azam ghasemi
Abstract
For al-Ghazali, “prophet-hood means preaching God’s words and the prophet is the preacher of God’s words”. The main question of the present study is what part in al-Ghazali’s view the prophet has in knowledge about God and what challenges his views bring. A ...
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For al-Ghazali, “prophet-hood means preaching God’s words and the prophet is the preacher of God’s words”. The main question of the present study is what part in al-Ghazali’s view the prophet has in knowledge about God and what challenges his views bring. A discussion of “miracle” as the reason for the truthfulness of the prophet is absolutely essential for tackling that question. From al-Ghazali’s point of view, prophets’ knowledge is gained through a light shed onto their hearts, rather than through sensations or education. Some recipients of the prophets’ knowledge only imitate what they hear, while some enjoy insights. In al-Ghazali’s work, imitation is of two kinds: acceptable and unacceptable. He believed that Islamic scholars (ūlamā) can achieve understanding on their own and it is only the masses who imitate. One of al-Ghazali’s stances where one could see the role of the prophet in his religious epistemology is on the necessity of thanking the Giver of blessings (wujūb-i shukr-i mun’im): from his point of view, the necessity is jurisprudential and stated by the prophet rather than rational. According to him, reason cannot achieve knowledge about the affairs because of which the prophet was appointed, and this is why the prophet was appointed. But, if reason cannot achieve knowledge about the affairs, how can it affirm the prophet’s prophet-hood and message? In some of his works al-Ghazali regards miracle as the proof for the truthfulness of the prophet. In some others, in addition to miracle he refers to such evidence as prophet’s words, actions, and states in which the prophet was, reported numerously by different narrators and through different chains of transmission. He maintains that the role of reason and theory is merely that through miracle they make sense of the truthfulness of the prophet. Then they depose themselves, admitting that whatever the prophet says about God and the Day of Judgment is acceptable. And this is among the affairs in understanding which reason enjoys no independence. Nor does it understand its impossibility. But even if we involve reason at the stage of proving truthfulness of the prophet, then it is the reason which should affirm the good of the truthfulness (ḥusn-i sidq), thereby jurisprudential good and evil being questioned. From a point of view outside religion and using a rational and argumentative method this study critiqued and examined al-Ghazali’s teaching on prophet-hood, and reached the conclusion that his view changed in his different works. In his theosophical works he said that reason judges that anyone who claims to be a prophet and produces a miracle is necessarily truthful, and then reason withdraws, assumes an instrumental role, and submits to the prophet’s remark. In some other works, however, he does not consider miracle to be enough, as miracle might be confused with magic, and therefore he thinks that proving the prophet’s truthfulness needs further signs. In general, al-Ghazali’s explanation of the epistemological role of the prophet in people’s acquisition of knowledge has many flaws which have been addressed in this article. On the one hand, he acknowledges reason’s limits and thinks that appointment of the prophet is accounted for by the fact that the prophet understands affairs that go beyond reasoning. On the other hand, he states that reason can discern the existence of the prophet as well as the fact that the prophet can understand affairs beyond reasoning. Yet it cannot understand what the prophet understands. There occurs a paradox, which is how it can be rationally proved that a person can understand affairs beyond reasoning. When reason does not have access to the affairs, it might have no judgment: there could be a mention of faith only. Reason can only consider the possibility of such a thing. But it cannot prove it i.e. cannot demonstrate undoubtedly and rationally that the one who is the prophet can understand affairs beyond reasoning. In fact, on the one hand it seems that reason is the chief determinant, as it understands prophet’s truthfulness. On the other hand, even if we ignore the challenges connected to the issue, it seems that the prophet plays a very determinant part in religious knowledge, and that without revelation given by the prophet reason fails to enter the field of religious knowledge. Furthermore, since in al-Ghazali's view the prophet is connected to the main source of knowledge and is taught by God and Gabriel, his words are preferable over limited human reason’s judgment, and thus although al-Ghazali tries hard to provide an argument for prophet’s truthfulness, in his religious epistemology the prophet has the highest status.
azam ghasemi; arya younesi
Abstract
There is a will which is attributed to Razi which have been a controversial topic from ancient times until now. Preferring Qur’anic method to theology and philosophy, some scholars, such as Ibn Emad Hanbali and Fathalla Kholeif, think of that as a kind of repentance from rational discussion. There ...
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There is a will which is attributed to Razi which have been a controversial topic from ancient times until now. Preferring Qur’anic method to theology and philosophy, some scholars, such as Ibn Emad Hanbali and Fathalla Kholeif, think of that as a kind of repentance from rational discussion. There is a statement which is apparently narrate by Ibn Salah, quote Razi’s word that he regretted studying theology and philosophy; that he said: “I regretted studying theology (Kalam)” and then he wept. This quote support former interpreting. We proved, in this paper, that that interpretation is not authentic and the meaning and purpose of it is different; thus it is not a kind of repent, but rather it is a moderate rationalism (opposite to both classical rationalism and fideism), which he held in his life and could be found in his works. And, it is showed that what is quoted from Ibn Salah is not reliable; because could not be found in Ibn Salah’s works, perhaps it is a transited saying from him. Those writers, who quoted from Ibn Salah, a few centuries after him; thus it is not acceptable. Therefore, this narration is not authentic. This story is important, because it targeted reasoning in Fakhr system of thoughts; if it is true, then it shows that Kalam is not in harmony with real, orthodox Islam, as those who mentioned it maintain. But if not true, it shows that Razi did not believe that theology (Kalam) is not a real part of Islamic sciences. As a matter of historic facts, there is not an authentic source for the story. Therefore, it seems that someone made it up to justify their fanatic, extremist, fundamental interpretation of Islam, in which they have not tolerated any kind of reasoning, including Islamic theology (Kalam), the field of study that Razi well represent. For Ash’ari scholars like Fakhr Razi, reasoning is a useful, discursive tool to assess and study claims and beliefs, and particularly to defend religious doctrines. However, their attitude toward reasoning and intellect (Aql) itself is far from their Mu’tazali opponents. While Mutazalis see reasoning as a source for inferring truth, their Ash’ari opponents see it as a tool to assess claims, interpreting holy texts, including Qur’anic verses. On the other hand, for Fakhr’s part, in the will we could find him in a mediocre rationality position. He stated that what he discussed in his life was not of stubbornness, carelessness or recklessness, but just for the sake of reason. In other works he can be seen committed to Quranic verses and holy texts, beyond reasoning as a source superior to the text; so to speak, he only used reasoning for understanding; and that he put the “Quranic method” on the top of the list, do not imply that he denied reasoning and respective fields of study totally. But a few figures, like Ibn Emad al-Hanbali or Kholief, saw it as a kind of repentance of discursive methods, which is impossible to justify such a position. As to Razi we could see that he had held such a position in his whole career, as he had scrutinized philosophical doctrines, assessing every claim, and always put the Quran on the top of everything else. Therefore, to say Razi repented Kalam is not a valid, authentic conclusion.
Mohammad Hadi Tavakoli; Azam Ghasemi
Abstract
The question of ‘knowability of God’ is not a major topic in the works of traditional Muslim philosophers, as if taken for granted. Despite his critical view of ‘those who divest God of His Attributes’ (mu’attila) - hence, actually divest the concept of God of all conceivability ...
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The question of ‘knowability of God’ is not a major topic in the works of traditional Muslim philosophers, as if taken for granted. Despite his critical view of ‘those who divest God of His Attributes’ (mu’attila) - hence, actually divest the concept of God of all conceivability - Hakīm Sabzawārī (1797-1873) also denied the possibility of a rational knowledge of God. Sabzawārī believed that the natural light of the human reason, when intensified by the divine Light, would be capable of knowledge of God through ‘arguments’, although he also emphasized that the very Essence of God cannot be known ‘exhaustively’, since any ‘acquired knowledge aimed at fathoming the depth’ (‘ilm al-iktināhī) would be possible only through the comprehensive acquisition of the essence of the ‘object’ supposed to be known, which is impossible in the case of God Who ‘by definition’ transcends any knowable ‘essence’ (māhiyya). It is worth mentioning that Sabzawārī enriched his arguments with insightful observations taken from Hadith literature and other traditional sources.
