofs, and in theology when talking about the doctrine of the nobler contingent to prove platonic forms.Testimony in Suhrawardī's Logical-Fārābī and Avicenna had talked about propositions taken from the testimony of others in their logic when discussing the first principles. With this in his hand, Suhrawardī begins to contemplate on the issue. He identifies two kinds of propositions that are related to testimony: accepted premises (maqbūlāt) and widely transmitted propositions (mutawātirāt). Accepted premises are propositions that we accept from someone we have good opinion of. In al-Talwīhāt, he adds that this good opinion is because of something celestial in that person or because he is more intelligent or religious. Widely transmitted premises are propositions that we become certain of because of the plethora of the testimonies of others. He, against others, does not require for what is testified to be perceptual/sensible. This is a smart move because he demonstrates the credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer using exactly the widely transmitted propositions.Suhrawardī makes four important movements that are contrary to the Avicennan peripatetic tradition-four movements that cannot be simply passed by. They become clearer only when they are considered in the historical context and with regard to al-Ghazālī's statements. First of all, he eliminates Peripatetics’ intuitive propositions and innate propositions from the list of certain principles. Second, he brings widely transmitted and experiential propositions under one title. Thirdly, he gives them the name of intuitive propositions, while what he means by intuition is its literal meaning, not its peripatetic terminological meaning. And the fourth is that he attends to the role of evidences in them.It seems, from what we have said so far in addition to what will come in the next section from al-Ghazālī and his influence on Suhrawardī, that he thinks of the accumulated opinions as the reason why widely transmitted propositions are certain.Testimony in Suhrawardī's Methodology of JurisprudenceOne of religious proofs for understanding religion and legal injunctions of God is what is transmitted by testimony. Here, Suhrawardī takes one of al-Ghazālī's books-i.e., al-Mustaṣfā-and writes accordingly. One of al-Ghazālī's contributions in this discussion is that he eliminates intuitive propositions from the six self-evident propositions and introduces another sixth way to knowledge base on evidences. Suhrawardī takes the idea of evidences and their role in knowledge firmly. It is from here that we can see the idea of evidences in his philosophical works.He also mentions some requirements for the one who gives testimony such as being just and having good vision. This, and other things, could show that he is not totally individualist and internalist about testimony.Testimony in Suhrawardī's TheologyIn theology, Suhrawardī, innovatively and for the first time, brings forward the discussion of testimony to prove the epistemological credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer. Sometimes, testimony is in important matters and by experts. When that is the case, Suhrawardī says, one or two testimony is enough to become certain about what is testified. For example, when one or two astronomers testify about something related to their specialty, that brings us knowledge and certainty about that thing. This is the way of science. He continues that when this is so, the testimony of religious experiencers should also bring us knowledge. Here, testimony is as valuable as testimony in science, and even more valuable. This is because the number of testifiers here are more, they are sages and prophets that moral truth is certain in them, and their testimony is about what they have seen directly not what they have inferred from their observations.ConclusionAlthough Suhrawardī relies heavily on al-Fārābi, Avicenna, and al-Ghazālī, he makes a great contribution to the epistemology of testimony. His point that the certainty of widely transmitted propositions is because of the accumulated opinions developed by Shahīd Ṣadr later on. His brilliant innovation is that he brings forward the discussion of testimony to prove the epistemological credibility of religious experience for the non-experiencer.
Philosophy
ali asghar jafari valani
Abstract
Abstract
Issue
Avicenna presented his "flying man" or "floating man" argument as a means to establish the existence of the soul, its immaterial nature, and its distinctiveness from the body. While originally conceived with an ontological focus, subsequent scholars have often employed this concept ...
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Abstract
Issue
Avicenna presented his "flying man" or "floating man" argument as a means to establish the existence of the soul, its immaterial nature, and its distinctiveness from the body. While originally conceived with an ontological focus, subsequent scholars have often employed this concept in an epistemological context, asserting that Avicenna’s flying man not only exists, but also knows that he exists. Such an interpretation of the flying man argument seems to be at odds with his own principles, his passages throughout his works, and what he pursued to establish through this scenario.
Method
Deploying a descriptive and analytical method, it may be said that
Findings: Avicenna believes that perception begins from senses, and the first stage of the human reason is material or hylic reason or pure potentiality. Moreover, there is a difference between consciousness (shuʿūr) that is actually obtained by humans since the beginning of their existence and consciousness of consciousness (al-shuʿūr bi-l-shuʿūr), which he believes to be a potential character that needs to be acquired, while our primary consciousness of the soul is the existence of our soul. Thus, the flying man is solely the existence and presence of the soul before any actual consciousness.
Results
In view of the fact that man was suspended in space at the beginning of his creation and Ibn Sina considers the human soul to be the event of the body and in the order of the beast intellect and pure power, which lacks any perception and becomes actual through sensory perception, it should be said : The human being suspended in Ibn Sina's space can have an existential quality and in fact, he is observing the position of presence, existence, and mere existence. In addition, Ibn Sina, emphasizing the two positions of consciousness and consciousness to consciousness, believes that consciousness is actually and permanently suspended in man, but consciousness to consciousness is potential in him. Therefore, it seems that the soul at the beginning of creation, although it is present and proven, but it cannot be said that it has knowledge of itself; That is, the soul initially lacks attention to itself, and this lack of attention prevents any self-perception of the soul.
Innovation: In fact, regarding "Avicenna's suspended human being in space", it can only be said that "a human being is conscious (without any actual awareness)", but it cannot be said: "In addition, because this human being is conscious, he knows that he is like this." ».
sayyed mohammad hosain naghibi; abdolah nasri
Abstract
During the sensory perception, two stages occur, one is the sensation of the sensory member and the other is the perception of the soul. The first stage is material and the second stage is single. Based on the union of the soul and the body, the soul has knowledge of the material influences that are ...
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During the sensory perception, two stages occur, one is the sensation of the sensory member and the other is the perception of the soul. The first stage is material and the second stage is single. Based on the union of the soul and the body, the soul has knowledge of the material influences that are present in the senses, and this science is of the nature of knowledge. Allameh Tabatabai and Martyr Motahhari tend to this viewpoint on the epistemological properties of this theory, the ability to explain the cause of the emergence There are some sensory errors. The acceptance of the presence of science in the material affection of the sensory member is commensurate with the promise of the acquisition of sensory perception. Ibn Sina and Sadrà believe in the achievement of sensory perception, they consider themselves to be in front of Suhrawardi and Sabzevari. According to the recent viewpoint, it finds its own soul, so the inaccuracy of perception can not be realized externally, while in the face of an external sensory instrument, in some cases the face appears inconsistent with the self, thus, it can not be The presence of sensory perception
Seyed Javad Miri
Abstract
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The disciplinary knowledge has been conceptualized as the valid from of classifying sound knowledge vis-à-vis other from of epistemic which have been classified as erroneous or unscientific from of fathoming different modalities of realities. By internalizing disciplinary forms of cognitions the social sciences have conceded to compartmentalization of knowledge and thus branded any attempt towards unity of knowledge as archaic forms of understanding complexities. In this article I have taken issue with the question of epistemology based on the reading of Allama Jafari with reference to classical epistemologists who did not share the principle of disciplinary epistemic configuration. This, in other words, is another way of demonstrating a full-fledged critique of disciplinary knowledge construction but this does not mean that the way forward is interdisciplinarity which loses sight of reality as a holistic entity. it seems Allama Jafari while rejecting the idea of disciplinary knowledge due to compartmentalizing effect of such an epistemological strategy but he does not favor interdisciplinary strategies either as in his view these seemingly different strategies would lead us to a complete from of clerkish mentalite in humanities.
Morteza Hosseinzadeh; Sahar Kavandi; Mohsen Jahed
Abstract
The truth of knowledge was considered by western philosophers and epistemologists long time ago unclear sentence. They were mostly foundationalists or coherentists in the justification element. Muslim philosophers specifically paid attention to the problem of knowledge, and defined it as constant certainty ...
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The truth of knowledge was considered by western philosophers and epistemologists long time ago unclear sentence. They were mostly foundationalists or coherentists in the justification element. Muslim philosophers specifically paid attention to the problem of knowledge, and defined it as constant certainty corresponding reality. In consideration of ternary definition of knowledge, it can be deduced that Muslim philosophers accepted the corresponding theory in truth element, and accepted foundationalism in justification element. Though, epistemological model of Sadra is different from those of Muslim philosophers in consideration of different evaluations of statements, and emphasis on different role and place of proof and mystic intuition in reaching knowledge, and on the other hand, by accepting that knowledge is existential, and by reducing conceptual knowledge to immediate knowledge. Understanding of Mulla Sadra's theory requires examining his method of the justification element. Various aspects are indicated to distinguish between the Transcendent Philosophy and other philosophical schools. In this view, mystic intuition can play a justifying role. From viewpoint of Mulla Sadra, what should be followed are proof and mystic intuition. In the Sadra’s system, revelation is the criterion for evaluation of mystic intuition. So, reaching knowledge demands the existence of proof or mystic intuition, and the truth of the latter should be evaluated by the revelation. Epistemic system of Sadra is formed by three elements of proof, mystic intuition, and revelation being interrelated to each other. Explaining the epistemological role of proof, mystic intuition, and revelation addresses the context of justification, uncovering the theory of the Transcendent Philosophy about the knowledge. Methods This study describes the problems, analyzes them, and in some cases, criticizes them using a literature review. Results and discussion After determination of the ternary epistemic elements, viz. proof, mystic intuition, and revelation, it can be concluded that real knowledge is gained through proof or mystic intuition. In an initial look, it seems that proof and mystic intuition are different, but since he believes that real knowledge is the immediate knowledge, it can be believed that proof and mystic intuition are single and the same, and that the reality of both is the existential encountering with non-material reality. Each of proof and mystic intuition is preparing a cause for encountering non-material existence and gaining knowledge. After considering the theories that set forth the justifying element in the Sadra’s system, and examining their faults according to this system, another theory is reached herein about justifying element, which is not just foundationalism or coherentism. Conclusion In our opinion, in consideration of epistemological foundations of the Transcendent Philosophy, one cannot believe that Mulla Sadra's theory of justification is the same as those of other Muslim epistemologists. Mulla Sadra's theory of justification is a compound one that authors named it as “existential foundherentism”. From the viewpoint of Mulla Sadra, proof and mystic intuition (purification of the soul) are the preparing causes for the existential encountering of non-material existence, and consequently, for justifying the beliefs. Coherentism of Mulla Sadra and his reliance on proof is the realm of conceptual knowledge. This means that in the realm of conceptual knowledge, he believes in two kinds of statements, i.e. foundational and non-foundational, and justifies the latter by the former. Mulla Sadra's cohrtentism implies his belief of conceptual knowledge to be compatible with immediate knowledge, the latter being compatible to the former. In consideration of Mulla Sadra's foundation, the reality of proof and mystic intuition is unique and the same, and that reality is immediate encountering the object of knowledge. This encountering, as a result, is a product of proof or purification of the soul, that is, both promote the existence of the knower and put him/her in the presence of object of the knowledge, and just here, object of the knowledge attends for the knower and the identity of knower and known occurs. The compound theory named “existential foundherentism”, pays attention both to the role of proof and the mystic intuition. Although in some of his works, Mulla Sadra only emphasizes the proof for justifying the statements, his final viewpoint is to follow proof or mystic intuition, and that proof proves, hence it cannot be incompatible with the mystic intuition, and real proof is not against to the mystic intuition.
Abbas Javareshkian; Ali Ghaffarpour; Alireza Kohansal
Abstract
Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Sadra, 1569-1640), composed philosophical commentaries on the Qur’ānic concept of the ‘transformation of the Earth’ through epistemological and ontological approaches. In fact, Sadr al-Dīn composed a rich, multi-faceted commentary, dealing with relevant ...
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Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Sadra, 1569-1640), composed philosophical commentaries on the Qur’ānic concept of the ‘transformation of the Earth’ through epistemological and ontological approaches. In fact, Sadr al-Dīn composed a rich, multi-faceted commentary, dealing with relevant philosophical issues, on the following Qur’ānic verse about the transformation of Heavens and the Earth: ‘One day the Earth will be transformed into a different Earth, and so will be the Heavens, and (men) will be marshalled forth, before Allah, the One, the Irresistible’ (Q 14:48). In certain parts of his work, Sadr al-Dīn makes use of the principle of ‘substantial motion’ (al-harakat al-jawhariyya) to explain the transformation of the Heavens and the Earth (referred to in Q 14:48), but in some other passages, he considers the same transformation as a result of the final return of all existing things to their divine origins. Besides that, Sadr al-Dīn regarded the possibility of the occurrence of this transformation in the sight of the ‘Universal Man’ (al-insān al-kāmil), when the ‘eternal Ideas’ of the Heavens and the Earth come to be manifested in the ‘imaginal realm’ of both the soul and the universe.
Mohammad Kazem Elmi Sola; Seyyede Akram Barakati
Volume 6, Issue 1 , May 2015, , Pages 67-94
Abstract
The present article studies Paul Ricoeur and Mulla Sadra's views on imagination, particularly its influential role in knowledge. Though their philosophies differ in principle, they share certain ideas in common. Ricoeur, contemporary philosopher and hermeneut, utilizes semiotics, linguistics, structuralism, ...
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The present article studies Paul Ricoeur and Mulla Sadra's views on imagination, particularly its influential role in knowledge. Though their philosophies differ in principle, they share certain ideas in common. Ricoeur, contemporary philosopher and hermeneut, utilizes semiotics, linguistics, structuralism, and so on, to enrich hermeneutics. Language, thus, gets a central role in his philosophy. The basic difference of Ricoeur’s idea on imagination which distinguishes him from Mulla Sadra is that ‘language’ is used as a basis to explain imagination; he explains the role of imagination in knowledge through language. But Mulla Sadra does not directly deals with language, but considers act of imagination in constituting knowledge as an act of certain faculty of the soul. But in spite of this basic difference, both philosophers consider imagination as a mediator between external world and internal world of the mind and both explain this possibility by the notion of integration of two different issues.
Zohreh Mottaghi; Reza Ali Nowrozi
Volume 5, Issue 1 , October 2014, , Pages 87-107
Abstract
The epistemological approach of a thinker influences his attitudes to education, and determines teacher activity in the learning process. This article through a qualitative approach and based on a ‘descriptive- inferential’ method, examines the necessity of aesthetic experience in education ...
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The epistemological approach of a thinker influences his attitudes to education, and determines teacher activity in the learning process. This article through a qualitative approach and based on a ‘descriptive- inferential’ method, examines the necessity of aesthetic experience in education based on Allama Jafari’s epistemological principles. So we at first, according to his works, consider Allama’s epistemological elements as theoretical principles, then focusing on his cognitive pluralism, explain the necessity of aesthetic experience in education, and analyze the importance of its use in the education system. The results show that regarding epistemic pluralism can get rid us of narrow perspectives in education and can lead us to a special kind of literacy i.e. aesthetical literacy
Maryam Saneapour
Volume 4, Issue 1 , October 2013, , Pages 87-115
Abstract
In this paper presents an Epistemological Process of Mulla-Sadra’s transcendental wisdom. He introduces First Intellect as Perfect Man’s light that is first effusion and emanation’s source of vertical intelligences in gradational degrees. On his Approach the first Creature is the “Intellect” ...
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In this paper presents an Epistemological Process of Mulla-Sadra’s transcendental wisdom. He introduces First Intellect as Perfect Man’s light that is first effusion and emanation’s source of vertical intelligences in gradational degrees. On his Approach the first Creature is the “Intellect” namely “Light of Perfect Man” that descends stage to stage from unity and activeness of Intellect to plurality and passiveness of reason and then ascends from potential reason to unity of Active Intellect and swamp in Happiness and Mercy of ALLAH.
In both of them, all of intellects from particular reason to universal intellect are prerequisite of upper degrees on the substantial motion.
Gholamhossein Khedri; Mastaneh Kakaii
Volume 3, Issue 1 , September 2012, , Pages 75-96
Abstract
The Agent intellect of Aristotle has different position in later philosophers’ thoughts. Each, according to their need and the vacuum in their philosophy would determine the position of the agent intellect. Plato considered ‘Universals' as self-subsistance, immaterial and permanent which ...
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The Agent intellect of Aristotle has different position in later philosophers’ thoughts. Each, according to their need and the vacuum in their philosophy would determine the position of the agent intellect. Plato considered ‘Universals' as self-subsistance, immaterial and permanent which were not in the sensible world. He had not felt that there would be a need for agent intellect; however Aristotle, contrary to his master put ‘Universals' in sensible things, and to be able to explain the concept of universals, required intellect. Since Aristotle discussed vaguely about the intellect and compared it with the sense, after him, exponents and commentators, extracted agent intellect from his philosophy, or like Alexander of Aphrodisias who considered it as a transcendent and supernatural being or put it beyond the human soul like, Muslim philosophers, Al-Farabi and Avicenna to resolve the issue of the relationship between plurality and unity as well as Knowledge. In contrast, some philosophers in the medieval age, like Thomas Aquinas despite the influence of these Muslim thinkers, regarding agent intellect took a different position and offered another explanation about Aristotle and put Intellect as part of the ‘soul'. Avicenna's agent intellect has the same position in Plotinus’ intellect. In the ontological realm, the link between separable intellects (tenth) and sensible things is offspring of emanation of the plurality of the material world. And in the epistemological realm, diffusion of the universal forms and ‘intelligible' on ‘rational soul’ and transformation from potentiality to actuality is one of its functions. Agent intellect for Thomas, according to him, is more Aristotelian and merely has epistemological position. Agent intellect for him is abstractive agent; it abstracts the intellectual forms from sensible things and actualizes them. In the ontological realm, agent intellect located in human soul and has no ontological and causal functions.
Majid Mollayousefi; Ahmad Allahyari; Maryam Eskandari
Volume 3, Issue 1 , September 2012, , Pages 119-140
Abstract
The term of ethics of belief is appeared for the first time in Clifford's well-known essay by the same title in 1876.According to Clifford's saying that became known afterwards as Clifford's Credo or Principle "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence". ...
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The term of ethics of belief is appeared for the first time in Clifford's well-known essay by the same title in 1876.According to Clifford's saying that became known afterwards as Clifford's Credo or Principle "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence". This debate from the time of its presentation by Clifford has been the subject of different controversies. The main problem behind these controversies was that whether human beliefs are principally under the will of human beings to be evaluated morally or they are, like many of mental states, involuntary and passive and so excused of any moral evaluation. Some say that our beliefs are involuntary and are not under our control. In contrast, some believe in the impact of the will on our beliefs or the doxastic voluntarism. Depending on the amount of influence of the will on our beliefs, doxastic voluntarism is divided into two general kinds: direct voluntarism and indirect voluntarism. The doxastic voluntarism (direct/indirect), on the other hand, can divide into descriptive voluntarism and normative voluntarism. In normative voluntarism, we can say about a kind of epistemic deontologism in our beliefs and it is this epistemic deontologism that entails the ethics of belief. In effect, only when we can say about the ethics of belief that we believe in the epistemic deontologism in our beliefs. Martyr Motahhari believes that the reasoning (ta‘aqqul) and the thinking (tafakkur) as mental actions are in direct control of our will. For him, there is a difference between opinion (‘aqida) and thinking (tafakkur).In his view, thinking is the opinion based on a rational process which can bring about the knowledge. Taking in consideration the process of forming knowledge from him, shows that he believes in a kind of epistemic deontologism. Thus he gives some advices about the ways of acquiring the knowledge that we can place them under the title ethics of belief such as avoidance of intellectual stagnation, distinguishing between belief and the owner of belief and like that.
