mohammad ali vatandoost
Abstract
In the verses and Islamic traditions, the two terms "font" and "plaque" have been used together and are considered to be of the magnitude of the current knowledge of God. The relationship between "Tablet and pen" and the levels of the current science of God has led to the emergence of two terms in Islamic ...
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In the verses and Islamic traditions, the two terms "font" and "plaque" have been used together and are considered to be of the magnitude of the current knowledge of God. The relationship between "Tablet and pen" and the levels of the current science of God has led to the emergence of two terms in Islamic philosophy and is one of the issues of the first philosophy. In the meantime, philosophers such as Mulla Sadra, in brief, and Allameh Tabatabai, have, in a detailed way, tried to use the religious teachings of these two terms to give a philosophical explanation. In the present research, it has been attempted to review and analyze the ontological conceptual analysis of Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabatabai about "pen" with a narrative and philosophical approach. Also, some of the traditions that have been mentioned about the pen and the two thinkers have not been interpreted, and new points have been extracted. At the end, it is concluded that the "pen" and "items" are the truths of the wisdom that are in the longitudinal dynasties, and are considered to be the intermediary of grace than the facts below the subject itself.
Gholamreza Maroof; Iraj Dadashi
Abstract
Farr(ah)/xvarənah-, a key concept in Persian thought and culture which literally means ‘glory’ and ‘splendour’, probably related etymologically to the word xuar/n ‘sun’, but mostly understood as a divine power and glory endowed upon the chosen ones. The discourse ...
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Farr(ah)/xvarənah-, a key concept in Persian thought and culture which literally means ‘glory’ and ‘splendour’, probably related etymologically to the word xuar/n ‘sun’, but mostly understood as a divine power and glory endowed upon the chosen ones. The discourse formation of farr(ah), through texts belonging to different periods, reaches its full development during the Islamic period, especially in the teachings of Suhrawardī, the well-known founder of the Persian Illuminationist school of philosophy. Based on a qualitative method, the present study aims at classifying and arranging the different types of farr(ah) and also investigates how the Qur’ānic teachings, especially the Qur’ānic divine Names, influenced transformation of the concept of farr(ah) during the Islamic period. Farr(ah) was a royal and divine attribute and occurs in phrases like farr-u-awrang. Burz (the lofty one), warz (Av. varəcah, the vital energy) and bagh (a deity or divine power distributing settled portions and deserved fates, Sans. bhaga) may be mentioned among the other important words and notions accompanying the notion of farr(ah). Major types of farr(ah) are as the followings: farr-i kiyānī (royal splendour attributed to virtuous kings), farr-i Īrānī (showing that farr(ah) corresponded not only to the concept of royal fortune but also to that of ‘fortune’ in a more general sense), farr-i zartusht and farr-i mūbadī (fortune and splendour attributed to the priestly class). As a magic force of luminous and fiery nature, the notion of farr(ah) closely accompanied the key notions of ‘beauty’, ‘wisdom’ and ‘power’, hence, it may manifest itself through an interconnected network of living beings, including animals and plants, as well as non-living objects. As a result of the promotion of equality and hence removal of Sassanid social classes during the Islamic period, the concept of farr(ah) – influenced by the Qur’ānic divine Names and Qualities including Mercy and Light alongside the key notion of Sakīna (Spirit of Tranquility, divine Presence and Indwelling) - transformed into a more mature and rich form.
Seyed Mehdi Mirhadi
Abstract
The history of topics related to action can be clearly documented in the history of philosophy and its various periods from ancient Greece to the present, as well as in the history of Islamic philosophy. In the Greek philosophy, Aristotle has put forward his own views one practice in his book “On ...
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The history of topics related to action can be clearly documented in the history of philosophy and its various periods from ancient Greece to the present, as well as in the history of Islamic philosophy. In the Greek philosophy, Aristotle has put forward his own views one practice in his book “On the Soul”. In the medieval philosophy, Aquinas, and in western contemporary philosophy, Hobbes, Hume, Anscombe, and Davidson, in particular, have focused on the action. Also, Islamic philosophers have paid attention to the issue of action, in particular Mulla Sadra, who has a special position due to discuss issues such as the quiddity of the action, and the why of and the quality of the action effects on the soul. Using five main questions, this paper seeks to present a preliminary plan for the philosophy of action in the Transcendent Philosophy of Mulla Sadra. The first question is the philosophy of human presence in the world and the role of action at the end of such a presence. In the second question, the relationship between action and body and the preparative role of the body (the creation of physical action) is described as the essential condition for the creation of the inner form of action in the soul. The quiddity of the action, the why and effects of action, and the quality of the action influence on the soul, as well as other questions are explained by the philosophy of action in the Transcendent Philosophy. In general view, Mulla Sadra's perception of the action can be paid attention as the basis of his theory about quiddity and quality of action and its relation with the soul. In this perception, the action, as an external existence similar to other external realities and objects, in order to associating with the soul, is required to unify with the soul by its immaterial form. Methodology The method of analysis and deduction was used according to the issue. Results and Discussion Human being is the only creature whose capacity to acquire new abilities is unlimited. Actualizing (becoming existence) this capacity and disposition can be a good reason for our entry and presence in this world, since the initial actuality is just a factuality and pre-disposition, and if it remains at this stage, there will in fact be nothing. In Mulla Sadra's view, the action is the incipience of the formation of attributes, and attributes is the incipience of the acquisition of knowledge and science. Thus, for example, the repeated fulfillment of the acts of kindness leads to the establishment of the attribute and the habit of kindness in us. In his view, it is important that, because of our kindness, we have a different perception of existence as compared to someone who is unkind. We act (having good behavior with others) through the body that is realized and actual, so that what is in potency in us (the potentiality of human being kindness) but not actual at the beginning of our birth, is realized and we are attributed. For him, the good and evil of action relate to an aspect of action (the effect on the soul) that has survival and stability, and an aspect of action (combination of moves that creates the appearance of an action) that does not remain and does not exist in ourselves lacked identity and attribution to goodness or evil. Actions are effects of our existence, and we are the subject and the cause of them. For Mulla Sadra, intention is the identity of action. The intention of action is of mode of soul and determining the degree of perfection of action. Human beings have the ability to become species with different intentions and actions. Mulla Sadra introduces the action as planting seeds in the earth of the heart, and the intentions as seeds. He believes that "each of us (his being) is his intention." Mulla Sadra has paid a special attention to the effects of the action arising from the fact that action makes the identity. In his view, "Anyone who does something, an effect of it (action) is occurred in the soul, and as the effects are repeated in the soul, the habits are formed." The formation of habits, as the moral attributes, the acquisition of knowledge, and the formation of human essence (existence), are all the most important effects of human action. When someone observes something by the camera, nobody says that the camera is looking and it is clear that we watch ourselves. Similar to this example, in terms of Mulla Sadra, the soul has the same relationship with its perceptual faculties (senses, imagination, intellect), and the faculty of motion and senses. The true subject of all acts is the soul. In this way, for example, violence against others by hand is the action of the soul (not the action of hand); therefore, its effect will also belong to the soul. Conclusion The action is the unique human facility to build one’s own religion and world, and the world is a glancing opportunity to act. The human body is the means of providing the possibility of action. The body is the servant of the soul (nafs) in order to realize our eternal life by depreciating itself under the will of the soul during our lifetime. The formation of humanistic or inhumanistic habits, the acquisition of knowledge, the progress or obstruction of the hearts into the path of intuition of the existence facts, the realization of human entity, and the acquisition of happiness or adversity for the human soul are become possible by the action. The action has an external existence that is the motion of bodily organs and limbs. Also, the action has an inner existence which is the inner form (immaterial and unified with soul) of action. In this way, as actions are different outside of mind, the inward form and the soulful existence of actions will also be different. The difference of the inward forms actions means that every external actions, after being transformed into an esoteric form and unified with soul, leads to a special and distinct effect from the other acts. Gradually, by the repetition of actions, the habits (humanistic or inhumanistic attributes) and the identity of human beings are formed, and the human souls are distinguished from each other.
malek shojaei jeshvaghani
Abstract
This Paper, By referring to the different approaches to Islamic philosophy and wisdom in the contemporary world, examines Abdul Javad Falaturi's different approach to Islamic philosophy. Contrary to the predominantly Orientalist readings of Islamic philosophy, which understand this tradition under the ...
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This Paper, By referring to the different approaches to Islamic philosophy and wisdom in the contemporary world, examines Abdul Javad Falaturi's different approach to Islamic philosophy. Contrary to the predominantly Orientalist readings of Islamic philosophy, which understand this tradition under the Neo-Platonic tradition, Falatouri seeks to explain the role of the Qur'an in Islamic philosophy through contemporary comparative and linguistic studies. According to his analysis, Islamic philosophy and wisdom resulted from the fusion of two different worldviews, namely, the worldview of Greek science and philosophy and the Qur'anic worldview. So this philosophy was neither purely Greek nor purely Qur'anic nor a mixture of the two, but rather a separate and distinctive process arising from their synthesis and consequence. Introduction The discussion of the relationship between Greek philosophy and Islamic philosophy is one of the most important and crucial issues among philosophers and historians of philosophy, and the study of main topics in this field clearly shows the diversity of views on this subject. Approach and method Hermeneutical-comparative analysis Discussion and results Due to the predominance of Mulla Sadra's philosophy in the recent approaches of philosophy and theology in Iran, reading the Peripatetic (Ḥikmat-iMashā'), Illumination (Ḥikmat-i Ishrāq), traditions of Islamic philosophy and even Islamic theology is strongly influenced by this philosophical current and attention to research such as Falaturi reading of Qur'anic origins of Islamic philosophy. Despite the criticisms that have been made and discussed in this paper, it can be a conquest of dialogue between contemporary Mulla Sadra's philosophy and its intellectual rivals, so that through this philosophical struggle, the possibilities and limitations of the dominant Islamic philosophy can be overcome. Result It seems that Falaturi, who considers his style of research and questioning to be different, has empathized with Heidegger while reading the developments in key concepts of Greek philosophy such as "time" and its methodological implications, and in a negative step in the pathology of philosophical theology. The more closely we compare these themes of Heidegger's philosophy with Falaturi's methodology, the more seriously the question arises as to whether only considered Heidegger in the historical-comparative study of the evolution of philosophical concepts in Greek and Islamic philosophy. Or is it beyond this comparative-historical study of all the methods of Heidegger's reading of the history of philosophy? It seems that a very positive answer cannot be found for judging in this case.
morteza shajari; safa salkhi; maziar asefi
Abstract
Motion is necessary for architectural perception. Architecturalspace provides the observer with physical, mental, and intuitivemovement due to dynamic properties, fluidity and pause.In philosophy, the cause of the motion is the basis of perceiving the facts of the material world. Islamic philosophers ...
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Motion is necessary for architectural perception. Architecturalspace provides the observer with physical, mental, and intuitivemovement due to dynamic properties, fluidity and pause.In philosophy, the cause of the motion is the basis of perceiving the facts of the material world. Islamic philosophers believed that motion was related toperfection and has an aim to pursue that been subject to the principle of potential and action.According to MullaSadra theory ofSubstantial Movement, the material existence through its constant movement toward the spiritual presence, by passing through the realms of sensibility, imagination andrationality, is achieved through the true perception of the world.The research methodology is qualitative particularly analytical-descriptive one and with an interpretive approach, the research strategy is a case study. Through analyzing the perceptual experience of the observer in themosque of Tabriz, this research views the implication of movement and perception inboth philosophy and architecture.From the main findings of the study, there is a significant correlation between the steps toward perfection from the body to the soul in acquiring knowledge based on the philosophy of Substantial Movement and the stages of experiential perception of space from material to meaning in Islamic architecture.With thecreation of a particular spiritual environment, Islamic architects of Iran have always provided a place for theobserver's inner discovery and intuition, and according to its fluiditycharacteristics, the perceptual experience of the observer was guidedfrom the lowest to its highest.
soheila golipoorsharakey; mojtaba jafarieashkavanday; mohsen fahim; Alireza khajegir
Abstract
Faith is the most basic element of spiritual life, the jewel that adorns the human soul and the brightest ray of the Alawite world, One of the most important theological issues is faith and its related elements, so that its fundamental role in the formation of religious belief in the meaning of life ...
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Faith is the most basic element of spiritual life, the jewel that adorns the human soul and the brightest ray of the Alawite world, One of the most important theological issues is faith and its related elements, so that its fundamental role in the formation of religious belief in the meaning of life can not be ignored. The present study seeks to examine the role of religious components such as prophecy, Imamate, worship on faith and its accessories in the meaning of life in both cognitive and functional dimensions, with a descriptive-comparative method from the perspective of two great thinkers with two different Islamic traditions, Sunni and Shiite. It has been used to collect data through a library. The research data has been analyzed by collecting similarities and differences between the views of these two great thinkers based on their anthropological foundations. The results showed that every thinker considers faith to be meaningful in life, although there are differences in the details based on the principles of their thoughts, In the issue of Ghazali worship, more emphasis is placed on the individual dimension of worship, but Allameh emphasizes both the individual and social dimensions of worship. The most important difference between these two scholars is the issue of Imamate, which Ghazali considers as a worldly management and a jurisprudential and sub-matter. Allameh considers Imamate as the continuation of prophecy and divine covenant.
morteza shajari; sonya silvayeh
Abstract
The dome of the mosque leads the eyes and heart of the viewer to the ascendancy, which it is reminder of sublimation. The center of the dome is the symbol of unity and the lower level is the symbol of the soul. In this paper, based on Sadra 's philosophy (including of the three worlds; sense, imagination ...
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The dome of the mosque leads the eyes and heart of the viewer to the ascendancy, which it is reminder of sublimation. The center of the dome is the symbol of unity and the lower level is the symbol of the soul. In this paper, based on Sadra 's philosophy (including of the three worlds; sense, imagination and wisdom), a visualization the mosque's dome associated with these three cosmos is presented. Materials of the dome is perceived by the sense of eye as a reminder of the physical world. The cube and sphere in the dome, which emerged from the imagination of the architect artist, is like a fantasy world and a form of congregation, which begins from the base of the dome (multiplicity) and reaches to the top of the dome (unity), it shows the congregation and stability of the wisdom world. God is the origin of the universe, if the mosque's space is like the universe, then the mosque also has the origin with that passes through the entrance and the courtyard to it, which eventually ends to the dome.
shabnam faraji; Hossein Fallahi Asl; Fatemeh Ahmadi
Abstract
Banu Amin, who is a follower of MullaSadra's School of philosophy, has differences with her predecessors in some positions, such as the forces of the human Self, “Intellects Theory”, etc. Regarding the Intellects Theory, while criticizing the previous theories, she proposes the Theory of ...
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Banu Amin, who is a follower of MullaSadra's School of philosophy, has differences with her predecessors in some positions, such as the forces of the human Self, “Intellects Theory”, etc. Regarding the Intellects Theory, while criticizing the previous theories, she proposes the Theory of the Muhammadiyah's Spirit. The main question of the present research is the critical review of his encounter with the Intellects Theory and the evaluation of the Muhammadiyah's Spirit Theory. In his opinions, the Incorporeal of the First Intellect emphasized and she considers the First Intellect to have a delicate substance. Banu Amin answers the eight problems surrounding the Intellects Theory. Two problems are about the Incorporeal and Being of the intellect, five problems are about the corporeality of the intellect, and one problem is about the longitudinal order and the number of the Intellects. On the one hand, she considers rational reasons for Incorporeal of Intellects to be acceptable. On the other hand, she believes that considering the narrative evidences and the flaws of the rule of “Alvahed”, the corporeality of intellects not rejected in general. Therefore, in the end, she considers the corporeality of Intellects to be permissible and as the alternative Theory uses the Theory of Muhammadiyah's Spirit to explain the relationship between one and many. Sometimes she considers the Muhammadiyah's Spirit to be equivalent to the First Intellect, and sometimes considering the First Intellect to be corporeal and the Muhammadiyah's Spirit to be Incorporeal, she considers them to be differencing from each other. Therefore, Banu Amin criticizes the Theories that existed about Intellects until her time, and accepts and proves some parts of both Theories of Corporeal and Incorporeal of Intellects, and rejects some parts, and finally, expresses a new Theory about Intellects. In addition, in this regard even provides a new definition for the substance. Banu Amin is close to the mystics in the Muhammadiyah's Spirit Theory. Muhammadiyah's Spirit is the first issued from whom the First Intellect is issue, and the same characteristics that the philosophers have listed for the First Intellect; she counts for the Muhammadiyah's Spirit. Relying on narrative reasons and their preference and discussion from different points of view has created this new Theory in the opinions of Banu Amin. The present research method is analytical-critical.
azam ghasemi
Abstract
For al-Ghazali, “prophet-hood means preaching God’s words and the prophet is the preacher of God’s words”. The main question of the present study is what part in al-Ghazali’s view the prophet has in knowledge about God and what challenges his views bring. A ...
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For al-Ghazali, “prophet-hood means preaching God’s words and the prophet is the preacher of God’s words”. The main question of the present study is what part in al-Ghazali’s view the prophet has in knowledge about God and what challenges his views bring. A discussion of “miracle” as the reason for the truthfulness of the prophet is absolutely essential for tackling that question. From al-Ghazali’s point of view, prophets’ knowledge is gained through a light shed onto their hearts, rather than through sensations or education. Some recipients of the prophets’ knowledge only imitate what they hear, while some enjoy insights. In al-Ghazali’s work, imitation is of two kinds: acceptable and unacceptable. He believed that Islamic scholars (ūlamā) can achieve understanding on their own and it is only the masses who imitate. One of al-Ghazali’s stances where one could see the role of the prophet in his religious epistemology is on the necessity of thanking the Giver of blessings (wujūb-i shukr-i mun’im): from his point of view, the necessity is jurisprudential and stated by the prophet rather than rational. According to him, reason cannot achieve knowledge about the affairs because of which the prophet was appointed, and this is why the prophet was appointed. But, if reason cannot achieve knowledge about the affairs, how can it affirm the prophet’s prophet-hood and message? In some of his works al-Ghazali regards miracle as the proof for the truthfulness of the prophet. In some others, in addition to miracle he refers to such evidence as prophet’s words, actions, and states in which the prophet was, reported numerously by different narrators and through different chains of transmission. He maintains that the role of reason and theory is merely that through miracle they make sense of the truthfulness of the prophet. Then they depose themselves, admitting that whatever the prophet says about God and the Day of Judgment is acceptable. And this is among the affairs in understanding which reason enjoys no independence. Nor does it understand its impossibility. But even if we involve reason at the stage of proving truthfulness of the prophet, then it is the reason which should affirm the good of the truthfulness (ḥusn-i sidq), thereby jurisprudential good and evil being questioned. From a point of view outside religion and using a rational and argumentative method this study critiqued and examined al-Ghazali’s teaching on prophet-hood, and reached the conclusion that his view changed in his different works. In his theosophical works he said that reason judges that anyone who claims to be a prophet and produces a miracle is necessarily truthful, and then reason withdraws, assumes an instrumental role, and submits to the prophet’s remark. In some other works, however, he does not consider miracle to be enough, as miracle might be confused with magic, and therefore he thinks that proving the prophet’s truthfulness needs further signs. In general, al-Ghazali’s explanation of the epistemological role of the prophet in people’s acquisition of knowledge has many flaws which have been addressed in this article. On the one hand, he acknowledges reason’s limits and thinks that appointment of the prophet is accounted for by the fact that the prophet understands affairs that go beyond reasoning. On the other hand, he states that reason can discern the existence of the prophet as well as the fact that the prophet can understand affairs beyond reasoning. Yet it cannot understand what the prophet understands. There occurs a paradox, which is how it can be rationally proved that a person can understand affairs beyond reasoning. When reason does not have access to the affairs, it might have no judgment: there could be a mention of faith only. Reason can only consider the possibility of such a thing. But it cannot prove it i.e. cannot demonstrate undoubtedly and rationally that the one who is the prophet can understand affairs beyond reasoning. In fact, on the one hand it seems that reason is the chief determinant, as it understands prophet’s truthfulness. On the other hand, even if we ignore the challenges connected to the issue, it seems that the prophet plays a very determinant part in religious knowledge, and that without revelation given by the prophet reason fails to enter the field of religious knowledge. Furthermore, since in al-Ghazali's view the prophet is connected to the main source of knowledge and is taught by God and Gabriel, his words are preferable over limited human reason’s judgment, and thus although al-Ghazali tries hard to provide an argument for prophet’s truthfulness, in his religious epistemology the prophet has the highest status.
Sayyed Ahmad Ghaffari Gharabagh
Abstract
IntroductionThe question of the role of knowledge in the realization of the known is crucial to philosophical and mystical theological studies. Mystics and Sadraean philosophers have adopted different views of the efficacy or inefficacy of knowledge in the known as well as their account of how knowledge ...
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IntroductionThe question of the role of knowledge in the realization of the known is crucial to philosophical and mystical theological studies. Mystics and Sadraean philosophers have adopted different views of the efficacy or inefficacy of knowledge in the known as well as their account of how knowledge affects the known. The goal of this research is to uncover the view of Islamic mysticism and Transcendent Wisdom concerning the issue. MethodThis research draws on the method of analysis and comparison to provide an analytic comparative consideration of the mystical and Sadraean view of the issue. Moreover, it was carried out based on library data. ResultsWhen it comes to the semantics of the relation between knowledge and the known in the mystical approach, we might discern three different positions in the words of mystics. First, the known is not made by knowledge in the sense that God’s knowledge does not play a role in how Immutable Entities (al-a‘yān al-thābita) are. Indeed, God knows such entities as they are, without making or changing them. By an analogy of our knowledge of the impossible, Ibn ‘Arabī explicates the notion of knowledge being subordinated to the known, in that it is not our knowledge that makes it impossible, nor can it stop it from being impossible. The second notion of subordination is the correspondence between knowledge and the known. That is, what is original is the known entity as it is present an Immutable Entity, and it is knowledge that corresponds to it, although the ontological subordination of the known with respect to knowledge is a well-acknowledged fact in Islamic mysticism. This remark by Fanārī is in obvious conflict with the first view concerning the semantics of the subordination of knowledge with respect to the known according to which the former is posterior to the latter. Such differences in the semantics of subordination indicate that there is no consensus over the notion of knowledge being subordinated to the known, as it shows that the dispute is not merely verbal. The third notion of subordination refers to that of the relation to its relatum. Moreover, on the Sadraean view, knowledge’s subordination to the known is accounted for in the third mystical sense. To illustrate, we should note that by the known here we mean the essentially known, which consists in the Immutable Entity or the epistemic form. Accordingly, for knowledge to be knowledge it needs to belong to a known entity, where belonging is a relation that needs, and is posterior to, its relatum, although the posterity is hierarchical rather than temporal, and thus it does not lead to the occurrence of events in God’s essence. Furthermore, when he deals with the problem of knowledge’s subordination to the known, Mullā Ṣadrā often distinguishes active and passive knowledge, tethering the response to the question of knowledge’s subordination of the known to the varieties of the distinction. That is, since knowledge is the origin of the instantiation of the external known entity, it cannot be posterior to the known, but in passive knowledge as such, the knowledge in question is necessarily posterior to the external known entity. What is more, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn provides a significant research concerning the differences between the views of Muslim mystics and Mu‘tazilī theologians, in which he notes the differences between the two views, referring to epistemic and objective (concrete) obtainment (or immutability) as two varieties of obtainment. He accounts for the view of Muslim mystics that Immutable Entities obtain prior to their concrete or objective existence in terms of epistemic obtainment. In this connection, he also points to the mode of existence of Immutable Entities. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, since such entities exist by God’s existence, they are not created by God, which is unlike the existential condition of existential objective entities that are made and created by God. ConclusionIn Mullā Ṣadrā’s view, knowledge’s subordination of the known corresponds to the third mystical sense. Moreover, relying on his principle of the primacy of existence, Mullā Ṣadrā tends to believe that the known is not made by knowledge, with knowledge not contributing to the known. Sadraean and mystical accounts agree over the idea that Immutable Entities are essentially determined, non-made realities, which is why the divine knowledge does not affect such entities in God’s essence.
somayeh sadat mousavi; seyyed ali akbar hosseini ghaleh bahman
Abstract
IntroductionThe necessity of observing moral values by human beings is approved by every common sense and human nature; But does such a necessity also apply to the observance of moral values for God? If we accept that it is necessary for God to observe moral values, on what basis can we know whether ...
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IntroductionThe necessity of observing moral values by human beings is approved by every common sense and human nature; But does such a necessity also apply to the observance of moral values for God? If we accept that it is necessary for God to observe moral values, on what basis can we know whether God has acted morally or not? The truth is that knowing God as the moral agent and determining the theory of value God's actions has received less attention and no precise answer has been given.Value theories are responsible for determining the good and bad criteria for moral actions, and so far various value theories have been proposed to measure human moral actions. The most well-known theories of moral value include teleological theories, virtue-based theories, and conscientious theories. The fundamental problem in most of these theories is that they consider only man as a moral agent, and the criterion they offer is only for measuring the good and bad of human actions. Hence, in the face of the question of "whether God's actions are moral or not" they do not have a clear answer for the audience. Therefore, it is necessary to first examine whether we can basically consider God as a moral agent or whether the observance of moral values is only for man? Second, if God's actions can also be morally valued, by what criteria can we understand their morality? Are the criteria presented in the moral schools adaptable to God's actions, or should another theory of value be sought for God? In this research, we want to provide appropriate answers to such questions as possible.Methods In this research, the analytical method has been used to examine the extent to which the theories of virtue oriented, Deontological, and Teleological are applied to the actions of God.Results and DiscussionThe first theory of value to be examined is the theory of virtue oriented. Of course, those virtue ethics's views that have considered the criterion of valuing characters and recognizing virtues from vices as their end are considered as Teleological views, and any result obtained in examining the Teleological view also includes Teleological virtue ethics. Other virtue ethic's views are called Agent-based virtue ethics, which say that the criterion for good and bad deeds is only their motive; Not their goals and results. According to this view, the existence of good motives for God causes good deeds to be issued from Him, without pursuing a purpose from these deeds. This criterion is not acceptable for conforming to God's actions; Because God is wise and the requirement of wisdom is that all God's actions have a wise purpose.The second theory of value is the Deontological theory. The general criterion in this theory is that an action is moral and right when it is done only because of duty. Since this cannot be assumed to be a duty to God, this view also cannot be chosen as a theory of value for measuring God's actions; Because duty means where there is a right and the right cannot be achieved without ownership. God is the owner of everything; Therefore, no one has the right to oblige him to do something. The third theory under consideration is teleologicalism. The general criterion in teleology is this: if something leads us to the desired result, it is good, and if it leads us away from that result, it is bad.We have said that God is wise and the requirement of wisdom is that all God's actions have a purpose; Therefore, the main criterion of teleology is compatible with God's moral actions. But purposes such as profit, pleasure, power, and happiness, which have been proposed in kinds of teleological theories such as consequentialism and perfectionism, are all appropriate to man and cannot be considered as purposes for God. Nevertheless, the concept of "perfection" is one of the concepts that has the capacity to be presented to God; Because God is absolute perfection, and God's wisdom requires that the actions that come from Him be commensurate with His inherent perfection. Thus, a new interpretation of perfectionism can be offered that includes the actions of God.To do this, the circle of the moral agent must be considered beyond man so that God is also known as the moral agent. Then, the realization of "mere perfection", without restricting it to man, was considered as the purpose of moral actions. In this case, each of the moral actors will aim at the realization of perfection, and this perfection, according to the nature of each moral actor, can have different instances. For example, man's goal can be his own perfection and God's goal can be the perfection of creatures; Because the goal is the realization of perfection, and if a moral act leads to the realization of perfection for a person other than the doer, the moral goal is still achieved.ConclusionAccording to what has been said, our proposed theory, as a theory of value that can be applied to both human and God's actions, is a perfectionist teleological theory - which also includes a Teleological virtue ethics - with the interpretation that we consider the purpose of moral actions to be the mere realization of perfection. According to this theory, a good deed is an action that is compatible with perfection, and a bad deed is an action that is incompatible with perfection. This perfection is either the perfection of the moral agent himself or the perfection of a being other than the moral agent. Therefore, the perfection of creatures by God, which is itself pure perfection, is a moral act
vahid khademzadeh
Abstract
Cognitive linguists use two instruments to explain the process of human cognition: image schema and conceptual metaphor. Image schema is a mental structure that is the result of human interaction with sensory things especially human body. Conceptual metaphor extends the image schema from sensory concepts ...
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Cognitive linguists use two instruments to explain the process of human cognition: image schema and conceptual metaphor. Image schema is a mental structure that is the result of human interaction with sensory things especially human body. Conceptual metaphor extends the image schema from sensory concepts to abstract concepts systematically. Usual human interaction with physical containers like human body, house, and vehicles create the image schema of in-out orientation (containment image schema) in the mind. Conceptual metaphors based on this image schema are used to conceptualize many abstract concepts as containers. Mulla Sadra uses Arabic words like ẓarf (container), wiʻā’(container), dār(house) and buqʻah (spot) to describe metaphysical concepts such as existence ,quiddity and non-existence. Also, he talk about going in or out of existence and non-existence. He uses external existence in opposition to mental existence. This evidences are understandable in the context of the containment image schema and conceptual metaphors based on this image schema.
Ghasem Pourhasan
Volume 3, Issue 1 , September 2012, , Pages 33-54
Abstract
Foundationalism is considered the most important approaches in epistemology. Traditional foundationalism is expounded in present article. Its main claim is the division of beliefs into two kinds: Basic beliefs and deductive beliefs. Because of the regressive argument, all deductive beliefs finally should ...
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Foundationalism is considered the most important approaches in epistemology. Traditional foundationalism is expounded in present article. Its main claim is the division of beliefs into two kinds: Basic beliefs and deductive beliefs. Because of the regressive argument, all deductive beliefs finally should be referred to basic beliefs. In present essay, meanwhile explaining the objections to foundationalism, I would offer the responses regarding to Tabatabaii’s epistemological system. Fallibility and corrigibility are considered the main deficiency of foundationalism theory. Tabatabaii explains both the possibility and the method of grasping certain knowledge on the basis of three principles. He emphasizes that all deductive beliefs should referred syllogistically to basic particularly self-evident propositions
Abouzar Norouzi; Mohsen Shiravand
Abstract
Allameh Tabataba'i (Seyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba'i) is a classic philosopher in the tradition of the Transcendent Philosophy and a great commentator of the Holy Qur'an. His thoughts are not, however, limited to these two areas. He has new ideas in other epistemic areas as well, including ethics. The ...
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Allameh Tabataba'i (Seyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba'i) is a classic philosopher in the tradition of the Transcendent Philosophy and a great commentator of the Holy Qur'an. His thoughts are not, however, limited to these two areas. He has new ideas in other epistemic areas as well, including ethics. The main area in ethics is undoubtedly the division of schools into moral realism and non-realism. The purpose of this research is to analyze the issue of Allameh Tabataba'i's position in these categories and to gloss the philosophical subjects which describe this issue? This paper tries to address this issue by analyzing and explaining the issue of "Iʿtibārīyāt" (fictions) and "sensation". Methods This paper is written in a documentary-analytical way. Results and Discussion In the theory of Iʿtibārīyāt (Fictions), we have the following propositions: Each of delusive meanings is based on the truth; each delusive limit that we present in a referent, has another real referent that has been taken from it; indeed, the consideration is not untruthful; The moral propositions are the model and representation of the Causality, which even manifests itself in mental conceptions; The obligation state of "ought" has been taken in all fictions from the obligation of “necessity” and, therefore, the state of prohibition will be taken from the necessity of “privation”. Rational men’s Fictions are based on criterions and truths. They judge that justice or honesty are goodness, because they think that both of them are always helpful to the interests and purposes of society. Real effects are predicated on these Affairs. Accordingly, it can be deduced that the consideration of good and evil is the result of the general necessity that the pre-community human being considers inevitably. Goodness and badness are natural particulars. Their favorability and acceptance or unfavorability and disacceptance are perceived by the faculty of perception. Moreover, any freewill act is done with using the state of "necessity". therefore, when we do any action we believe that doing that action bases on the requirement of the active power (quwwat faʿʿālat). Good and bad are defective and, unlike truth and falsity, are true sentences that describe the attributes of the action and the harmony between the action and the goal (telos). Whenever a person considers something to achieve his/her goal and interest of the action, and the consideration and goal are rational, it will be useful and otherwise abolished and unnecessary. Moral judgments are not pure considerations, but based on the truths of the world, mankind, noumenal interests and evil aspects, and have their own real and special effects. The difference between true knowledge and considerative (mentally-posited) one is that true knowledge is abstracted from the outside world of mind. True knowledge is called truth (ṣidq) Corresponding to truth in the outside world of mind, and is called right (ḥaq) because the outside world of mind corresponds to it. Consequently, the meaning of truth and right is that this mental truth is exactly the same as the external reality, and the external reality is the same as the truth that it is in the mind. But considerative knowledge is realized only in the mind and does not correspond to the outside world of the mind unless an interest of our interests impels us considering it factual. The fact of predicate of these propositions of cases is depends on the consistency and mismatch with the opinions of scholars and rational men. The creation (inshāʾ) of scholars are not vain, and goes back to the realm of their understanding of realities. Conclusion Therefore, the following achievement can be guided: the considerative meanings are taken from the realities. The considerative obligation, through the scholar’s consideration, is taken from real obligation for acquisition of goal and interest of the action. The considerative propositions of ethics are based on the realities of the universe and mankind and the noumenal interests and evil aspects, and have their own real and special effects. Corresponding to Allameh's view, although propositions of ethics and creative propositions are cognate, and thus they are not in the cycle of real propositions that are capable of being truth or falsity, but the reality of moral propositions and judgments and judgments is explained in terms of their intentions and goals according to the beliefs of scholars and their perception of reality. Thus, the view of Allameh Tabataba'i in his epistemic system stays on defining moral realism.
azam ghasemi; arya younesi
Abstract
There is a will which is attributed to Razi which have been a controversial topic from ancient times until now. Preferring Qur’anic method to theology and philosophy, some scholars, such as Ibn Emad Hanbali and Fathalla Kholeif, think of that as a kind of repentance from rational discussion. There ...
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There is a will which is attributed to Razi which have been a controversial topic from ancient times until now. Preferring Qur’anic method to theology and philosophy, some scholars, such as Ibn Emad Hanbali and Fathalla Kholeif, think of that as a kind of repentance from rational discussion. There is a statement which is apparently narrate by Ibn Salah, quote Razi’s word that he regretted studying theology and philosophy; that he said: “I regretted studying theology (Kalam)” and then he wept. This quote support former interpreting. We proved, in this paper, that that interpretation is not authentic and the meaning and purpose of it is different; thus it is not a kind of repent, but rather it is a moderate rationalism (opposite to both classical rationalism and fideism), which he held in his life and could be found in his works. And, it is showed that what is quoted from Ibn Salah is not reliable; because could not be found in Ibn Salah’s works, perhaps it is a transited saying from him. Those writers, who quoted from Ibn Salah, a few centuries after him; thus it is not acceptable. Therefore, this narration is not authentic. This story is important, because it targeted reasoning in Fakhr system of thoughts; if it is true, then it shows that Kalam is not in harmony with real, orthodox Islam, as those who mentioned it maintain. But if not true, it shows that Razi did not believe that theology (Kalam) is not a real part of Islamic sciences. As a matter of historic facts, there is not an authentic source for the story. Therefore, it seems that someone made it up to justify their fanatic, extremist, fundamental interpretation of Islam, in which they have not tolerated any kind of reasoning, including Islamic theology (Kalam), the field of study that Razi well represent. For Ash’ari scholars like Fakhr Razi, reasoning is a useful, discursive tool to assess and study claims and beliefs, and particularly to defend religious doctrines. However, their attitude toward reasoning and intellect (Aql) itself is far from their Mu’tazali opponents. While Mutazalis see reasoning as a source for inferring truth, their Ash’ari opponents see it as a tool to assess claims, interpreting holy texts, including Qur’anic verses. On the other hand, for Fakhr’s part, in the will we could find him in a mediocre rationality position. He stated that what he discussed in his life was not of stubbornness, carelessness or recklessness, but just for the sake of reason. In other works he can be seen committed to Quranic verses and holy texts, beyond reasoning as a source superior to the text; so to speak, he only used reasoning for understanding; and that he put the “Quranic method” on the top of the list, do not imply that he denied reasoning and respective fields of study totally. But a few figures, like Ibn Emad al-Hanbali or Kholief, saw it as a kind of repentance of discursive methods, which is impossible to justify such a position. As to Razi we could see that he had held such a position in his whole career, as he had scrutinized philosophical doctrines, assessing every claim, and always put the Quran on the top of everything else. Therefore, to say Razi repented Kalam is not a valid, authentic conclusion.
Hossein Zamaniha; Tahereh Yavari
Abstract
Apart from the fact that the ‘corporeal body’ is a natural container for the origination and progression of the soul, Sadr al-DīnSīrāzī(1569-1640) distinguishes another ontological level of body, i.e. the ‘imaginal body’,predicated upon the existence of an ontological ...
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Apart from the fact that the ‘corporeal body’ is a natural container for the origination and progression of the soul, Sadr al-DīnSīrāzī(1569-1640) distinguishes another ontological level of body, i.e. the ‘imaginal body’,predicated upon the existence of an ontological state of being known as the ‘imaginal’ (mithālī) that mediates between an intelligible and the sensible realms.The ‘imaginal body’ or ‘body of the resurrection’is ‘perceiving’ (mudrik) and ‘living’ (hayy) and contrary to the ‘corporeal body’, is inseparable from the soul and it is through the intermediary function of this ‘imaginal body’ that the human ‘rational soul’ (al-nafs al-nātiqa)presides over the ‘corporeal body’. In fact, Sadr al-Dīn explains the relation between the ‘rational soul’ and the ‘corporeal body’ through two intermediaries, first the‘imaginal body’ and second, the ‘steam/animal spirit’. The ‘steam spirit’ is ontologically closer to the ‘corporeal body’ and the ‘imaginal body’ is ontologically closer to the ‘rational soul’. In other words, the ‘imaginal body’ presides over the ‘corporeal body’ through an intermediate link,i.e. a kind of ‘subtle mass’ known in the Peripatetic philosophy as the ‘steam spirit’.
mohammad ali mirbagheri; Abbas Yazdani; Amirabbas Alizamani
Abstract
By introducing evidential argument, William Rowe opened a new chapter in discussions about problem of evil. Rowe’s first formulation of the problem based on the idea that because “it appears” that some evils in the world are gratuitous then they are indeed so. The most influential ...
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By introducing evidential argument, William Rowe opened a new chapter in discussions about problem of evil. Rowe’s first formulation of the problem based on the idea that because “it appears” that some evils in the world are gratuitous then they are indeed so. The most influential critique of Rowe’s argument is Stephen Wykstra’sthat is based on the epistemological principle which is called CORNEA. He shows that in the Rowe’s assumed situation we are not permitted to pass from “it appears” to “is”. According to CORNEA,considering evidence Xwe areentitled to say it appears that p, only if p were not the case, probably X was different in a discernable way. The goal of this paper is firstly to introduce CORNEA as an answer to the problem of gratuitous evil, then introduce and assesse some selected critiques ofCORNEA and to defencethe principle and finally compare between skeptical theism - that CORNEA is an instance of – and approaches of Islamic thinkers to the problem of evil.
Zahra Moballegh
Abstract
This essay is an attempt to make some textual material of Islamic philosophy speak to us. The first part of this article discusses the importance of re-reading and making the silent texts of the Islamic philosophy speak. In this way only, the Islamic philosophical tradition can contribute to the development ...
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This essay is an attempt to make some textual material of Islamic philosophy speak to us. The first part of this article discusses the importance of re-reading and making the silent texts of the Islamic philosophy speak. In this way only, the Islamic philosophical tradition can contribute to the development of the philosophy world we live in today. The second part of this essay reviews the development of a significant philosophical problem that has changed our understanding of the meaning and applications of philosophy. The problem concerning the relationship between the theoretical and the practical has been considered from a different point of view since the18th century. Many philosophers since then have deviated from the traditional cliché of the separation between the practical and the theoretical discussing the two as intertwined concepts. This unifying view can be discovered within the Illuminationist philosophy of Sohrawardi. It portrays thought and practice in a so deeply unified consistency that practical philosophy is being born and bred from within the most theoretical part of philosophy, that is, logic. The Illumationist logic gives birth to a moral philosophy. The last part of the essay endeavors to re-construct this co-existency of logic and ethics in the Illuminative philosophy.
maryam saneapour
Abstract
The dichotomy of mind/body, and form/matter are two of most problematic questions in western philosophy, which could be retraced to ancient Greece and have been lasted until age of enlightenment. Post-modernists hold that this dualism and dichotomy are reflected in the most aspects of civilization explicitly, ...
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The dichotomy of mind/body, and form/matter are two of most problematic questions in western philosophy, which could be retraced to ancient Greece and have been lasted until age of enlightenment. Post-modernists hold that this dualism and dichotomy are reflected in the most aspects of civilization explicitly, and that, the I/Other dualism is a sequence of it. Thus, the philosophical contrasting between mind/body, and form/matter should be a subject of our thinking. The resolution of the mind/body dualism is sought based on the Sadrian unity of being, in this paper. The employed method is dialectics and communicational and it is tried to find and advanced a resolution of the mind/body dualism in a intercultural philosophy space, with an eye on Sadrian philosophy. Mulla Sadra’s resolution to this problem is explained from two points of view; from an ontological viewpoint, resolve mind/body problem is possible by imagination world intermediating. From a epistemological viewpoint, resolve mind/body problem is possible by imagination faculty intermediating, as well. Mulla Sadra also look into soul intermediating for pushing mind and body into a kind of unity.
Asadollah Fallahi
Abstract
Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī has authored two logical books Qisṭās al-afkār and its self-commentary Sharḥ al-Qisṭās, both of which have two versions on ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions, which seem to be due to the change of Samarkandi's logical opinions about ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions. ...
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Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī has authored two logical books Qisṭās al-afkār and its self-commentary Sharḥ al-Qisṭās, both of which have two versions on ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions, which seem to be due to the change of Samarkandi's logical opinions about ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions. In the first versions of both the books, the relations between the propositions are mere implication (ʿumūm wa khuṣūṣ muṭlaq), but in the second version, the relations change to denial of implication (ʿumūm wa khuṣūṣ min wajhin). Also, in the first version, Samarqandī presents a universal rule (ḍābiṭ) for taking conclusions from mixed syllogisms composed of ḥaqīqī and khārijī propositions. Indeed, the second version can be seen as correcting the first version. In this paper, we shall show that even though Samarqandī’s attempt corrected some faults in the first version, it leaves some others uncorrected. In addition, there are new objections to the second version which would not been forwarded to the first version. Therefore, none of the first and second versions provides a correct and complete analysis of the mixing of the categorical khārijī, ḥaqīqī and mental propositions.
Hooman Mohammad Ghorbanian
Abstract
In his famous 1985 article “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”, Lewis Carroll offers a regress that suggests that we could never reach the conclusion of a deductive argument. Here, by reviewing Corine Besson`s article, we discuss a solution for his puzzle by suggesting that we should consider ...
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In his famous 1985 article “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles”, Lewis Carroll offers a regress that suggests that we could never reach the conclusion of a deductive argument. Here, by reviewing Corine Besson`s article, we discuss a solution for his puzzle by suggesting that we should consider logical principles as dispositions that guide us in our mental movements; logical principles, in this way, are not some sort of beliefs that represents facts. In articulating this solution, Besson uses a theory in the philosophy of ethics that considers moral judgments as non-cognitive mental states. In logical non-cognitivism, logic is a handbook for deducing. Also, according to logical internalism, non-propositional rules of logic are enough to entail the conclusion and there is no need to add other premises to the argument. Logical expressivism is an approach in the epistemology of logic that regards logic as a self-sufficient knowledge and as a prerequisite for any rational activity.
Keywords: Lewis Carroll, cognitive states, logical non-cognitivism, logical internalism, logical expressivism. Corine Besson.
Abbas khosravibizhaem; Mohammad Saeedimehr; seyyd ali alamolhoda; Gholamhossein khedri
Abstract
Extended AbstractIntroductionA model for the epistemology of religious belief is Zagzebski’s virtue epistemology. It evaluates religious beliefs in terms of intellectual virtues such as understanding, wisdom (phronesis), and doxastic characters. A belief is stable and valid if its subject possesses ...
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Extended AbstractIntroductionA model for the epistemology of religious belief is Zagzebski’s virtue epistemology. It evaluates religious beliefs in terms of intellectual virtues such as understanding, wisdom (phronesis), and doxastic characters. A belief is stable and valid if its subject possesses intellectual virtues. We might embark on evaluating religious beliefs, particularly monotheism, God’s existence, and His attributes based on virtue renderings of intuitions and illuminations. Intuitions and illuminations are processes through which one achieves rational flourishing in light of wisdom. Both Suhrawardī and Zagzebski draw on intellectual virtues, particularly wisdom, to account for religious beliefs. In such an evaluation, instead of beliefs, believers are evaluated. Zagzebski’s account gives way to two readings: in terms of understanding and in terms of wisdom. This article deals with the role of wisdom in evaluating religious beliefs. This reading might be thought of as a version of Suhrawardī’s view of religious beliefs, particularly the belief in God. In a recapitulation of his view, Suhrawardī insists that attainment of genuine knowledge is enabled through theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom, intuitions and revelations, and possession of moral and intellectual virtues (Suhrawardī 1993, vol. 2; also see Zagzebski 1996, 1993a, 1993b, 2000, 2011). There has been research on religious beliefs in Iran in the last decade, but none of these studies has talked about the rationality of religious belief in the light of wisdom with all its aspects and independently. Therefore, the present research is novel in this connection, and its main contribution is its discussion of the virtue of wisdom according to Suhrawardī and Zagzebski.MethodThe method of this research is descriptive-analytic. It is based on Lakatos’s research program. The research is focused on wisdom and its role in choosing beliefs. Its positive strategy is the epistemic authority of the self and others in choosing beliefs, and its negative strategy is the critique of rival theories such as radical fideism and strong rationalism. Results and Discussion This article begins with an overview of the epistemic foundations of Suhrawardī and Zagzebski:(a) Intellectual virtues as modeled upon virtue ethics, (b) rational faculties or powers are not the only belief-forming powers. Indeed, moral faculties or powers play a reciprocal role in the formation and reception of beliefs, (c) an epistemic subject has both epistemic and moral duties, (d) just as we have an epistemic trust in our own rational and moral faculties, we have an epistemic trust in other people, (e) the will or motivation to attain the truth is as relevant to moral virtues as it is to intellectual virtues, (f) giving up on the scientific-empirical model of epistemology and tuning to the specialized model of religious epistemology, (g) extension of objects of religious beliefs from propositional to non-propositional facts, (h) taking into consideration the external and internal dimensions of knowledge-conferring character of non-epistemic factors in attainment of genuine knowledge, (i) special consideration of wisdom in reception of genuine knowledge, instead of explanation or justification of beliefs. A wise person is one who possesses moral and intellectual virtues, through which he or she decide under certain circumstances what is the right thing to believe or to do. Intuitions are crucial to the process of attaining wisdom. A wise person deploys intuitions, particularly rational intuitions, to make proper decisions about accepting or denying a belief or act.ConclusionThere have been different versions of rational evaluation and stability of religious beliefs, including foundationalism, coherentism, and fideism. What matters is that the believer possesses moral and intellectual virtues to attain the beliefs that are proper to wise people. To take a wise person as a role model can pave the path for attainment of valid beliefs. In their virtue-theoretic framework, Suhrawardī and Zagzebski propose that a wise person, possessing spiritual virtues, is a superior model for those who seek genuine knowledge so that they can attain wisdom. Both Suhrawardī and Zagzebski begin with reflective reasons, and then turn to theoretical reasons. The highest degree of belief in monotheism, God’s existence, and His attributes can be attained in light of wisdom.
Philosophy
Nafiseh Nojaba; Mahdi Qiasvand
Abstract
Abstract IntroductionContemporary models of "specific divine actions", mostly and regardless of differences, have shaken with three metaphysical commitments, namely "The incompatibility of the divine act and the act of nature", "God's non-intervention" and also "the prescriptiveness of the ...
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Abstract IntroductionContemporary models of "specific divine actions", mostly and regardless of differences, have shaken with three metaphysical commitments, namely "The incompatibility of the divine act and the act of nature", "God's non-intervention" and also "the prescriptiveness of the laws of nature". What the following paper examines among these assumptions, is the first commitment or assumption. Neo-Thomism poses a serious challenge to the premises of incompatibilism within the frame of contemporary scientific theories and the only solution is to present alternative model. Nevertheless, the duality of nature and the supernatural as a common facet of compatibilism and incompatibilism is a berrier to both models providing a plausible explanation. Although, neo-Thomism s argument about longitudinal God–nature relationship fails to meet all expectations and they are faced with the dilemma between Deism and the denial of non-divine agency. Breaking the ontological boundaries between nature and the supernatural, there seem to be a possible solution to the dilemma. It seems monistic approach of Sadra developed two systems of unity “Tashkiky” and “Shakhsi” can be a solution to this problem. Thus, this essay examines Sadra argument to address the problem arised by “compatibilism” approach. MethodThis article is written in a descriptive-analytical method based on Mulla Sadra's principles.Results and DiscussionIn what follows, to address the issue by relying on Sadra s argument, firstly, double causality, causal closure and the difficulty of explanation of the supernatural effect on nature which makes difficult to explain “special divine action” in the frame of “compatibilism” approach, will be analysed. Sadra theory and Thomistic view have tried to solve the problem through rejecting causal duality, that is, they deny the adequacy of physical causes. The possibility of the supernatural effect on nature by excluding the ontological aspects between them is one of the significant components provided by this paper. Given the key role of the concept of “existence” and “essence” in Sadra and Thomistic view in explanation of the supernatural and nature, by appealing to different versions of Sadra s argument about “Asalat al-wujud” and Thomistic view, analysis of the relationships between these two concepts has been done. Finally, it is argued that the dualistic approach of Thomistic view and one of the version of “Asalat al-wujud” which is the identity of “existence” and “essence” fail to prove the possibility of the effect of the supernatural on nature. However, there are two other versions of “Asala al-wujud” can provide the solution to this problem.ConclusionWhat is suggested in this paper is only to show the power of Sadra s theory in breaking of the ontological boundaries between nature and Supernatural. Even two systems of “tashkiky unity” and “shakhsi unity” support this possibility. To solve the problem of “special divine action” through the breaking of the ontological aspects requires to be committed to components such as, the adequacy of the natural sciences, the laws of nature and noninterventionism commitment.
Mahmood Joneidi Jafari; Sayyed Said Jalali
Volume 3, Issue 1 , September 2012, , Pages 55-74
Abstract
In search for the roots and causes of Arab world undevelopment Al-Jaberi criticizes religious discourses and their philosophical elements and points to the age of establishment as the initiation and decline spot of Arabic-Islamic civilization. The age of establishment is a period in which Islamic wisdom ...
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In search for the roots and causes of Arab world undevelopment Al-Jaberi criticizes religious discourses and their philosophical elements and points to the age of establishment as the initiation and decline spot of Arabic-Islamic civilization. The age of establishment is a period in which Islamic wisdom was formed based on text of the Holy Quran in the framework of different Islamic philosophies (Religious Rational Concepts) along with unreligious philosophical systems (Foreign Rational Concepts). From the Al-Jaberi’s point of view epistemic internal systems based on religious rational concepts are the outcome of Sunni scholar’s scientific jihad and other epistemic external systems are represented by Shiites and/ or other denominations. From a geographical view he also describes a distinction between the Arabic west and east. He considers the initiatives of sheer Islamic reason and philosophy to root in the west of the Arabic-Islamic world and relates eclectic philosophies and foreign unreligious conceptual systems to Iran or east of the Arabic world. He claims that the answer to the question of Arabic decline is to get rid of ideologies and philosophies of the east of Arabic world and to join the sheer wisdom of the west Arab world especially that of the Ibn Rushd: 6th to 8th Hijra centuries. This paper criticizes the foretold dogma of argue against Shiite school of thought as part of the existent discourses in domain of Islamic world and rules out his refutation of Islamic scientific and philosophical realities .
hossin soheili; godratoallah khayatian; azim hamzeian; hamed masjedsaraie
Abstract
Mirza Javad Tehrani is one of the greatest critics of the theory of the originality of existence in contemporary times. In total, he has criticized eleven arguments for the authenticity of existence. This descriptive-analytic method aims to assess its critical point of view in the face of these arguments. ...
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Mirza Javad Tehrani is one of the greatest critics of the theory of the originality of existence in contemporary times. In total, he has criticized eleven arguments for the authenticity of existence. This descriptive-analytic method aims to assess its critical point of view in the face of these arguments. Investigations show that Mirza Javad has used two main approaches in criticizing the originality principles: First, the invalidation of the proof of the authenticity of existence through the proving of the use of the distant and confiscating the desirable in them. After evaluations it turns out that this approach has been effective in eight arguments. Second, the annulment of the evidence of the originality of the existence from the way of the perception of my nature as the concept of nature. For this reason, he committed the three arguments incorrectly. Therefore, contrary to the common view, many of the evidence presented to prove the originality of existence is not a valid argument.
